reliance on them for defining a wordnsuch as “democracy” is not helpfijl.nMoreover, it is odd that Mr. Fossedalnnowhere specifically includes in his understandingnof democracy the elementnof opposition, though the right or powernof opposition to an incumbent set ofnrulers is essential to most Western ideasnof freedom.nIn the second paragraph of this footnote,nMr. Fossedal tells us that “For thenpurposes of this book, where an advancenof economic or civil freedomnoccurs, even without the function of anrepresentative body, it will be equatednwith an advance of ‘democracy.'” Butnin the next paragraph he says he “willnnot be offended if readers mentallynscribble in the word ‘representative’ beforenthe word ‘democracy’ wherever itnappears throughout most of the book.”nThus, we are to assume that Mr. Fossedal’sndemocracy is representative, evennwhen there is no representation.nTo clarify further what he means,nMr. Fossedal has appended to his booknthree world maps for the years 1875,n1935, and 1988 to show the ebb andnflow of democracy across the globe,nrather like those old advertisements fornSherman’s paint. The first map showsnPanama and Yugoslavia as nondemocracies,nthough neither state existed inn1875. It also shows the whole of thencontinental United States in 1875 asnsimply “democratic,” but the US territorynof Alaska is only “partiy democratic,”nthough much of’the Western partnof the country then enjoyed preciselynthe same legal and political status asnAlaska. Great Britain also is shown asncompletely democratic in 1875, thoughnits electorate was still strictly limitednaccording to economic class and excludednabout 80 percent of the adultnmales and all women, and its landednaristocracy, established church, and hereditarynmonarchy and House of Lordsnwere then far more powerful than theynare today. In the American “democracy”nof 1875, universal suffirage for whitenmales existed in all states, though it wasnnot mandated by the Constitution, andnwomen, blacks, and Indians were notnguaranteed the vote. States determinednfor themselves who voted, senators werennot popularly elected, and direct primariesnwere virtually unknown. Few reactionariesntoday would be unhappy withnthis degree of democracy.nThe map for 1988 tells us thatn30/CHRONICLESnTaiwan and mainland China belong innthe same category of “partly democratic,”nwhich is a step ahead of SouthnAfrica, communist Ethiopia, Angola,nand Mozambique, all of which aren”undemocratic.” Zimbabwe also is classednas “undemocratic,” though on p.n203 Mr. Fossedal refers to it as an”one-party democracy.” Japan and Indianare democracies according to thenmap, while Mexico is only partly so. Innall three countries, however, there arenuniversal suffrage, more or less freendebate, and regular elections, thoughnsingle parties have dominated their governmentsnfor so long that formal rightsnof opposition are somewhat academic.nThe reader will be happy to learn thatnAlaska, still only “partly democratic”neven in 1935, has by 1988 masterednwhatever exaniinations Mr. Fossedalnput to it and taken its degree as a fullndemocracy.nWhatever democracy is and wherevernit might be, Mr. Fossedal’s book isndevoted to the thesis that its developmentneverywhere in the world shouldnbe the main (perhaps the only) goal ofnAmerican foreign policy. The bulk ofnhis volume expounds how this goal maynbe pursued—through propaganda bynthe broadcasting facilities of the USngovernment and education by the NationalnEndowment for Democracy,nthrough support for guerrilla forces, andnthrough international economic policies.nMr. Fossedal begins his book with ansalute to the Abraham Lincoln Brigadenas “an active American attempt to extendndemocracy beyond its ownnshores.” Unfortunately, as he acknowledges,nthe naifs of the Brigade soon metnthe Majors of the Palace in the shape ofnthe Comintern agents who ran thenBrigade and used it to try to subvertnSpain on behalf of Joseph Stalin. Morenfortunately, freedom in Spain was savednby the very undemocratic Geri. Franco,nwho knew political fraudulence whennhe saw it. However, the support ofnCommunist fronts does not seem tonperturb Mr. Fossedal, since he laternwrites that “the United States shouldnhave considered support for the AfricannNational Congress as eariy as 1983,”ndespite the control of the ANC and itsnterrorism by the Soviet Union and thenSouth African Communist Party. Evennif all the members of the ANC werendevoted readers of Human Events, tonsupport an armed insurgency in anoth­nnner country is an act of war. It does notnoccur to Mr. Fossedal that what he isncontemplating is unprovoked aggressionnagainst a state that has nevernthreatened the United States and innfact has been its loyal supporter sincenWorld War II.nInstead of spending his energies in thenstudy of how the United States couldnexport democracy, Mr. Fossedal mightnhave been better advised to have concentratednon pondering three fundamentalnquestions, affirmative answers tonwhich appear to be largely unexaminednpresuppositions of his book.nFirst, he might have asked whetherndemocracy is an intrinsically good formnof government. If the contemporarynUnited States is the model of democracy,nthe answer is not self-evident. Thenexpansion of the franchise in the UnitednStates has occurred in tandem with thenenlargement and centralization of thenstate, with reliance on socialist economicnpolicies, and with the systematic usenof concentrated power to uproot socialninstitutions and classes, cultural patterns,nand local and regional pluralism.nDespite the vast technological and economicnresources of the United States,nAmerican democracy is only marginallynable to protect its citizens and interestsnabroad and seems utterly incompetentnto enforce minimal standards of order atnhome. The criminal corruption of officeholders—nin Congress, the executivenbranch, and in many urban andnstate governments — is commonplace,nbut corruption in the broader sense ofnthe use of public power for private ends,nideological or material, is so routine thatnit has become an acknowledged part ofnour government.nThese disadvantages might be bearablenif democratization were accompaniednby an enlarged control of governmentalnpower at the popular level, butnthis does not seem to be the case.nDespite universal suffirage, increasednopenness in government, and morenactive participation in some public forums,nAmerican democracy is governednlargely by a permanent and only partiallynvisible elite of bureaucrats, managers,nadvisers, staff aides, technicians, andnclerks, whose role in decision making isnseldom disclosed, whose power is nevernsubjected to popular judgment, andnwhose ability to subvert, co-opt, orndeflect even the most intrepid reformersn