if a crisis in the Middle East had requirednU.S. intervention in the 1960’s, thenstandard-issue combat rifle for Americanntroops would have to have performednproperly in these climates as well as innVietnam.nFallows castigates several Senators,nboth of the left and of the right, for theirn1980 debate on chemical warfare. Bothnsides talked only about the horrors of ornthe need for nerve gas. Neither, says Fallows,ndiscussed the only sensible soludon:na nonlethal knockout gas couplednwith antigas suits for troops. Once more,nthe essential point can be grasped by anyonenconversant with military reality: ifnthe Soviets were to use lethal gas, our usenof a nonlethal gas against them would beninadequate. Only our capacity to usenlethal gas against them would be an adequatendeterrent to their initiation of itsnuse against us. Fallows’s tour through defensenpolicy, then, is somewhat like thatnof the stereotypical American touristnthrough the museums and palaces of oldnEurope. He has a good time and henlearns something; but to those who arenfamiliar with the subject, he is an objectnof ridicule.nFallows is on much firmer ground onnthe relatively nontechnical aspects of defense,nespecially in his critique of the volunteernarmy and of what he calls then”managerial view” of the military, annapproach that applies the methods ofnGeneral Motors to the armed forces. Fallowsnargues that the replacement of traditionalnmilitary styles by managerialismnignores the realides of war and the necessarilynheirarchical, authoritarian naturenof military organization. The managerialnrevolution in the military has led to inappropriateneducation for military officers,nerrors in training and recruitment, careerismnand the erosion of the martialnspirit. Fallows’s discussion of the resultingnproblems is by far his best chapter,nbut he fails to appreciate that this revolutionnhas been promoted by the samenliberalizing influences that he elsewherendefends. It was, after all, not George S.nPatton or Douglas MacArthur who promotednthe managerial approach to war.nbut Robert MacNamara and his entouragenof technocrats. The motives of thisnapproach were partly a desire for more efficiencynand partly a libertarian and egalitariannhostility to the discipline and deferencenthat alone make military life andnwar possible and bearable.nFallows fails to understand that thenrestoration of traditional military stylesnwould necessarily involve the justificatonnof some very antiliberal values and, indeed,na certain glorification of war itselfn—the comradeship, the heroism, thensense of victory and what Patton himselfncalled “the cataclysmic ecstasy of conflict.”nTo be sure, to defend these thingsnin the military does not mean theynshould be defended or applied outsidenit, but if civilians are to think well of traditionalnmilitary values, there must be angood deal more appreciation of authority,ndiscipline, hierarchy and self-sacrificenthan now exists.nVjertain conceptual lacunae exist innFallows’s book, the result of his ambiguousnadherence to liberal ideology. Thenprincipal gap is his inability to make anfirm connection between the technicalnneeds of defense and the social and moralnfabric of the society defended. Fallows isnonly vaguely aware of this connection,nand what wisdom the book containsnarises from his occasional awareness. Anmore profound understanding mightnhave enabled him to see the range ofntechnical and budgetary problems henidentifies as reflective of the failure ofncontemporary orthodoxies to recognizenthe nature of social reality. The ideologynof management, the denigration of selfsacrifice,nthe universalization of economicnand rationalistic models in allnspheres of life—these are hardly peculiarnnnto the American military establishment.nThey pervade contemporary America,nand they are drawn from and justified byncontemporary liberal doctrine. The realnfault of American conservatives in thendebate over national defense is not thatnthey are hypocrites blind to wastefulnessnbut that they do not generally perceiventhe cultural roots of many contemporarynfailures in defense and military policies.nThe dominant ideology among conservativesnin America today is a naive faithnin economic solutions: more developmentnwill thwart revolution in the ThirdnWorld; a freer market and economicnprogress will resolve racial tensions innAmerica; more spending will lead to anstronger defense; economic sanctionsnwill be effective against communist andnterrorist aggressors. There is little qualitativendifference between these ideas onnthe right and corresponding ones on thenleft—except that the right generally prefersnbusiness as an instrument of progress,nand the left turns to government.nFallows’s book, then, is not significantnfor the novelty of its ideas and conclusionsnbut rather for its primary conceptualnfault. It betrays an ambiguity in thencontemporary liberal mind, whichnstumblingly perceives its own inadequaciesnbut as yet has failed to come to gripsnwith the source of these shortcomings.nFallows recognizes the value of authoritynand the need for a better motivation thannenlightened self-interest, and this verynrecognition should lead him to a view ofnman and society similar to that of modernnconservatism. That this tension betweennperception and ideology exists innthe liberal mind today (Fallows is notnalone in his ambivalence) is cause fornhope that it may lead to a larger and truernview of society on the left (in which case itnwill become right). The fact that manynconservatives are now congratulatingnthemselves on their political victories,ntheir well-funded organizations, theirnaccess to high-level officials and their essentiallynmaterialist ideology of economicnsalvation is a disappointment, an ominousnsign of their failure to understandntheir original mission. Dn^^^^miUnMay June 1982n