another word for the “reform process.”nBy agreeing to CODESA Mr. de Klerknundermined his own Parliament, just asnhis exclusive preoccupation with thenANC at CODESA kept him from dealingnwith all blacks—not only Buthelezi :nbut also the other homeland leaders, es- •npecially Mangope of Bophuthatswana— ;nwho truly want to negotiate instead ofnusing talks merely to seize power.nDe Klerk’s preoccupation with the [nANC and its international support maynhave also led him to consent to thenexclusion of moderate groups fromnCODESA, among them the churchngroups and the elected town councillors,nwho incidentally are now critical of thenNational Party. In contrast to these :ngroups and to the homeland leaders,nwhose support can only be guessed at,nnobody really knows how much of a followingnthe ANC enjoys.nDuring the referendum campaignnPresident de Klerk’s appeal to 70 foreign ‘ngovernments for support of a “yes” votenalso betrayed his preoccupation with thenANC’s international connections. Insteadnof explaining his policies, he triednto intimidate the voters. As one of thenbest South African journalists, KennOwen, wrote. President de Klerk claimsn”that he will insist on free enterprise, butnhe does not say exactly how that will ben.achieved. He talks of protecting private |n• property, but does not really explainnwhether it will be achieved by the bill of :nrights, or tell us when and how the statenmight expropriate land. He says thenconstitution will protect minority representation,nand he puts forward suchncurious mechanisms as a revolving presidency,nwhich is unlikely to last, but hen•does not explain to the voters the more |n.important concept of proportional rep- nresentation (which not one in a hundrednSouth Africans understands).” To winnany kind of confidence, constitutionsnhave to be discussed thoroughly in publicnbefore their adoption, for there is nonway a people can trust a government itndoes not understand, especially a peoplenwhose majority has no political experi­nence.nThe government’s acquiescence tonMandela’s refusal to renounce violence,nwhich Mr. de Klerk now seeks to undo,nhas had immediate consequences. Anyear after Mandela’s release, fear amongnwhites was palpable, especially of car hi-n: jackings at stop lights—the drivers sometimesnmurdered. In 1990, the year ofnMandela’s release, political killings rosento 2,674 in contrast to 659 the year before,nand 28,000 people died violentndeaths (in both criminal and politicalnkillings) in the 18 months before thenend of 1991. Assigning the ANC’s terrorismnto the realm of “townshipnviolence” has blurred the distinction betweennpolitical and criminal killings, thenlatter usually seven times more frequent.nExcept for the fighting in Alexandra andnother townships in the spring of 1991nand 1992, most of this violence has receivednmuch less attention in the Americannpress than the more limitednviolence under P. W. Botha. In Alexandranin 1992, ANC killers were said tonrun wildly through the streets firing AK-n47s at random with plentiful supplies ofnammunition—in contrast to the Zulusnwho fought with traditional weapons, annimbalance rarely mentioned by thennewspapers that usually seek to blamenboth sides equally. Perhaps the newspapersnavoid reporting these stories inndetail because they do not want to facentheir and the American government’snrole in bringing about the violence.nThe real story is that the ANC, becausenof its greed for power, is keepingnthe country frorn the constructivenchange almost everybody wants. Thengovernment runs the risk of colludingnwith the ANC not only because of destructivenand self-destructive internationalnpressure, especially from Britainnand the United States, but perhaps alsonbecause the government prefers thencompany of cutthroats and ex-convictsnto the company of people who respectntheir country enough to know that nonchange would be worth much thatncomes of fear rather than consent.nButhelezi and the Zulus, who have takennthe positions one would have expectednof the government and who havencontributed most to the little stabilitynthere is in South Africa, have been constantlynsnubbed and sidelined, the rewardnfor men of courage and reason innan irrational situation.n—Leo RaditsanGREAT TOPICS, GREAT ISSUESnThe Spanish Americas—April 1992—RichardnEstrada on the Hispanic contributions to Americannculture, Mario Vargas Llosa on the difficultnrise of the Latin American novel, ChiltonnWilliamson, Jr. on bullfighting in Juarez, Mexico,nand poems by Jorge Luis Borges. Plus BradnLinaweaver on Albert Jay Nock, WilliamnMurchison on LBJ, and Murray Rothbard onnviolence in New York City.nLaw and Order: Crime and Punishment—nMay 1992—Thomas Fleming on the role of thenexecutioner, Philip Jenkins on the drug war andnpersonal liberties, Graeme Newman on the casenfor corporal punishment, and Theodore Pappasnon vigilante justice. Plus Murray Rothbard onnstreet crime, Llewellyn Rockwell on vagrancynlaw, Richard Irving on taxi drivers and minorityncrime, and a firsthand account of life in prison.nNamenTitlenTHE SPANISH AMERICASnLAW AND ORDERnRESTORING THE REPUBLICnCITIZENSHIPnBACK ISSUES ORDER FORMnEach issue $5.50 (postage and handling included)nRestoring the Republic—June 1992—ClydenWilson on the republican approach, SamuelnFrancis on the nationalist approach, and E.nChristian Kopff on the Augustan compromise.nPlus Thomas Fleming on why we have thengovernment we deserve, Theodore Pappas onnJapanese-American trade, Chilton Williamson,nJr. on illegal immigration, and Muiray Rothbardnon repudiating the national debt.nCitizenship—July 1992—John Lukacs onnpatriotism, Richard D. Lamm on why greatnnations need great citizens, Richard Flathmannon four models of citizenship, and PeternSchuck and Rogers Smith on why citizenshipnshould be based on consent and not birth.nPlus Thomas Fleming on the rebirth ofnnationalism, and Samuel Francis on thenBuchanan Revolution.nDate Qty.nAPRIL 1992nMAY 1992nJUNE 1992nJULY 1992 :nTotal Enclosed $ -nAddress City State ZipnMail with check to: Chronicles * 934 North Main Street * Rockford, IL 61103nnnCostnAUGUST 1992/9n