war was a continuation of the viciousnessnof the Indian-fighting army are alsondubious; such views smack of the fashionablenmyths of the Indian wars rathernthan reality. “Virtually every member ofnthe high command had spent most of hisncareer terrorizing Apaches, Comanches,nKiowas, and the Sioux. Some had takennpart in the massacre of Wounded Knee.”n(Unlike some Indians, the tribes mentionednwere fer from helpless innocents,nand, as S.L.A. Marshall and Robert Utleynhave shown, Wounded Knee was not anmassacre, though neither was it a creditnto the Army.)nCuriously, Miller is a bit unfair in hisnhandling of the opponents of the war,nthe anti-imperialists, although he is carefulnto defend them against the smears ofnMarxist critics. He su^ests that theynexhibited pri^shness and intellectualnarrogance and were out of touch withnthe times. The vigorous anti-imperialists,nhe shows, were mosdy upper-classnpeople a generation or more older thannmost of the imperialist leaders. Manynwere racists who disliked recent immigrantsnas well as nonwhites. PerhapsnMiller is oversensitive. While some ofnthe intellectual anti-imperialist leadersnof the Eastern elite were mild racists, thenanti-imperialist forces of the South andnWest were often rabid bigots whosenprime objection to annexing the Filipinosnwas their skin color. Many antiimperialists,nnotably Senator Hoar, werenrock-ribbed conservatives, while manynof their imperialist opponents, e.g., SenatornBeveridge and Theodore Roosevelt,nwere Progressives. Racism and antiracismnwere found on both sides of the politicalnspectrum, and if many imperialists believednracial stereotypes, they were oftennmuch milder racists than their opponents.nMiller’s avoidance of fashionable simplismsnin discussing this subject is asnpraiseworthy as his skill in presenting ancomplex situation with clarity. If somenof his analogies with Vietnam are lessnthan successful, it should be said thatnMiller, too, recognizes their limitations.nPerhaps the strongest point that Millernmakes is that of the enormous differencenin mental attitudes between the turn ofnthe century and today; the imperialismnof 1900 was based to a large extent onninflated American egotism and succeedednby manipulating naive and unquestioningnpatriotism, while the socallednantiwar movement of the 1960’snarose from and exploited the oppositenqualities. Though Miller might notnagree, both the imperialist and antiwarnmovements would seem to exemplifynthe danger of allowing intellectual fashionnto dictate foreign policy.nJWlcCarthyism is one embarrassingnaspect of modem history that is discussednfar more frequendy than the PhilippinenInsurrection—though the actual evilsninvolved were of less magtiitude. Indeed,nlamenting the supposed damage to civilnliberties in that era has become a veritablenindustry. Stanley Kuder’s The AmericannInquisition is a rather dismal contributionnto this genre. While real,nthough on the wholerather minor, evilsndid occur in the late 40’s and 50’s, Kutler’snbook is marked by exa^erationnand deviousness at strategic points. Henoften slides over the distinction betweennfalse accusations of espionage and communistnaflBliation and true ones. He can’tnget very excited about the latter; AlgernHiss remains only an “alleged” Sovietnagent—despite the decision of a jurynand Allen Weinstein’s research. Kuder’sndiscussion of real abuses is submergednin tripe and inaccuracy.nTwo of the cases discussed—^the trialnof Iva Toguri (“Tokyo Rose”) and thenEzra Pound case—^have nothing to donwith the Cold War. The prosecution ofnToguri, a victim of circumstances whonseems to have done nothing wrong, wasnan instance of petty revenge for supposednwartime betrayal. The use of psychiatrynthat enabled Ezra Pound to escapentrial may well have been dishonestnand deplorable, but it had litde to donwith an American “inquisition.” Thenonly function of the chapter on Poimdnseems to be to let Kutier vent his spleennagainst fascism and to display his doublenstandard. Most people would find it a bitnnndifficult to explain the difference betweennthe actions of Ezra Pound, whomnKutier correcdy excoriates, and those ofnJohn Wesley Powell, the pro-Chinesenpropagandist whom he defends.nKuder’s discussion is often vague andneven downright evasive. He spends annentire chapter, for example, deploringnthe prosecution for contempt of the defensenlawyers in the Smith Act case ofn1949. He is harshly critical of JudgenMedina’s handling of the matter. ButnKutier carefully avoids saying preciselynwhat the lav^yers did or were supposednto have done. The reader is just supposednto accept Kuder’s claim that itnwas all a dreadful exercise in repression.nKuder’s discussion of the before-mentionednJohn Wesley Powell case is evennmore tendentious. Powell, who ran annEnglish-language newspaper in Shanghai,nacted as a Chinese-communist propagandistnduring the Korean War, publicizingnthe communist charges that thenAmericans were waging germ warfare.nThe government made a fiunbling attemptnto try him for sedition after thenwar. Kutier manages to discuss the casenwithout mentioning the fact that then”confessions” of American prisoners ofnwar were extracted by torture; he thusnimplies that the United States mightnacmaUy have been guilty of both aggressionnand the use of germ vrarfere in KoreanIn his epilogue, Kutier unblushinglynpresents today’s fevorite lie: that the laten40’s and 50’s saw^ “repression unprecedentednin scale, intensity, and duration.”nWhatever one thinks of McCarthyismnand some of the antics of the loyalty andnsecurity system in the early 50’s, this isnsimply nonsense. U.S. history containsninstances of worse violations of civilnliberties than anything Kutier relatesnabout the 50’s. The 50’s had their faults,nbut only self-pitying leftists can find ann”inquisition” in that era. Since the realitiesnof that time have never been satisfectorynto Kutier and his ilk, they have toninvent a largely fictitious version of it.nThere have been embarrassing momentsnin American history. But the 1950’snwasn’t one of them. Dn5iiS39nJonel983n