though today they would probably berntargets of a special prosecutor.rnEconomics, according to the followersrnof classical liberalism, is not supposedrnto be part of the high politics of internationalrnrelations like territory or alliances.rn’I’he doctrine of “free trade”rnforms the basis of their lack of concernrnfor the role of foreign money in Americanrnsociety, a blind spot they maintainrneven when the money is directly linkedrnto politics and national policymaking.rnYet the original classical liberal economistsrnwere writing at the dawn of thernhidustrial Revolution and could not secrnits implications. However, it might havernoccurred to them that this was a developmentrnthat would greatly acceleraterntrends already apparent from the commercialrnand military revolutions of thern16th and 17th centuries. Of those liberalsrnwho did see this trend, the responsernwas not that of visionaries, butrnrather of reactionaries, harking back to arnpremodern era already two centuriesrnpast when religious and dynastic concernsrndominated high politics andrneconomies were too underdeveloped tornhave much bearing on events. I’heyrnhoped economics could continue to bernisolated from other concerns. Their intellectualrnheirs still drag these dead notionsrnaround, displaying a tenacity forrnirrelevance unmatched except perhapsrnamong the Marxists.rnWhile economic issues per se havernnot caused many wars, the strength ofrnnational economies has made the differencernbetween victory and defeat inrnthose major conflicts that have determinedrnthe balance of power in thernworld. Thus wise statesmen have neverrnbeen able to ignore the economic trendsrnthat could undermine the ability ofrntheir nation to control its own fate. Unfortunately,rnstatesmen are at a premiumrnin a system that so lavishly rewardsrnpolitical opportunists.rnAmerica’s Founding Fathers countedrnmore than their share of statesmenrnamong them. They learned that alliesrnmay have common enemies, but notrncommon goals. The same holds truernwith regard to Japan today. It shouldrnnot be surprising that new challengesrncan come from old allies. Though thernSoviet Union presented a grave militaryrnthreat, communism was never a seriousrnrival to capitalism. Only another capitalistrnpower can pose an economicrnthreat.rnThe Japanese are strongly nationalistic.rnThey have had to struggle for everythingrnthey have. Japan was “opened”rnby American warships, and its peoplernwere thrown into world affairs as the industrialrnWest carved a sphere of influencernin Asia. Japan’s leaders convertedrntheir land from potential prey to GreatrnPower predator in record time. As thernnoted scholar of Asian philosophies TomrnCleary has written, “There is no practicalrnway to overlook the military rule andrnmartial culture that have dominatedrnJapan for many centuries, virtually uprnto the present day.” The basic symbolrnof the sword may now mean computerrnchips rather than battleships, but therndesire for victory has not diminished.rn”The way of the warrior” came tornJapan from ancient China. At the endrnof the Ming Dynasty an unknown authorrndistilled the essence of this philosophyrnin a set of mnemonic phrasesrnknown as The Thirty-Six Stratagems.rnSeveral pertain to the current situationrnand are taken from Clcary’s 1992 bookrnThe Japanese Art of War: Understandingrnthe Cuhure of Strategy.rn”Hide a sword in a smile. You ingratiaternyourself with enemies, inducingrnthem to trust you. When you have theirrnconfidence, you can move against themrnin secret.” Alliances can be used to coverrnsubversion.rn”Let them climb the roof, then takernaway the ladder. You maneuver enemiesrninto a point of no return by baitingrnthem with what look like advantagesrnand opportunities.” Ibkyo has used thernsophistry of “free trade” well in this regard,rnplaying on the shortsightedness ofrnAmericans to penetrate deeply into keyrnindustries. Our continued trade andrnbudget deficits merely strengthen thernleverage of Japanese financiers.rn”To capture the brigands, capturerntheir kind. When confronted with arnmassive opposition, you take aim at itsrncentral leadership.” This can certainlyrnbe seen in Washington, where Japan’srnfinancial net has been thrown wide tornensnare as much of the American politicalrnestablishment as possible. Sincernthe United States is inherently stronger,rnTokyo must prevent a concerted Americanrneffort to regain global predominance.rnThe Japanese have contributed largernsums to politicians and policy groupsrnthat promote “free trade” ideology, justrnas the old Soviet Union gave money tornAmerican communists. The only differencernis that Japan wants others to believernin an ideology it rejects for itself.rnOtherwise, it’s the same old story.rnWhen foreigners dump money into thernpolicymaking process, it is to promoterntheir interests, not ours.rn—WiUiam R. HawkinsrnNAFTA —the North American FreernTrade Agreement—is not unlike the notoriousrnstar chamber, where the kingrnand counsellors of medieval England secretlyrnmeted out justice without concernrnfor precedent. If Congress approvesrnNAFTA, George Bush’s proudest diplomaticrnachievement, Americans can expectrna heavy dose of star-chamber-stylernjustice in the 21st centurv.rnFor the average citizen, NAFTA is arnformidable document. It extends somerntwo thousand pages and reads with allrnthe elegance of a mortgage contract.rnBehind the cumbersome seirtences andrnpassive verbs lie revolutionary conceptsrncloaked in innocuous words. At firstrnglance, Article 20 (relating to disputesettlementrnprocedures) appears a harmlessrnmonument to the drafting skills ofrndisciplined international lawyers. But arncloser reading reveals the mischievousrnfingerprints of incremental internationalists,rnthe modern-day gnomes ofrnSwitzerland who sit around Genevarndrafting codes for the New World EconomicrnOrder. Indeed, the spirit ofrnGeneva runs rampant at the U.S. TradernRepresentative’s Office in Washington.rnTo write NAFTA, the gnomes of USTRrndrew heavily on dispute-resolution proposalsrnadvanced in the Uruguay Roundrndeliberations of the General Agreementrnon Tariffs and Trade. Eager to rationalizernand harmonize international tradingrnpractices, they have done the legalrnequivalent of reinventing the wheel.rn’They have revived the medieval starrnchamber.rnInstead of relying on an independentrnand impartial judicial system based onrnestablished law, NAFTA’s Article 20rngives extraordinary latitude to ad hoerndispute-settlement panels. NAFTA panelsrnhave authority to conduct hearingsrnaway from the glare of public opinion.rnI learings, deliberations, and reports willrnall remain confidential, except to governments.rnIndeed, final panel reportsrnneed not be published. The five-memberrnpanels arc not composed of experiencedrnand independent justices insulatedrnfrom popular passions and politics,rnlike United States courts. Instead, thernMAY 1 993/5rnrnrn