of Maryland Professor MancurnOlson. In it, Olson addresses ankey riddle of modern macroeconomicnstudy: Why and howndo nations grow? Why, fiirthermore,ndoes one nation outstripnanother or grow faster in one agenthan in another? Olson puts forthnwhat is essentially a more pessimisticneconomic restatement ofnMadison’s £imous vea&iFecleraUstnessay. In modem democratic industrializednsocieties, specialinterestnorganizations—in Madison’snphrase, fections—^naturallynarise. These interest groups—nlabor unions, professional societies,nmanufecturing lobbiesnand cartels—^have goals that arenlargely inconsistent with sound,nhealthy economic expansion.nEach group can protect the gainsnit has won for its members onlynby restricting the entry of domesticnand foreign competitorsnand by inhibiting those upsettingnfactors that make an economynflexible, dynamic, and resourcefiil.nIn Olson’s words, “institutionalnsclerosis” sets in, and thencountry stagnates.nOlson is careful to say that henis not putting forward a “monocausal”nexplanation for whyneconomies wax and wane. Henalso gives generous credit to thencatch-up model, in which ancountry with large potential forngrowth—South Korea or the defeatednAxis powers—will generallyngrow fester than those whichnhave already industrialized—nGreat Britain or the United States.nPerhaps the most startling corollarynof Olson’s thesis is that extendednpolitical stability andnliberalism are precisely the correctningredients for creating ansocial atmosphere in whichnsclerosis-inducing groups cannflourish. Great Britain has beennlargely hurt by the solidity of itsninstitutions and the generallyntemperate and evolutionary naturenof its politics. Olson bravelynconfronts this implication of hisnidea:nThe contradiction is betweenna8inChronicles of Culturenthe desire for stability andnpeace and the desire to realizenour fall economic potential.nFor those, like this writer,nwho are so devoted to democraticnfreedoms and peacenthat they would retain themnat the cost of all furtherngrowth, this is a disturbingnfinding. To some degree, thencontradiction is inescapablenin that there is no way tonavoid it entirely.nThe remainder of the booknconsists of essays by other economistsnwho evaluate Olson’sntheory and apply it to the experiencenof England, France, Germany,nItaly, and Switzerland.nIronically, the most impressivenof these essays is by Moses Abramovitz,nwho casts serious doubtsnon some of the central tenets ofnOlson’s thesis. Abramovitz rejectsnOlson’s contention thatnlong eras of political stabilitynnecessarily strengthen specialinterestnorganizations and questionsnthe converse assumptionnthat political revolutions, likenRoosevelt’s New Deal or the Mlnof Vichy France, inevitablynweaken such groups.nSome of the contributors get intonregression analysis and questionsnof “statistical significance”nthat are rather abstruse. The casenstudies generally wind down tonconclusions that “more research isnneeded.” Two Marxist-orientednessays condemning the wholenpremise of Olson’s essay act asncomic relief One is frustratinglynreminded at times of HarrynTrumait’s complaint that if younlined up all the economists endnto end, they would still all pointnin different directions. Still, thenattempt is provocative. Olson’snessay and a summarizing piecenby editor Dennis C. Mueller shownthat economists can be sensitivento how messy real life is andnremain economists. Followingnin James Madison’s footsteps,neven 200 years late, is a notablenand impressive intellectualnaccomplishment. DnWiU Without a WaynGeorge F. Will: Statecraft asnSoulcraft: What GovernmentnDoes; Simon & Schuster; New York.nLike a medical expert who isnpxjpular among tobacco lobbyists,na conservative pundit lionizednby liberals seems suspect GeorgenWill is such an enigma: the authornof a recent cover feature defendingnthe welfare state for ThenNew Republic; Will is the EasternnEstablishment’s fevorite conservative,nthe token Tory invited tonfijshionable salons and editorialnoffices. Nonetheless, the trenchantncriticism Will levels at liberalismnin Statecraft as Soulcraftnshould allay any fears that he hasndefected to the other side. Likenother conservatives. Will blamesnthe amoral egalitarianism ofn”equal rights grounded in… commonnpassions” preached by liberalnmodernity for “the collapse ofnstandards” in contemporary society.nUnfortunately, for all his professednconcern for “moral community,”nWill disdains the companynof other conservatives, atnleast living American ones,nadopting a superciUous moreconservative-than-thountone asnhe ejqxjunds his “‘European’ conservatism”ndrawn largely fromnBurke. This haughty dismissal ofnthe American right is doubflessnone reason for his popularitynamong liberals. After he informsnnnhis liberal readers in the firstnchapter that “there are almost nonconservatives, properly understood,”nthey can only be amusednwhen he announces in the thirdnchapter a “conservative counterattack”naimed at reorienting government:nan army consisting ofnone arrogant general may be entertaiiunent,nbut it’s no seriousnthreat. Even if Will could musternsome troops liberals would havenlittle to fear, for his batde plan isnso hopelessly vague as to leavenwholly clouded in doubt wherenthe columns should be deployednand how they should advance.nThus he upbraids conservatismnfor its alleged feilure “to engagenitself with the way we live now,”nand yet he refuses to dirty hisnhands by leaving a “high level ofngenerality” which says litde aboutnwhat is needed in America today.nOn the one point that Will isnvery clear, that the governmentnis the key to American wellbeing,nhe again strikes a chordnsure to evoke sympathy amongnhberals, since they dominatenthat institution and ever seek itsnenlargement. He justifiably excoriatesnUberals, though, for Mingnto apply government ton”moral husbandry” or “soulcraft,”na task Will believes “politicsnshould share . . . with religion.”nSurely, government can andnshould “legislate morality,” asnWill posits, but it can do so efifectivelynonly by reinforcing perceptionsnalready developed bynreligion. However, Will does notnunderstand religion in America,neither past or present. He thusnunfeirly truncates the thought ofnthe Foimding Fathers, largely ignoringntheir deep and publicncommitment to God as he indictsnthem for our present moral crisesnbecause they stooped “to thenlangu^e of’interest'” in framingnthe Constitution. Apparendy be-nUeving that it somehow illuminatesnour present circumstancesn