opportunity O’Keefe postulates is notnthere; the need for the U.S. to redress thenimbalance is.nProbably his most naive position is onninternational terrorism. He wants strongnantiterrorist measures because he fearsnthat terrorism may escalate to the nuclearnlevel and might even trigger a nuclearnwar through overreaction. This is fine,nalbeit overdrawn. His problem is in believingnthat the Soviets are likely partnersnin an antiterrorist campaign. He reasonsnthat the Soviets fece the threat of terrorismnthemselves growing out of their dissidentnmovement, and feils to note thatnthe international terrorist network thatnplagues Western interests is largely thencreation of the Soviets and their proxies.nTerrorism is an arm of Soviet policy theynwill not dismantie.nThe terrorism issue also provides ancontradiction in that O’Keefe is willingnto restrict civil liberties to stop terrorismntoday, but he protests the security measuresnhe had to endure at Los Alamos. Hendiscusses the Fuchs-Gold-Rosenberg espionagencase and considers them guilty:n”Fuchs passed on virtually everythingnthere was to be known at Los Alamos.”nYet his response to learning that the projectnhad been infiltrated was to wondern”why weren’t the security barriers easedna little now that they had been breached?n… Probably just the innate secretivenessnof security people, the refiisal to admitnerror.” What sort of logic is this? It is justnone example of the contradictions andnconfusion which run through this book,nleaving the reader frustrated.nJVlichael Mandelbaum, a Fellow ofnthe Council on Foreign Relations, presentsna better-grounded discussion. Henmakes some valid points: that the extremesnof Arm^eddon and disarmamentnare both unlikely, that no political goal isnworth the price of a fiall nuclear exchangenaimed at cities. However, the politicalncosts of disarmament in an environmentnof continued U.S.-Soviet rivalry are alsontoo high. Nuclear technology cannot benforgotten and force, or the threat of it,ndoes play a major role in internationalnChronicles of CulturenafEairs. For more than a century, nationalismnand science have combined tonproduce arms races; the nuclear dilemmanis only the most recent example. Onlynunder a world government might disarmamentnbe possible, but the trendsnare all toward increasing global anarchy,nnot unity. Attempts to limit arms races bynnegotiation have not been very significant,nMandelbaum admits:nPolitical disputes cause war. Armsncontrol agreements do not addressnthem. … At the heart of the Soviet-nAmerican conflict lie differences aboutnthe political organization of Europenand indeed the world These are issuesnabout which, on the whole, formalnagreements are not possible.nHe also concedes that arms buildups donnot cause war:nThere is no necessary connection betweennlarge forces and a high dangernof war. The reverse may be true Anpre-emptive strike would be seen tonbe more feasible against a few weaponsnthan against a great many.nMandelbaum does not think that thenpeace movement will have a major effectnon policy. However, his liberal leaningsnlead him to handle the peace movementngentiy. He mentions the professionalnand religious wings of the movement;nthe Physicians for Social Responsibility,nthe National Council of Churches, andnthe Catholic bishops are the only groupsnmentioned by name. He also comparesnthe peace movement with the oi^anizedneffort to require a balanced budget bynconstitutional amendment. Both groupsnnnare rooted in distrust of government andna desire to influence policy by democraticnmeans removed from the “priesthood”nof experts. This is a rather disingenuousnway to distort both right and left by linkingnthem. He blames current distrust ofnnuclear policy on the Reagan Administration’snrejection of SALT II and on thennew arms program. This overlooks thenfeet that SALT II was dead before Re^annwas elected and that Reagan’s views onndefense were well known and contributednheavily to his election. The defensenconsensus has eroded since 1981, butnthat is partially the feult of the Administration’snfailure to confront its criticsnand make a strong enough case for militarynstrength. There have been too manynchanges in policy at START, on the MX,nand in announced strategy which seemsnaimed at appeasing the peace movementnThe peaceniks have not been quieted,nbut the Administration has underminednits own position in the public mind byntalking arms control rather than nationalnsecurity.niVlandelbaum ends up adopting somenof the positions of the peace movement.nHe opposes the deployment of newnweapons, which amounts to a unilateralnfreeze. He sees no threat from the U.S.S.RnFirst-strike weapons would normally indicatena^ressive intent, and he acknowledgesnthat the Soviets view nuclear warndifferendy than does the U.S. But he stillnconcludes that “what appears aggressivento Americans is evidentiy compatible, innSoviet eyes, with defensive intentions.”nWhy? Because he believes that the Sovietsnhave defensive intent, therefore thefr ac-n