20 / CHRONICLESnof the social scientists who make upn”laws” about law or marriage or evennmoney. Since our mental states (byndefinition unknowable) remain “crucialnto social phenomena,” social lawsnare impossible: In order to get marriednor buy property, you and other peoplenhave to think that is what you arendoing. Enormous advances have beennmade in the study of the brain during anperiod in which psychology has becomena battlefield of dozens of warringnsects. Even so, sensible people havengenerally assumed that our mental lifenwas involved in organic functions.nEven if we had a more complete understandingnof how the brain functions,nwould we really be any furthernalong than Epicurus in solving thenproblem of free will and morality?nEpicurus, remember, formulatednthe fundamental principle of all materialistnphilosophies: that every eventnhas a material cause and, therefore, anmaterialist explanation, whether ornnot a given explanation is correct.nSetting aside the “swerve” and thenuncertainty principle, can the will benfree in a determined universe thatnincludes our mind (=brain)? WilliamnJames was troubled by the problem.nWith Samuel Johnson, he realizednthat all our reason is against, all ournexperience is for it. Flanagan thinksnthat James had the wherewithal tonsolve the problem, if only he hadnadopted a “soft determinism.” While itnis true that people cannot be heldnaccountable for past actions—theyncould not have acted otherwise—theyncan in the present choose to beginnmodifying their behavior in accordancenwith a certain ethical view of life.nEven if this began to solve the technicalnproblem of free will, it would notnget at the deeper problem of our moralnsense. Most of us behave as if somenacts were right and others wrong. Evennsoft determinism makes our consciencesninane.nIt is hard to believe Flanagan expectsnus to take him seriously. Hisn”solution” to the problem of free will isnthe Marxist formula (freedom is thenrecognition of necessity) or the reductionad absurdum oflFered by the sociobiologistnDavid Barash that “free willnmay actually be greatest when everyonenis able to behave in accordancenwith his or her inclinations.” Flanagannand Barash both adopt a form ofn”compatibilism,” which—as Searlenobserves—“denies the substance ofnfree will while maintaining its verbalnBOOKS IN BRIEF—ANTHROPOLOGYnDirections in Cognitive Anthropology; edited by Janet W.D. Dougherty; University ofnIllinois Press; Urbana. In the past 30 years, culture has been redefined by many anthropologistsnas “whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptablento . . . a society’s members.” The emphasis on knowledge has led to the creation of cognitivenanthropology, a comparatively new discipline whose range is well illustrated in this significantnvolume. Like much anthropological theory, CA is rooted in linguistics. Much of the worknconcerns folk classifications of plants or personality. More metaphysical questions areninvestigated with a good deal less success. Even great linguists like Chomsky obscure theirnpoints with jargon and pseudoscientific equations, and their disciples are even worse.nAnthropology, which can be the most humane of the social sciences, now runs the risk ofnbecoming marginalized—like phrenology or psychoanalysis. This volume contains a usefulnarticle by Roy D’Andrade on character terms and an important piece by Burgess, Kempton,nand MacLaury on color terms, refines and extends the work of Brent Berlin, Paul Kay, andnChad McDaniel, and gives hints that color terms evolve historically within a language innaccordance with the human visual system.nLaw and Order in the New Guinea Highlands: Encounters With Enga by Robert J. Gordonnand Mervyn J. Meggitt; University Press of VermontAJniversity Press of New England;nHanover and London. The breakdown in law and order is an urgent national problem, innNew Guinea. Approaches to the problem usually focus on official agencies and are flawed bynromanticization of the past. Gordon and Meggitt offer exemplary fieldwork, a seriousncriticism of Marxist-dominated theory, and a hardheaded grasp of the practical problemsnfacing an emerging nation. In sum, an excellent piece of “applied anthropology.”nTestament to the Bushman by Laurens van der Post and Jane Taylor; Viking Penguin; NewnYork. A touching tribute in words and photographs to the most-scrutinized primitives in thenworld. The peculiar success of the film The Gods Must Be Crazy creates a natural market fornthis readable exercise in amateur ethnography—a spin-off of a TV series.nnnshell.” Searle has the great merit ofnconfessing his inability to reconcilenfree will and determinism. With somenreluctance, he opts for complete determinism,neven though “evolution hasngiven us a form of experience of voluntarynaction where the experience ofnfreedom, that is to say, the experiencenof the sense of alternative possibilities,nis built into the very structure of conscious,nvoluntary, intentional humannbehavior.” Searle falls back on determinismnbecause he thinks it makesnscience possible. If the will were free,nit would mean that there was a selfncapable of interfering with the coursesnof physical laws.nBut it is not obvious that science isnpossible in a determinist universe,nwhere, as Mary Worthy Montagu expressednit, “We are no more free agentsnthan the Queen of Clubs when shentakes the Knave of Hearts.” It is an oldnproblem, as old as Plato and Augustine,nbut it is worth stating again (asnC.S. Lewis did in Miracles). If all ournthoughts—including the thoughts ofnscientists—are determined by the unreasoningnforces and particles of nature,nthen how can notions liken”truth” or “falsity” have any substancenor relevance? If John Searle’s decisionnto become a determinist has been determined,nthen what possible differencencan it make? Some scientists takenrefuge in the notion that our brainsnhave evolved to have a certain “fit”nwith the material world.nIn From Athens to Jerusalem (annexpanded version of his 1982 GiffordnLectures) Stephen Clark makes whatnshould be the obvious point that “thenneo-Darwinian account of our historynis not one that we can coherentlynbelieve,” because it is self-refuting:nIf we attempt to follow throughnits implications we find that itngives us no right to believe innthe theories we form about thenworld, including the neo-nDarwinian story itself. It mustnalso lead to doubts about thenconsciousness of our fellowncreatures, and even (absurdly)nour own.nIn Clark’s view we must begin withnwhat is given to us, our consciousness.nFor logic and observation to work (as innscience), we must take it on faith thatn”the universe is not one to whichn