countervailing powers was to be held accountablernby the consent of the governed,rnand whose right to rule over us wernwould be socialized over time to acceptrnwithout question.rnConsent stands, therefore, as the cardinalrnmeasure of democracy. In thernwords of John Adams, “As the happinessrnof the people is the sole end of government,rnso the consent of the people is thernonly foundation of it.” In no area is thisrnmore valid than in the employment ofrnmilitary force. To the Founders, therncommitment of troops to prospectivernhostilities was war; and war was to be accompanied,rnif not preceded, by a constitutionallyrnprescribed congressional declarationrnrepresenting the will of thernpeople, whose blood and treasure werernon the line.rnPostmodern politicians realize, ofrncourse, what the Founders did not: war isrnwar only if you call it that. If you call it arnpolice action, a counterinsurgency, or arnpeace operation—and if, moreover, yournreplace citizen-soldiers with volunteerrnregulars and create standing “emergency”rnlegislation to routinize the call-up ofrnreservists—you can sacrifice the sons andrndaughters of the patriotic, trusting littlernpeople at will without their consent.rnAnd Congress and the Supreme Courtrnwill look the other way. Small wonderrnthat non-wars have claimed more thanrn350,000 United States casualties sincern1945.rnWe willfully sublimated our powers ofrnconsent during the Cold War to the criesrnof urgency and imminent danger. Wernwere thereby complicit in institutionalizingrnand legitimizing the technocratic oligarchyrnthat now reigns in this country,rnmasquerading as the ideal democracy wernpretend to have.rnAbsent the Cold War conditions thatrnseemed then to rationalize such civicrnsurrender, the only defensible justificationrnnow for consent to give way to moreor-rnless unchecked presidential unilateralismrnin matters of war and peace might berna President who holds a bona fide electoralrnmandate from the people—^and hasrna demonstrated record of competence inrninternational affairs. President Clinton,rnhaving ascended to office with only 43rnpercent of the popular vote—24 percentrnof the overall voting-age population andrn18 percent of the total populace—commandsrnnothing approaching such a mandate.rnA Congress, therefore, that wouldrnforsake its obligation to the people and tornthe Constitution by giving a free hand tornsuch a President—especially one whosernadministration’s strategic maladroitnessrnand military illiteracy have been so palpablern—is complicit in perpetuating thernimperialization of the presidency andrnthereby opening the way for the sort ofrnexecutive tyranny our forebears sought tornescape.rnFaced with a continuation of this staternof affairs—where our own governmentrnneither hears nor seeks our consent inrnthe gravest of matters—^we will be left tornask how literally we should interpret therninjunction in our Declaration of Independence:rn”That whenever any Form ofrnGovernment becomes destructive ofrnthese ends [of securing the natural rightsrnof the people through government basedrnon the consent of the governed], it is thernRight [and duty] of the People to alter orrnto abolish it.” If we descend to thatrnpoint, we will then realize just howrnpyrrhic—and, by contrast, meaninglessrn—our Cold War victory was.rnGregory D. Foster is a professor at thernNational Defense University inrnWashington. The views expressed herernare his own.rnClinton andrnthe TroopsrnbyA.f. Bacevichrna l i m angry. I’d like to ask PresidentrnClinton why is my dad dead? Andrnwhat are we doing fighting in Bosniarnin the first place?” Coming from the 15-rnyear-old son of Sergeant First Class DonaldrnA. Dugan, the first operational fatalityrnof the United States intervention inrnBosnia, those questions command respect.rnBut the)’ are the last questions thernClinton White House wants to hear.rnWith Bill Clinton’s much-hypedrnBosnia trip earlier in the year, the President’srnrelations with the military seemedrnto turn the corner. Although the triprncame and went without consequence, itrnsucceeded as a Kodak moment, producingrnas its chief legacy widely reprintedrnimages of a grinning Commander-in-rnChief enthusiastically embracing andrnbeing embraced by “the troops.” To thernextent that any public gesture by anyrnpolitician can be considered genuine,rnthe President in these photos appears tornbe genuinely enjoying himself. Indeed,rnour journalists reported that for the firstrntime in his presidency, Mr. Clintonrnseemed relaxed and comfortable whenrnventuring onto the military’s own turf.rnBut to attribute any significance to arnskillfully staged photo-op would be anrnerror. Indeed, more than is usually therncase, the image of Clinton surroundedrnby excited young soldiers is misleading.rnIt further obfuscates a civil-military relationshiprnfreighted with contradictionsrnthat most government officials, journalists,rnand scholars seem determined to ignore.rnClinton’s Bosnia visit did not markrnsome great reconciliation between soldiersrnand the former antiwar protesterrnwho now issues their orders. Rather, itrnwas an elaborate exercise in role-playing.rnClinton slipped into the routine withrnwhich he is most comfortable: the ebullientrncampaigner. Pressing the flesh inrnTuzla, he behaved precisely as he wouldrnhave in Dubuque or Denver. The youngrnAmericans assembled for the occasionrnresponded less as soldiers paying obeisancernto their political chief than as fansrnreacting to the arrival of a celebrity visitingrnfrom afar. They would have donernmuch the same for Tom Hanks or TomrnBrokaw.rnYet if largely instinctive, such politicalrntheater is also profoundly ironic. Whereasrnthe military that a draft-eligible Clintonrnonce professed to “loathe” as alien tornthe nation’s ideals was in fact composedrnlargely of conscripts, “the troops” withrnwhom Clinton now strives to identifyrnhimself are without exception volunteers,rnpart of a force that self-consciouslyrnstyles even its most junior members asrn”professionals” and that emphasizes arncultural identity that sets it apart fromrnthe rest of society.rnNo doubt the distinction is one tornwhich Clinton would prefer to remainrnoblivious. But it deserves emphasis. Indeed,rnthe gap between what this militaryrnprofesses to be and the imagery commonlyrnemployed to describe it lies at thernheart of America’s unacknowledgedrnproblem with civil-military relations.rnThe tradition of the citizen-soldierrnresonates powerfully among Americans.rnAnd with good reason: citizen-soldiersrnachieved victory in two world wars thisrncentury, stood the long watch against thernWarsaw Pact, and endured the misery ofrnKorea and Vietnam. At home, a militaryrnestablishment based on the citizen-soldierrnhelped bind together a racially andrn40/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn