port provided the foundation for political parties. This, in turn,rnled to the development of a system of political spoils. Underrnthis system, a large number of federal patronage positions werernestablished, and the beneficiaries of these positions were requiredrnto “donate” a percentage of their wages to the party inrnpower. These mandatory contributions were outlawed in 1867.rnAlthough the growth of the railroads, the banks, and the oilrncompanies in the early 1800’s produced wealthy individualsrnwith national political ties, these titans were relatively few, andrntheir political dealings were usually kept well-concealed fromrnthe general public. If reform was needed to curtail these influencesrnduring the nation’s first century, the public was not generallvrnaware of it.rnAt the beginning of the 20th century, commercial interestsrnhad become increasingly important to the nation’s economy,rnand businessmen sought access to national officeholders. Becausernthe number of businessmen seeking access grew muchrnfaster than the number of officeholders, access became morerndifficult to acquire. As in most other markets where price becomesrnthe primary mechanism for allocating scarce goods, politicalrncontributions naturalK’ emerged as the way to allocate accessrnwithin the legislative marketplace.rnThe second cause of changing campaign standards is a resultrnof the expanding scope of the federal government. Althoughrnfederal budgets did not begin to balloon until the onset of thernNew Deal, legislators had the power to confer great wealth onrncorporations and their owners through the legislative process.rnUntil after the 1904 election of Theodore Roosevelt, thernpublic was largely ignorant of the magnitude of corporate givingrnto national candidates. At hearings held by a special committeernformed by the New York state legislature after the election,rnit was disclosed that both parties had solicited andrnreceived large contributions from major corporations and financialrnorganizations. A public outcry ensued, causing PresidentrnRoosevelt to request in December 1905 that all campaignrncontributions from corporations and banks be outlawed. Afterrnconsiderable maneuvering, a bill to this effect was passed byrnCongress in 1907, which Roosevelt signed into law. Meanwhile,rnpublic revelation of these business contributions hadrndampened any inclination the administration might have hadrnto show favor to its major contributors. In the words of one contributor,rnsteel magnate Henry C. Friek, partner of AndrewrnCarnegie, “Roosevelt got down on his knees to us. We boughtrnthe son of a bitch and he did not stay bought.”rnIn 1910, legislation was enacted that required organizationsrnoperating in two or more states to report their political contributions.rnReporting requirements were also imposed on individuals.rnBut a provision for preelection reporting was deletedrnprior to passage, thereb^’ denying voters knowledge of questionablernactivities until after an election. Thus, voters would bernforced to wait until the next election to exact retribution.rnTwo additional laws also affected campaign financing.rnWhen the 16th Amendment instituted the national incomerntax in 1915, it opened a floodgate of opportunity for congressmenrnto use and abuse tax laws to stimulate contributions fromrnaffected business interests. And as campaign costs escalated,rnso, it seems, did the number of businesses affected by changesrnin the tax laws. The other law, passed in 1911, clamped downrnon political committees influencing senatorial candidates.rnThis legislation also imposed reporting requirements both onrnpolitical organizations and the individual candidates for congressionalrnoffice, and it placed a ceiling on the amount candidatesrncould spend in primaries and elections. WhetherrnCongress in fact had the power to regulate primaries was a matterrnof intense debate—the Constitution makes no direct mentionrnof primaries—especially in the South, where the outcomernof the primary virtually determined the outcome. ThernSupreme Court declined to resolve this issue in 1921, in Newberryrnv. U.S.rnThe Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the next majorrnreform of campaign laws, was propelled through Congress in reactionrnto the Teapot Dome scandal, in which President WarrenrnG. Harding’s Interior Secretary had received kickbacks from arncompany whose contributions to the GOP had helped retirernthe party’s campaign debt. The Corrupt Practices Act overhauledrnexisting law, but primaries were removed from its scope.rnA provision was added to require disclosure of contributions notrnmade during an election year—a loophole that had facilitatedrnthe Teapot Dome scandal.rnStill, federal election law was easy to sidestep. Limitations onrncampaign expenditures applied only to spending made withrnthe “knowledge of consent” of the candidate. In addition, politicalrncommittees operating solely within a single state escapedrnthe grasp of the law. It was thus easy to shield candidates fromrnknowing about campaign expenditures, or to devise ways tornchannel contributions to single-state committees.rnThe limitations on contributions were circumvented by givingrnthe maximum amount to each of numerous committeesrnworking on behalf of a favored candidate, and corporationsrnwould legalize their large contributions by distributing themrnfirst as “bonuses” to their managers. Labor unions could collectrncontributions, other than dues, from their members forrncandidates and could deploy treasury funds for get-out-thevoternactivities. Finally, existing law included no provisions forrnreviewing or publishing disclosure reports to correct errors orrnomissions, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of disclosure.rnTo make matters worse, though it remained easy to circumventrnexisting campaign laws, even the punishable offenses that didrncome to light were studiously overlooked.rnApart from the 1939 Hatch Act, which prohibited overt politicalrnactivity by federal employees, significant campaignrnreform had to wait until 1971. In that year, the Federal ElectionrnCampaign Act was passed to address the weakness of existingrncampaign reform laws. The FECA and its 1974 amendmentsrnrepresented the most comprehensive effort at campaign financernreform and remains the basis for current law.rnThe 1971 act imposed limitations on individual contributions.rnAll political committees active in any federal campaign,rnincluding those operating within a single state and receiving orrnspending in excess of $ 1,000, were subject to reporting requirements.rnDonations above $100 to individual candidates and torncommittees had to be disclosed. Overall limitations also werernimposed on each candidate’s media expenditures. These limitationsrnapplied separately to primary and general elections.rnTo encourage more widespread public participation in electionrncampaigns. Congress also enacted the Revenue Act ofrn1971. This law gave taxpayers the option of earmarking $1 ofrntheir federal income taxes for the public funding of presidentialrnelections. Under this act, presidential candidates who metrnminimum qualifications and who agreed to observe overallrncampaign expenditure limits would receive matching funds.rnThe 1974 amendments to FECA followed the Watergaternrevelations about campaign law abuses. These amendmentsrnMARCH 1996/21rnrnrn