to grant autonomy to that historicallynseparatist and ethnically distinct region,nor for punishing those who took upnarms to advance the cause. Fusi indictsnwhat he calls “the Spanish regime”nbecause it created among Basques “anwidespread feeling of revulsion fromnthe very idea of Spain.”nIt was late in the summer of 1968nthat the Basque extremist organization,nEuzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA —nBasque Homeland and Liberty),nturned to violence, in part, as StanleynPayne suggests in his exhaustively researchednand authoritative study, becausenof the disorienting impact ofnrapid industrialization and secularization.nAfter ETA gunmen shot downnthe head of the Brigada social (politicalnsection) of the police in Guipiizcoa,nthe Franco government resolved tonmake an example of the accused, 16 innnumber. The trial opened in Burgos innDecember 1970, but provoked unexpectednand international sympathy fornthe terrorists. Fusi expresses enthusiasmnfor the anti-Franco demonstrationsnthat spread throughout Western Europe;neven spokesmen for the RomannCatholic Church — once among thenregime’s strongest supporters —ndemanded clemency for the terrorists.nWhat continues to infuriate Fusi isnthe way in which Franco, unlike sonmany democratic leaders, refused initiallynto knuckle under to pressure.nThe court sentenced nine of the defendantsnto death and the rest to a totalnof 519 years in prison. By then, however,nnervous government officials werencounseling their chief to commute thendeath sentences to life imprisonment.nDespite serious misgivings, he eventuallynagreed — and thereby emboldenednhis opponents. In 1973, ETA terroristsnassassinated Luis Carrero Blanco, whonhad been Franco’s alter ego and secondnin command for three decades. Andnthat same year they were joined by annew Marxist-Leninist terrorist organizationnknown by the acronym FRAP.nIn 1974, a two-member ETA team,naided by several communists, bombedna crowded Madrid coffee shop nearnnational police headquarters, killing 12npeople and injuring 80 others. Then,nduring the first months of 1975, terroristsnkilled eight police officers. Thenbeleaguered security forces finally succeedednin arresting 11 ETA and FRAPnmembers, whom the courts promptlynconvicted and sentenced to death innaccord with the provisions of a newnAnti-Terrorist Decree. Once again thenleaders of the European left orchestratedna propaganda campaign against thenFranco regime, exhibiting, in Payne’snwords, “much greater indignation overnthe determination to punish these killersnthan they had . . . over the Sovietninvasion of Czechoslovakia.” In a dramaticnmove that must have shockednand offended Franco, Pope Paul VInpersonally intervened on behalf of thenconvicted terrorists. This time, however,nthe Generalissimo did not backnaway. In a final display of the unemotionalntoughness for which he wasnknown and feared during his service innMorocco and the civil war, he orderednthat five of the killers be executed.nFor reasons of his own, Fusincharacterizes the Anti-Terrorist Decreenas a “repressive measure” and citesnwith undisguised satisfaction the “outburstnof revulsion across Europe andninside Spain” that greeted the lawfulncarrying out of the sentences. So blindednis he by his hatred of Franco thatnhe is able to describe the JuntanDemocrdtica, organized in Paris inn1974 by the Spanish Communist Party,nas “a potential democratic alternative”nto the regime. More helpfully,nPayne alerted members of the USnHouse of Representatives to the factnthat the Junta was a communist frontnorganization.nHere as elsewhere, Payne’s judgmentnand command of Spanish historynis superior to Fusi’s. A proponent ofndemocratic politics and an admirer ofnKing Juan Carlos’s successful disassemblingnof Franco’s authoritarian regime,nhe insists that the latter not benjudged against some imaginary, andnUtopian, democracy, but “in terms ofnhistorical alternatives that actually existed”nin 1936. An evolutionary authoritarianism,nhe concludes, “was in ancertain sense about as much as thenSpanish could expect from the impasseninto which they had maneuverednthemselves.”nMuch of the blame for that impasse,nas Payne demonstrates, must be assignednto the Second Republic thatnexercised political power from 1931 ton1936. The Left Republican-Socialistncoalition government did its best toninflame public passions. Not only, fornexample, was it anticlerical, but itsnnnleader, Manuel Azaiia, went so far asnto proclaim that Spain had “ceased tonbe Catholic.” Moreover, it grantednautonomy to the Basque Provinces andnCatalonia, a move that alienated manynof its most articulate defenders, includingnJose Ortega y Gasset. At the samentime. Republican officials were unable,nor unwilling, to maintain even thensemblance of public order. BetweennFebruary 17 and July 17, 1936, therenwere 213 attempted assassinations, 113nlocal general strikes, and 228 partialnshutdowns, with casualties numberingn269 dead and 1,287 wounded.nThis was what Franco meant when,nyears later, he identified Spain’s “familiarndemons” as “an anarchic spirit,nnegative criticism, lack of mutual cooperation,nextremism and mutual enmity.”nYet even as the country wrestiednwith these demons, the always prudentngeneral hesitated to join those of hisnfellow military officers who were preparingnto rebel. Then, on the night ofnJuly 12-13, Republican police and socialistngunmen murdered Jose CalvonSotelo, leader of the rightist parliamentarynopposition. Five days later, Franconand a small coterie of military conspiratorsnbegan the uprising that eventuatednin three years of civil war.nPayne makes short work of the notionnthat that epic struggle pitted democracynagainst fascism. Within a matternof days, Azafia and the LeftnRepublicans had handed power over tonthe revolutionary left, leading to thenformation of Juan Negri’n’s “People’snRepublic” in 1937. This governmentnwas not, as Payne points out, “a liberalndemocracy, but was driven by powerfulnrevolutionary forces determined to proscribenthe other side altogether. Itsnmass political executions were as extensivenas those by Franco’s supporters.”nNor were Franco and his comradesnfascists, although Payne does not denynthat the Caudillo and his profascistnbrother-in-law Ramon Serrano Siinernpresided over a “semifascist” regimenfrom 1936 to about 1945. There werenseveral reasons for this, includingnFranco’s dependence upon Germannand Italian aid during the civil war, hisnbelief that the Axis powers would winnthe Second World War, and his undyingnhatred of communism. Furthermore,nbecause he believed that a politicaln”philosophy” of some sort would bennecessary to the stability of a new formnOCTOBER 1988/33n