rect judgment. But it is a revolutionnnobody really wants, not anybody innthe country, at any rate. The ANC,nafter any number of membershipndrives, probably has no more than onenhundred and fifty thousand members,nin contrast to the Inkatha FreedomnParty’s one million members, amongnthem at least fifty thousand whites.nMoreover, ANC strategy has notnchanged, only the tactics. In fact, ANCnviolence has continued and even increasednsince the ban was lifted, a factnthe ANC denies and the governmentnignores. By the end of 1990, the worstnyear of violence since the beginning ofnreform, there were ten killings a day.nThe killing increased precipitously innthe two weeks following the ANC’snsupposed renunciation of violence onnAugust 6. (The words the ANC actuallynused were “suspension of violence,”nwords P.W. Botha and thenforeign minister had rejected in 1986nbecause they implied no more than ancease-fire the ANC could cancel atnwill.)nNumerous black leaders were murdered,nincluding about one hundrednfifty Inkatha leaders; an important editorialnwriter for The Sowetan, the largestnnewspaper in South Africa, whonhad opposed the ANC; and rival terroristnleaders in the Pan-AfricanistnCongress (PAC). There was also anmarked increase in attacks ignored bynthe Johannesburg police. The press,nlike the government, did not want tonhear any evil about the ANC — withnthe exception oi Business Day and ThenCitizen. To my astonishment the pressneven criticized the government for notnmoving quickly enough on reform, asnif the only obstacle to change lay in thenminds of government ministers.nIn late 1990 and 1991 the ANCnbegan to force the government to recognizenANC men instead of the electedntown councillors it had been killingnand terrorizing since 1984. The attacknon the township governments was parallelednby a systematic attack on thengovernments of most of the homelands.nEverywhere the aim was tonintimidate and destroy black leadershipnindependent of the ANC, and withnregard to the townships, to make thengovernment complicit in this destruction.nThe release of Mandela meantnincreased suffering for the blacks, sufferingnMandela probably wanted ton6/CHRONICLESnharden them and to increase theirnsense of abandonment by the whites.nTo gain control of the townships thenANC exploits the government’s compassionnand remaining sense of responsibility.nAfter Mandela’s release, thenrefusal to pay rent and electric bills thatnhad occurred sporadically since 1984nspread wildly to many townships.nMany townships were forced to recognizenthe ANC after the medical authoritiesnordered the restoration ofnpower to prevent outbreaks of choleranand typhoid that might break out becausenpower shut-ofFs also cut off water.nThe final twist: recognition of thenANC did not necessarily mean paymentnof bills. “What other country innthe world do you know where millionsnof people do not pay their electric billsnand rent?” a young Afrikaner womannasked me, amusement lighting herneyes.nThe primary responsibility for thenclashes between the ANC and Inkathanlies with the ANC, especially in thentownships. If the government will notncontrol the ANC, the Zulus and othernblacks will. “Only the blacks are nownfighting the communists,” a toughnyoung white missionary told me. In ansense the ferocity of the Zulus in thentownships measure the extent to whichnthe government is out of touch. Somebodynin the country has to know wherenfreedom is. Buthelezi has put the responsibilitynfor the violence squarelynon the blacks, while Mandela insteadnhas tried to blame it on the government,ncalumny that the media did notnswallow.nAt a prayer breakfast on March 7 innDurban, Buthelezi said he regrettednthe violence, and wept. The questionsnon everybody’s mind were: had henwept spontaneously (as if tears couldnbe anything but spontaneous)? Andnwas this weeping a confession of weakness?n(In the Transvaal — a rougher,nmore unforgiving post is hard tonimagine — I heard one of Inkatha’snmen, Musa Myeni, more than oncenannounce to whites that weeping didnnot necessarily mean weakness.) In hisnspeech Buthelezi observed that thentime was not yet ripe for reconciliationnand repentance, but he also pointednout that the blacks themselves hadnmuch to admit to. He meant that thensituation in South Africa was not thenexclusive work of the oppressors butnnnalso of the oppressed, who had notnknown how to fend for themselves. Incould hardly believe my ears.nButhelezi profoundly hates violence,nbut as early as 1985 he alsonargued for the rationality of fightingnback. He is a man, in short, who cannlive with contradictions in his soul.nThis capacity to endure contradictionnmakes it possible for Buthelezi to understandnthat the distinction betweennreal negotiations with limited aims andnnegotiations that mask a transfer ofnpower depends on faith, a word that hendoes not have to utter to make itsnpresence felt in South Africa.nNot even a week later, on March 12,nwith the country still wrapped in thenriddle of his tears, Buthelezi faced DenKlerk and delivered another remarkablenspeech, this time upon the occasionnof De Klerk’s trip to Kwa Zulu,nthe first visit of any South African headnof state to the homeland. He said henhad never taken up violence becausenhe had thought change possible innSouth Africa without violence. Henprobably meant that change was onlynpossible without violence. He meantnalso that he had always known thenAfrikaners could be reached.nHe praised De Klerk for his readinessnfor the reconciliation that hadntransformed the country, but he criticizednhim severely for his almost exclusivenattention to the ANC. He pointednout that any partnership or ententenwith the ANC would lead to thendestruction of both the ANC and thenNational Party. He argued that if thenwhites really want to share power theynmust deal with the actual black leaders,nleaders that they have to respect. Henmeant also that nothing short of dealingnwith these few leaders will cut thenANC down to size and show thenextent of its fear of responsibility. AnSouth African friend had pointed outnto me in my first hours in South Africanthat he suspected the governmentnfeared the real black leaders, perhapsnthe most profound observation I heardnduring my trip. Buthelezi told DenKlerk the same thing to his face. Henmeant that De Klerk feared the spreadnof freedom, an understandable andneven a rational fear, but one that has tonbe faced openly, for otherwise thencountry will be vulnerable to evenngreater destruction than freedom couldnbring.n