Granting EVD to Salvadorans and Nicaraguans on thenbasis of economic hardship would be an extremely dangerousnprecedent given the economic and demographic projectionsnfor the Third World. Calling such a measure “temporary”nstretches cynicism even beyond normal congressionalnstandards. If we grant these people “temporary” legal status,nwe can count on them going home around the same timenNew Yorkers with rent-controlled apartments start payingnfair-market rents. <§>nDONALD DEVINEnPresident, Donald Devine Company,-nManagement ConsultantsnThe argument against mass immigration is that thenadmission of non-Anglo entrants into the UnitednStates will eventually undermine its culture. The fact thatnthis argument makes a good deal of intuitive sense meansnthat it cannot be dismissed by a simple appeal to emotion. Inmust admit my first reaction was that this Irishman wouldnnot be here today if the argument’s implications werenenforced earlier in history; but, clearly, that is not a sufficientnresponse.nThe more scientific way is to test the assumption of thenargument: what has the admission of non-Anglos done tonthe culture? Almost two decades ago, I wrote a book—ThenPolitical Culture of the United States — that investigated thenviability of that culture. Both the more impressionisticnevidence and the empirical data yielded the conclusion thatnthe culture has been maintained relatively intact over timenand that mass immigration has not undermined the valuenconsensus originally developed from English (not “British,”na relatively recent artifice) roots.nCulture was defined as the determining set of beliefs andninstitutions for a nation, and the American core values werenidentified as: national identity/patriotism, trust in neighbor,nlove of family, liberty, moral equality before the law,nproperty, achievement, belief in God, religion, altruism,nparliamentary rule, and decentralized politics — all basicallynderived from English culture during the colonial period. Tonthese, the Founders only had to add federalism, a formalnseparation of powers and democratic elections.nPolitical Culture analyzed all public opinion polls takenn18/CHRONICLESnnnbetween the birth of polling in 1935 and 1970 andnconcluded that Americans, across all population subgroupings,nhad supported the values of the culture throughout thisnperiod. Using earlier, less empirical sources back to Tocquevillenled to the same conclusion. The poll data were retestedn(somewhat less rigorously) in 1976, 1982, and 1990 withnsimilar results.nClearly, there are many problems in measuring supportnfor culture from polls. Yet the fact that Americans fromnmany different backgrounds give at least verbal approval tonthese values oyer this long period of time demonstrates somencontinuing level of cultural support. To be sure, there arensome differences among groups in support for these values,nbut the fact that, generally, all major groups give widenapproval to them all gives even stronger confirmation.nSome values did register lower levels of support over time.nThe ideal number of children in the home dropped, and thenacceptability of divorce increased. But even here, the idealnmedian has gone down from three children to two, and thendivorce rate has stabilized since 1980. Plus, the decline itselfnhas not come prirnarily from among immigrants — indeed,nquite the reverse.nWhile there are lower levels of support from ethnicngroups on some values, these same groups tend to havenhigher support for some of the other values in our culture.nFor example, African-Americans give significantly lowernlevels of support for property and (some of the) familynvalues, but give higher support to religion. Hispanics registernlower in support for liberty, but much higher in support ofnthe family. Among those competing values it is difficult tonsay which are the more important. F.A. Hayek, for example,ngives roughly equal status to the need in a free society for anreligious moral code, strong families, and support fornproperty.nInterestingly, when the relatively lower support for certainnvalues by some ethnic groups is compared to levels in othernnations — as measured by a National Opinion ResearchnCenter 1987 poll of seven nations — American minorityngroups are much more supportive of even private propertynthan the center of Anglo culture itself. Great Britain, to saynnothing about Ireland and most of the other nations.nThe available data simply do not give reason for concernnabout declining American values as a result of massnimmigration. Yes, there should be concern about the declinenof the family, and perhaps about a weaker commitment tonsome of the other values mentioned above, but the declinenseems more related to wider social problems — such as anwelfare policy that undermines the family, and schools thatndo not teach values — rather than to problems resultingnfrom immigration.nA good argument can be made for the proposition thatnimmigrants are more supportive of traditional Americannvalues than most groups in the population, includingnespecially the cultural and political elite. There is nonevidence for concern about Hispanic immigration. The factnthat Latin American countries do not work is much morenplausibly the result of their institutions than their values. Itnmay be miraculous that any immigrant group supportsnAmerican values, given the virtual onslaught against themnby the media, but in fact they do. How long they willncontinue to do so without a better defense of the culture byn