was to be any hope of an independentnPoland. People understood that they hadnto do something for themselves, if theninternational promise of the independencenof Poland was to have any bite.nBut something deeper than politicalnconsideration showed itself in thenfighting—something much like the experiencenDjilas describes but withoutnhis guilt: the insurgents themselves didnnot expect the strength that came overnthem in the sixty-three days they foughtntwenty-one thousand German troops.nJust this heroism which surprised everybody,nincluding the insurgents, putnGreat Britain and the United Statesnon the spot.nZawodny argues the final decisionsnabout Poland were already made in ansecret meeting between Stalin andnRoosevelt at Tehran in December, 1943.nIn fact, all through 1944 Poland wasnmuch on Churchill’s and Great Britain’snmind. The discussions betweennChurchill and Roosevelt and the Londonngovernment and their negotiations withnStalin about Poland all through 1944nand in early 1945 at Yalta are as importantnas the story of fighting in thenstreets of Warsaw. Zawodny’s tendencynto treat the Warsaw uprising not as anpart of the history of Europe but asnlocal history, and his awkwardness innliving with his own former courage,ncomes because he does not seek tonunderstand why the courage in Warsawncame to nothing in the negotiations.nJ. he story of the international negotiationsnis more painful and shameful—nbecause it tells of the greater difficultynand greater rarity of courage in negotiation,nespecially in dealings amongnfriends (between Churchill and Roosevelt),nthan in battle. For had Churchillnbeen able to get through to Roosevelt,nGreat Britain and the United Statesnwould have been able to cope with Stalin.nChurchill did not fool himself about thensignificance of events in Warsaw. Henknew and frequently said that what becamenof Poland would decide the peace.nHe wanted to restore an internationaln10nChronicles of Culturensystem of legitimate governments —nwithout, however, speaking of eithernlegitimacy or restoration—which explainsnhis failure.nChurchill wanted immediately toncome to the aid of the insurgents, butnStalin refused landing rights to Americannand British planes on Soviet bases.nAll through the days of August and September,nChurchill struggled with thenproblem Roosevelt wished away. Onnthe twenty-fifth of August he suggestednto Roosevelt that they inform Stalinnthat they would fly missions over Warsawnand land on Soviet bases withoutnpermission. He did not move whennRoosevelt refused but said he had nonobjections to British action. On Septembern5, about a month before thenPoles actually surrendered, Rooseveltntold Churchill there was unfortunatelynnothing to be done since the fightingnPoles had left Warsaw. Finally, on Septembern10, Stalin agreed to Americannmissions to help Warsaw.nAs for Stalin, his conduct was ambiguousn: he wanted, as Churchill later putnit, to appear to help and at the samentime to make sure the noncommunistnPoles perished. On September 15 Polishndivisions in the Red Army under thencommand of General Berling crossednthe Vistula for about a week, possiblynwithout the permission of the SovietnCommand. After September 13 Sovietnpilots and Polish pilots under SovietnCommand flew many dangerous lowflyingnmissions over Warsaw. Stalin’snIn th< lonhioniTni’ ISMK of ( hmiiult <, tif ( ulluti.nOn Conscience & Related ConcernsnI’. (III I InJI’ I [ I I 11nM, li I I I I ‘ 1 I I I I, ‘I r [ InI I 1 1 I II I < I i’ I IJ I I I Inr ri’ f f I ‘i s I II 1 r r 1 _nI r iir li I , I I I I I 1 1 I 1 1 1nrlii I ‘ I 11 1 r II I Inhoin r lit ( h inns of l”ii>riinilitvn}iv 1 hdiiiiis Mulniirn’11 r II I 1 n I 1 I r Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ii r ‘n(111 I II II I I I 1 I InP . C <Ã¢â‚¬Â¢ < IX ‘ 11 I’ ‘l I 1 I,n111 I Ã¢â‚¬Â¢ U I IIniroin niLiii.jn M.ii. iThiii l> M.in Kvirunv^ II II ml I Ã¢â‚¬Â¢ I I I ‘II II I I” i’ 111 ‘ I 11 1nsnili- II’di I I ‘ I 11 I ‘i 1 Ã¢â‚¬Â¢ s li’lliiun1 iiitil ill I II r II I I I I r i<> nilnIrom In Si.
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