United States would virtually annex mostrnof the civilized world—and a great dealrnof that which is not quite civilized—in anrnact of hubris so reckless, so contrary to thernlessons of history and common sense,rnthat it is positively breathtaking to contemplate.rnThat Wolfowitz, the author ofrnthis mad memorandum, is now one ofrnGeorge Dubya’s top foreign-policy advisors,rnthe theoretician and behind-thescenesrnpolicymaker who could well bernthe next secretary of state, is—or ought tornbe—a chilling thought.rnBuchanan lays out a frightening andrnall-too-realistic scenario for five futurernwars. (His portrait of the “Second BalkanrnWar,” which may have been written beforernthe attack on Serbia, reads like arnnews dispatch hot off the wires. Read asrna prediction of things to come, the descriptionrnof the burgeoning Balkan crisisrnhas the ring of authenticity.) Thern”Second Korean War” is a reenactmentrnof the earlier conflict, to which nuclearrnweapons are added; in the “Baltic War,”rnRussia and Belarus overrun Lithuaniarnand demand that the Baltics remain arn”weapons free zone.” “The U.S. Presidentrndeclares, ‘This will not stand,'” aversrnthat “there will be no Munich in thernBaltics,” and takes us to the brink of nuclearrnwar —in the name of NATO’srn”credibility.” In the Middle East, thern”Arab street” explodes, toppling the Saudirnprincelings and provoking a massivernAmerican intervention in Iraq, while thern”Second Gulf War” pits the UnitedrnStates and Israel against virtually the entirernArab world in what Buchanan callsrn”a nightmare scenario.” Most interestingrnis Buchanan’s “Ghina-Taiwan War,”rnwhich has its origins in the shadow of anrneconomic slump that drags the Far Eastrndown in a slough of depression. As thernPeople’s Liberation Army quells riots inrnHong Kong, “Taiwan declares independencernin Jefferson’s own language andrnasks the United States and the UnitedrnNations for recognition. Both refuse.”rnTaiwan proceeds recklessly to threatenrnthe mainland with nuclear retaliation ifrnBeijing dares even to contemplate an invasion.rnThe Chinese leadership respondsrnby informing the United Statesrnand the rest of the world to stay out of therncrisis, and blockades the island. Thernsiege of Taiwan is begun. “Should thernnavy engage Chinese air and naval unitsrnin the waters around Taiwan,” asksrnBuchanan, “or stay out of the war?” Hisrnanswer may surprise many conservatives:rnClearly, Fat Buchanan favors a policy ofrnstrict nonintervention. As he puts it:rnIn none of the wars would any vitalrnU.S. interest be at stake to justifyrnsending a large American army tornfight or to risk nuclear war. In eachrnof the wars described above, Americarnis drawn in because of commitmentsrndating to a Cold War thatrnhas been over for a decade .. .rnAs an American nationalist, Buchananrnbelieves that the interests oithisrncountry deserve a special place — indeed,rnthe only place — in the affections ofrnAmerican policymakers. He is, above all,rnan American patiiot, deeply in love withrnthe tradition and spirit of a peoplernuniquely averse, from their love of liberty,rnto the task of empire-building. Yet anyrnassertion of this brand of Americanism isrn”shouted down as ‘isolationist!'” he complains;rn”it is time to expose this malevolentrnmyth of’isolationism,’ so that our foreignrnpolicy debate can proceed on therngrounds of what is best for America.”rnWhat is best for Americc2—not the multinationalrncorporations, or the United Nations,rnor the peoples of the world, or evenrnthe New World Order. Not any of these,rnbut for America First.rnOne of Buchanan’s major achievementsrnin this book is to rescue the memoryrnof the old America First Committeernfrom the slanders of the War Party. Citingrna particularly egregious example inrnthe speech of Bush Senior on the occasionrnof the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harborrn—”Isolationists flew escort,” saidrnBush, “for the very bombers that attackedrnour men”—Buchanan avers that “PresidentrnBush had stood history on its head.”rnUttered at the height of Buchanan’s assaultrnon the Bush establishment, this lyingrncanard no doubt enraged Buchananrnat the time, and much of the rest of ArnRepublic, Not an Empire is a refutation ofrnthis particularly Big Lie.rnThe “isolationism” of the Founders,rnBuchanan asserts, is a myth —a usefulrnone for the War Party, but a mythrnnonetheless. He proceeds to make hisrnpoint in the next few chapters as he describesrnthe expansion of the United Statesrnfrom a struggling confederation clingingrnto the Eastern shore to a continental republicrnon the brink of empire. Buchanan’srnaccount is enthralling, full of historicalrndetail and odd fact. The fatefulrnturn toward empire began with the acquisitionrnof the Philippines and PuertornRico and the “liberation” of Cuba,rnBuchanan argues, dramatizing the temperrnof the times with such fascinatingrndoggerel as the Boston Transcript’^ ode tornCommodore George Dewey, the conquerorrnof Manila:rnO Dewey at ManilarnThat fateful first of May,rnWlien you sank the SpanishrnsquadronrnIn almost bloodless fray.rnAnd gave your name to deathlessrnfame;rnO glorious Dewey, say.rnWhy didn’t you weigh anchorrnAnd softly sail away?rnAmericans exulted in the taking of thernPhilippines, but, as Buchanan shows, itrnwas a fateful decision. Indefensiblernagainst the rising peoples of the East, whornwere nation-building in spite of Westernrninterference, the Philippines, rather thanrnbecoming the forward position of an expandingrnAmerican power in the Orient,rnbecame our Achilles’ heel—as the eventsrnin the Pacific during World War II wouldrndemonstrate.rnThe bacillus of imperialism, as onerncritic of the Spanish-American War putrnit, had infected the American bodyrnpolitic, lodging itself most importantly inrnthe consciousness of the financial and intellectualrnelites. We had become a mirrorrnimage of the Mother Country, againstrnwhose depredations we had rebelled —rnand were now inflicting similar depredationsrnon the conquered peoples of thernPhilippines, Puerto Rico, and the Caribbeanrnisles. No longer our nemesis. GreatrnBritain had become “our exemplar.”rnThe Anglicization of American foreignrnpolicy was completed on a grandrnscale as the tragedy of World War Irnunfolded. Buchanan asks: “Why didrnWoodrow Wilson break with all traditionrnand lead America into a slaughterhousernthat had consumed millions of the bestrnand bravest of Europe’s young, when nornvital interest was at risk?” Buchananrnpoints to the Anglophilia rampant amongrnthe nation’s elites, cifing historian RalphrnRaico:rnThe President and most of his chiefrnsubordinates were dyed-in-the-woolrnAnglophiles. Love of England andrnall things English was an intiinsicrnpart of their sense of identity. WithrnEngland threatened, even thernChief Justice of the United StatesrnSupreme Court, Edward D. White,rnJANUARY 2000/27rnrnrn