“GLOBALIZATION” —when didnit become a central tenet of conservatism?nAccording to Deputy Secretarynof State John C. Whitehead, it was innthe New Deal era that the US “rejectednisolationism and economic nationalism”nin favor of the “globalization ofnour daily lives.” The text of Whitehead’snaddress to the September meetingnof the Economic Policy Council ofnthe United Nations Association wasngiven wide circulation in December asna State Department policy paper onn”Global Economic Integration.” In hisnremarks, Whitehead praised “the distinguishednmen who shaped our internationalneconomic policy in the 1940sn— people like Cordell Hull, HarrynWhite, William Clayton and GeorgenMarshall.”nThe Reagan administration hasnspent a great deal of effort on behalf ofnglobal interdependence. That the Presidentnand his neoconservative foreignnpolicy advisors drew their inspirationnfrom Franklin D. Roosevelt is no secret.nMr. Reagan has said that henbecame a partisan of “free trade” innthe 1932 election campaign, whennFDR accused the Republicans ofn”causing” the Great Depression bynadopting the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.nCuriously, FDR’s Smoot-Hawleynmyth has become a standard line fornReagan administration globalists, andnWhitehead dutifully used it. That itnhas no grounding in fact or logic, that itnwas merely a charge in a negativencampaign that made the Willie Hortonnissue look like the high road, has notnstopped its endless repetition.nSmoot-Hawley went into effect inn1931, well after the Depression hadnstarted (the stock market had collapsednback in 1929). Its focus was agriculture,nwhich had been depressednthroughout the 1920’s. The minornchanges made in industrial policy werenof no consequence. As America’s foremostntariff expert Frank Taussig wrotenat the time, “The new duties on manufacturedngoods were mostly of a pettynsort. . . . On the important branchesnof these industries the protective systemnhad already been carried so far thatnno considerable further displacementnof imports could be expected.” Then6/CHRONICLESnCULTURAL REVOLUTIONSnhistorical truth is that the US hadnalways used protective tariffs and hadnbecome the world’s most powerfulneconomy running perennial trade surpluses.nTrade policy did not eliminatenthe business cycle — nothing can donthat—but it did not cause it, either. Itnwas the collapse of the banking system,nnot trade, that made the Depression sondevastating.nIt is disturbing when conservativesncannot come up with anything betternthan a half-century old Democraticncampaign slogan to guide policy —nespecially when the country is in thenmidst of a techno-industrial trade warnthat will affect the worldwide distributionnof production capacity well intonthe 21st century, with all that meansnfor the international balance of wealthnand power. But it is not the onlyndisturbing element in Whitehead’sntalk, for among the “distinguished”nmen the deputy secretary mentionednwas the traitor Harry White.nBetter known by his full name,nHarry Dexter White had taught internationalneconomics at Harvard beforenbecoming an assistant secretary of thenTreasury. He was the father of thenWorld Bank and became director ofnthe International Monetary Fund inn1946. He was also a Soviet agent who,naccording to his wife, saw himself as an”revolutionary.” He was part of thensame Soviet network that included AlgernHiss and Whittaker Chambers.nWhen Chambers quit the Communistnspy ring, he went to White in annattempt to convince him also to quit,nbut, like Hiss, White rejected Chambers’nplea.nTestifying before the House Un-nAmerican Activities Committee,nWhite denied that he had ever metnChambers. But Chambers still had innhis possession a handwritten memo ofnintelligence information that Whitenhad given to Chambers for delivery tonthe Soviets. Chambers left the spy ringnin 1938, but another courier, ElizabethnBentley, who did not leave thenring until after World War II, testifiednthat White continued to pass secrets tonMoscow. White died of a heart attacknduring the subsequent investigations.nAs stated in Allen Weinstein’s authori­nnntative study, Perjury: The Hiss-nChambers Case, “White not onlynpassed confidential data but alsonhelped place influential Communistsnin sensitive positions within Treasury.”nWhite was not just an espionage agent,nbut also an agent of influence attemptingnto move policy in directions thatnadvanced his own peculiar notions ofnprogress rather than the national interestsnof the United States.nWhy would a high State Departmentnofficial praise a Soviet spy? DidnWhitehead feel that since his UNnAssociation audience was composed ofnself-styled “citizens of the world,” resurrectingna traitor would impressnthem? Or was this just a gaffe resultingnfrom historical ignorance, displayednnot only by the deputy secretary butnalso by the State Dept. bureaucracynthat cleared this particular speech fornwider distribution?nWe see now that our opening questionn”when did ‘globalization’ becomena tenet of conservatism” is a tricknquestion. From its intellectual lineage,nit is clear that it has never been a tenetnof any philosophy properly called conservative.nIts sudden popularity testifiesnto the low state of historical understandingnwithin the conservative movement.n—William R. HawkinsniSCHOOL decentralization was onenof the few practical items on the NewnLeft’s agenda of the 1960’s. It was angenuinely radical idea, since the entirenhistory of public education in the USnhas been the steady progress of consolidationnand centralization. Small districtsnwere merged, time after time,ninto larger consolidated units, andnpower was inexorably shifted to thenprofessionals who ran the district.nWhat had once been local districtsnunder democratic control turned into annightmare of bureaucratic arrogancenand ineptitude — a sort of gulag with anhuman face.nNew York was supposed to be thenproving ground for decentralization,nbut the arrest in November of thenprincipal of P.S. 53 (an elementarynschool in the Bronx) has triggered an