Callers noted the one common denominatornon the faces of the rioters—npimples. A Miami caller said, “Thosenwere children—Lord of the Flies gonenweird. These kids in their designer runningnshoes seem like Beirut in Air Jordans.nAfter twenty-five years of GreatnSociety spending,” he wondered, “whatn[were these] well-intentioned policiesn[that] have so dissolved family discipline?”nCallers of all colors are frightened.nThey know that twenty-five years ofnpoverty programs could buy the total assetsnof the Fortune 500 companies withnenough money leftover to purchase allnof their country’s farmland—and whatnhas it bought? A man from Dover wasn”terrified watching middle-class fathersnhuddled in their doorways, pistolsnprotecting their families.” He was afraidnthat he “might be just a SecondnAmendment away from the Crips andnBloods. Gun fun on the New Frontier.”nOr, as a Texas bumper sticker puts it,n”Guns, the Final Frontier.”nAnd finally callers are baffled by thenmedia. “Why,” a Denver lady asked,n”after thousands of showings of thenmost grisly parts of the Rodney Kingntape, was there no discussion anywherenof the possibility of a not-guilty verdictncoming out of Simi Valley? Why weren’tnwe prepared in any way?”nThen picture this. L. A. is still innflames, looters pillage the streets, thengovernor of California, seeking calm,ngoes on CBS Morning News with PaulanZahn who asks, “Governor Wilson, howndo you respond to critics who chargenthat the riots were the direct result ofnfailed Republican policies?” “THUNK,”nthe sound of mouths dropping wide!n”That was an editorial, not a question,”na Tacoma caller argued. And how doesnthe caller explain Zahn’s politics? “Thenfact that she’s up after sunrise shoots mynvampire theory all to hell.”nWatching television newspeople worknduring the May Mess was, to many, likengetting signals from Mars. A Mainencaller wondered if “they booked guestsnfrom Horton, Hill, and King—thenSpeakers Bureau run by Willie, Anita,nand Rodney, a crew that even discriminatingnreptiles normally shun.” Televisionnwas loaded with advocates for everythingnfrom multicultural textbooks tondefenders of free condoms. A New Orleansnman noted that, “While one groupnexplained L. A. was caused by Bush’s internationalnjunkets and inattention ton8/CHRONICLESnthe cities, another urged him to join AlnGore and the Greenies on their conganline to Rio!” Yet amidst all this, anNashville caller said, “Television’s concernnfor the welfare of Koreans or carenfor the victims of a quarter century ofntax rape came and went so fast—itnamounted to subliminal sensitivity.”nCallers were confounded by TV coveragenthat argued that the solution tonthe melee in the streets was a whole lotnmore of the Democrats’ Great Society.nAnd a Cincinnati woman pointed outnthat “every tottering municipality hasnbeen governed by Democrats for years.” •nAnother guy from St. Louis said, “Ted, ifnLBJ were a city, why he’d be L. A.!”n—Ted ByrnenSOUTH AFRICA’S March 17 refer-;nendum led the government to toughennits position against the ANC. Within anmonth after the results, Mr. de Klerk gotnthe ANC at the Convention for anDemocratic South Africa (CODESA) to’.nagree to the election of a transitional;ngovernment, the interim government.nthe ANC had wanted appointed. The :nANC had wanted CODESA (whose’nname echoes the Congress of Demo-,ncrats—COD—a front organizationnfounded in 1953 by the South African ‘nCommunist Party after its banning in •n1950) to mask the transfer of power to ;nitself. The government was able to win :nthis concession not only because of itsntwo-to-one victory at the referendum,nbut because Mangosuthu Buthelezi andnthe Zulu organization, Inkatha, had insistednat CODESA on an elected interimngovernment. The government fre- jnquently suspected of private deals with Inthe ANC owes whatever strength this Invictory shows to the Zulus, who also in-‘nsisted that no elections for a transitionalngovernment occur before the ANC renouncesnviolence unequivocally, anotherndemand the government adopted morenor less at the time it demanded an electedntransitional government. It also de-:nmanded that the ANC transform itselfninto a political party, and that it lend itsnsupport to the creation of conditions fornfree and fair elections without coercion •nor interference. These demands presupposena fundamental change of heartnin the ANC, a change the governmentnthinks possible because it believes thenANC to be different from European terroristnorganizations like the Baader–nMeinhof gang. In any case, there is nonnnagreement on the form of the electionsnor the form of the transitional government,nespecially on whether there willnbe two houses with an upper house,nwith a veto, elected on proportional representation,nwhich the government demands.nMore importantly, the violencenin the townships, and the chaos and intimidation,nmakes elections impossiblenfor a long time, as even a visiting committeenof international jurists recentlynstated publicly. The government estimatesnthat it will be at least a year beforenelections, but the real question isnwhether they will ever be possible withoutnfierce intimidation.nThe ANC’s tie to terrorist activity hasnbeen central to the situation ever sincenMr. de Klerk decided to release NelsonnMandela in February 1990 without hisnrenunciation of violence, a condition hisnpredecessor, P. W. Botha, would notnhave waived. De Klerk implicitly recognizednhis break with Botha in thenwording of the referendum that datednthe “reform process” from Mandela’s release.nDuring the campaign, however,nPresident de Klerk blamed Botha fornstarting reform after Botha attacked himnfor gradual abdication. Botha then announcednhe would vote against the referendum,na statement carried the nextnday on the seven o’clock news but notnon the eight o’clock, with its greater audience.nEarlier at the first meeting ofnCODESA, Mr. de Klerk’s criticism ofnthe ANC for not renouncing violencenprovoked a 2 5-minute attack from Mandela,nlive on television. De Klerk hadn”to forget [the notion] that he can imposenconditions on the ANC,” Mandelansaid, calling him the head of “a discredited,nillegitimate, minority government.”nMandela and other members ofnthe ANC later made it clear they had nonintention of renouncing terror or “armednstruggle,” as they put it. Mandela clearlynthrives on violence, understandably—nsince it was terror, and the internationalnsupport it won him and the ANC,nthat got his release. In the end, after 27nyears, it was the South African governmentnthat yielded to him, not he to it,nan act that did not win his respect.nMandela’s attack made a profoundnimpression on South Africans who typicallynrespect their leaders and can tellnthe difference between tough criticismnand abuse. Mandela’s scorn made undeniablenthe gradual erosion in the authoritynof the police, army, judges, andnmost importantly even Parliament itself,n