inequity.”* Accordingly, he and Doddnhave called for increased American economicnaid, while also sponsoring a measurenforbidding military involvement innCentral America without prior Congressionalnapproval.nAlthough such sentiments are by nonmeans universal among the Vietnamngeneration, they are surely characteristicnof it and especially of its most prominentnspokesmen. For this is a generation lackingnnot only memory of World War II,nbut, in a way, of the Vietnam War asnwell. Because of political reluctance tonmobilize the country, probably never hasna nation fought so protracted a strugglenwith such a small fraction of its populationndirecdy involved. Moreover, thosenofdraft age during the 1960’s had plentifulnopportunities for avoiding militarynservice. (Both Tsongas and Dodd, for example,nwere in the Peace Corps.) Evennthose who did serve in or support the warnhad experiences—defeat abroad, scornnor indifference at home—that were unlikelynto sustain a willingness to “bearnany burden” afterwards. The problem ofnthe Vietnam generation is not just, asnPodhoretz writes^ a deficiency in “historicalnknowledge or understanding” thatnled it to conclude this war was uniquelynevil. Rather, its own history has convincednit that wars are things othersnshould fight.nFor this reason, W^y We Were in Vietnamnis likely to have as much effect onnthe rising generation of American leadersnas Churchill’s calls for British rearmamentnhad on the Oxford Union. The gapnis not one of age but of experience. Contrarynto popular belief, the Vietnam generationnis not more idealistic thannprevious ones; it may even be less so. Itsnchief concerns, if surveys can be believed,nare with careers, possessions and enjoyingnthe kind of life that affluence is supposednto make possible. The history lessonnPodhoretz provides may persuade itsnmembers that containing communism isna “noble cause” and that we acted morallynin Viemam. But it will do little to con-n*T