USSR, while only 6,500 Soviets camenhere. In 1976 (before Afghanistan),n66,000 Americans went to the SovietnUnion, and 12,000 Soviets visited us.nThe numbers do not tell the wholenstory — the Soviet visitors are exclusivelynparty members who’ve been rigorouslynchecked, or experts held in line by keepingntheir family in the Soviet Union ornby other behavior-modifying ploys.nAmerican visitors are for the most partncurious amateurs put on guided tours.nApparently g/asnosf does not extend tonletting average Soviets travel abroad.nIn the introduction, the authors try tondeal with the objection that citizen diplomacyncan’t affect the Soviet governmentnbecause there is no real public opinion innthe USSR. They conclude this sectionnby implying that the Soviets stoppedntheir nuclear testing (since resumed),neliminated the French and British nuclearnforces from arms talks with the U.S.,nand proposed a 50 percent reduction innnuclear weapons because of citizen diplomacy.nThey do not attempt to shownhow citizen diplomacy has brought aboutnthese results. Nowhere do they credit thenReagan administration or the strongnmandate it received from the Americannpeople in 1980 and 1984 for any ofnthese changes in Soviet negotiating postures.nThis last point is rather importantnsince the purported need for citizenndiplomacy is based on the ineffectivenessnof elected officials and professional diplomats.nAnother premise of citizen diplomacynis that a peace web to preclude war cannbe woven if enough personal and businessnrelations are formed between citizensnof the two countries. A high volumenof contacts and trade is thus seen asna factor in fostering peace. Yet the numbernof contacts and the flow of tradenbetween Germany and the Soviet Unionnjust before Germany attacked the USSRnin 1941 was never greater. In fact, perhapsnthose contacts were one reason thenSoviets were surprised at the Germannattack. Rather than preventing war, personalncontacts and trade, even the “nonaggression”npact of 1939, likely mislednStalin into thinking Hitler was his ally inncarving up Europe. This web of relationsnwas not an obstacle to Hitler’s decision tonattack, and there is much evidence tonshow it was nothing but a smoke screen.nMany citizen diplomats, perhaps bearingna sense of guilt about Mr. Peltier, donnot see the lack of human rights in thenSoviet Union as an important problemnthat should concern Americans. Thenones who do usually contend that therenis a more pressing problem; preventingnnuclear war. It is to Andrei Sakharov’sncredit that he widely publicized the ideanthat greater freedom and democracy innthe Soviet Union would inhibit Sovietnleaders from waging nuclear war. Militant,nsecretive nations are more apt to gonto war than countries with freedom ofnexpression, public opinion, real elections,nopen emigration, and the like. Ifnthis proposition is true, it may well benthat Gorbachev’s Soviet Union is less aptnto go to war than a Brezhnev-type SovietnUnion.nNonetheless, any conclusions aboutnglasnost and perestroika are premature.nAfter all, Khrushchev’s “public airing”nand “restructuring” of the early 1960’sndid not prevent the building of the BerlinnWall, the effort to put missiles in Cuba,nnor the explosion of a 57 megatonnhydrogen bomb, the largest in history,nwhich broke a three-year moratorium.nMoreover, party leaders deposednKhrushchev.nThese are sober facts to consider innthe midst of all the enthusiasm aboutncurrent developments in the SovietnUnion. The American citizen diplomaticncorp continues to multiply and whipnup even greater excitement. Their tripsnto the USSR are misrepresented as ancause of seemingly positive developmentsnin the USSR. Yet one can’t helpnbut feel the need for historical perspectivenand more modesty about the possibilitynof individual American citizensnchanging the foreign policies of anynmajor foreign power, least of all thenSoviet Union. The Soviet empire’s raisonnd’etre, its party platform, its socialnstructure, its military force, and its economynsince 1917 have all been gearedntoward the global expansion of theirnsystem. And exchanging musicians, bicyclingnand climbing mountains together,nand so on are not likely to change thendirection of Soviet foreign policy.nMichael Warder is executive vice presidentnof The Rockford Institute.nAMERICA BY THE THROAT:nTHE STRANGLEHOLD OF FEDERAL BUREAUCRACYn11 JlMEjfSgAnSmSeinI •I’HSSSwK””nCeorse ««”‘•”‘nby George Rochen”A iucid, even entertaining, yet also brilliantnand penetrating diagnosis of the majornsocial disease of our time. A splendid booknthat deserves very wide readership.”nNobel Laureate Milton FriedmannSenior Research Fellow,nHoover Institutionnf^JffSffJ&OfP^^S^ ‘fi^B!5ICW-.ffWF”’13^W*flH?*^JSWlW •neconomic disaster. George Roche makes…nthe problem frighteningly clear His book…ndisplays a keen understanding ot this issue,nand tarries an important message”niill’iim F birru'”!nFormer Secretary of the Treasuryn$5.00 PAPERBOUNDn$14.95 HARDBOUND (Michigan residents add 4% sales tax)nVISA AND MASTERCARD ORDERS 800-253-3200, EXT. 801n”Democracy will break down if the people do not soon become aware of whatnIs being done in their name . . . take notice of what Dr. Roche is telling you innthis book.”nF. A. Hayel<nNobel Laureate, F.A. FHajek, Author, The Road to SerfdomnHILLSDALE COLLEGE PRESSnHillsdale, Michigan 49242nnnJANUARY 1988/39n