even de Tocqueville seems to have heldnhim in high disregard. Fortunately fornFrance, she possessed other men, othernleaders, other ideas. The third Republic,nfor example, survived its inauspicious beginnings—defeatnin war and revolutionnat home—because it had a strong republicanntradition. The majority of nationsntoday do not possess such a tradition.nThus, the anticommunist alternative isnoften unattractive—caudillos, generals,nwarlords and worse.nOne sees how the nature of our currentndebate is defined. Mr. Szulc and his fel­nEisenhower in War & PeacenRussell Weigley: Eisenhower’s Lieutenants;nIndiana University Press;nBloomington.nBlanche Wiessen Cook: The DeclassifiednEisenhower: A Divided Legacy ofnPeace and Political Warfare; Doubledayn& Co.; New York.nby Paul H. ViviannOome books are best read in front of anwarm hearth while curled up on a softnchair with the book in one hand and anglass of dry sherry in the other. But RussellnWeigley’s Eisenhower’s Lieutenantsnis not such a book. It is best read standingnin front of a floor-to-ceiling operationsnmap of Europe with grease pencils in onenhand and, when not holding the book, anmug of beer chased by a stiff whiskey innthe other. Not only are Russell Weigley’snideas heretical, but they are also wellsubstantiatednand convincingly argued.nProfessor Weigley argues that many ofnthe Allied generals were not very good atnwaging war. As a consequence, he asserts,nthe war in Europe lasted longernthan necessary. Even more shocking,nWeigley suggests that the American footnsoldier was not as capable as his BritishnMr. Vivian is research director o/ThenAmerican Spectator.nmmm^^^mmtmmnChronicles of Calturenlow liberals perceive that the right isnoften cormpt and brutal, then illogicallynassign the exact oppposite qualities to thenrevolutionary opposition. Revolutionarynleaders abroad take on the qualities ofnRobespierre the Incormptible who oncendefined terror as nothing more than “inflexiblenvirtue.” In such situations quaintnbourgeois customs—like the mle of lawn—fall rapidly by the wayside. The shoddinessnof the “literary” production of thencountiess Szulcs who currently clutter thenlowbrow cultural scene makes such simplentmths pervasively painful. Dncounterpart or his German adversary.nWhile ostensibly a straight historicalnstudy of Eisenhower’s principal subordinates,nEisenhower’s Lieutenants is alsonan attempt to lend weight to the argumentsnof the “maneuver warfare” theorists.nThis is a school of thought that innrecent years has gained popularitynamong “defense intellectuals.” The adherentsnof this school have sharply criticizedncurrent American military doctrinenas being too attrition-oriented. By thisnthey mean that contemporary doctrinenemphasizes the grinding down of thenenemy, tank by tank, man by man, bynsuperior application of firepower. Thenwinner is usually the side with the bestn”kill-to-loss” ratio. Such tactics arenviewed by maneuver theorists as beingntoo crude, bloody and inflexible. In thenplace of attrition tactics, the maneuvernschool would employ a tactical doctrinenwhich emphasizes mobility, speed andnmaneuver—above all maneuver. By thenproper employment of these techniques,nso the theory goes, the enemy can be deprivednof the initiative, confused, cut offnand defeated in detail. Such tartics, thenmaneuver theorists argue, will permit annumerically inferior force to defeat ansuperior one.nUsing maneuver-warfare theory as thenaiteria by which to judge the performancenof tiie principal Allied field com­nnnmanders. Professor Weigley reaches thenharsh conclusion that the Allied leadershipnin general and the American leadershipnin particular was not only less effectiventhan it might have been, but thatnit also ” lacked a clear conception of war.”nBecause the American military establishmentnin the years prior to World War IIndid not effectively re-evaluate the assumptionsnunderpinning the army’snoperational methods, the United StatesnArmy entered the war with a tactical doctrinenthat stressed attrition instead ofnmaneuver and mobility at the expense ofnpower. Mr. Weigley traces the origins ofnthese assumptions to the unique historicalnexperience of the American army andnto operational concepts based in thenAmerican Civil War.nWhile deficient, perhaps, in tacticalnsophistication, the American officerncorps was not without able men, a numbernof whom were especially effective atnorganizational and logistical matters.nThat the officer corps should have sonmany logistical experts was no doubt anreflection of the American culture ofnplenty; it was also a reflection of the factnthat during the Civil War one of thenNorth’s most vexing problems was supplynlines choked with too many supplies.nThe curriculum of the Command andnGeneral Staff College, through whichnvirtually all senior American militarynleaders passed, devoted much attentionnto the problems of supply in war. InnWeigley’s view, this conttibuted to thencreation of an American military leadershipnmore adept at managing assets thannat leading men in combat.nV«onsidered against the criteria ofnmaneuver-warfare theory, Dwight D.nEisenhower does not fare well. GeneralnEisenhower favored fighting and advancingnon a broad front. Use of the rapid,ndeep thrust into enemy territory preferrednby the maneuver theorists found littlenfavor with Eisenhower. Eisenhowernsteadfastly held to his strategy evennthough, in Weigley’s judgment, thenAllies lacked the manpower reserves, armaments,nspare parts and ammunitionn