ered that it was best for all that theynshould do so.” The dismal record of sonmany of the colonies since “independence”nspeaks volumes on this point.nKitchener was made a viscount andnwas voted 50,000 pounds for his SouthnAfrican service. Now quite wealthy,nhe dabbled in investments in tradenwith Japan, railroad building in Russia,nand a plantation in Kenya, butnbusiness was of little interest to him.nWith the rank of field marshal, henwent on to India as commander innchief of the Indian Army where henintroduced major reforms. He reorganizednthe Indian Army from scatteredngarrisons into nine divisions of threenbrigades each (one British, two Indian).n”He saw the task of the IndiannArmy not as acting as a safeguardnagainst another mutiny but as a meansnof defending the country . . . and, ifnthe need arose, of supplying units forntasks overseas.” The need arose withnWorld War I. Four Indian divisionsnwere rushed to France, two more wentnto Egypt where they stopped a Turkishninvasion, and two protected the oilnfields in Mesopotamia.nKitchener quarreled with Lord Curzon,nthe viceroy, over the authority ofnthe viceroy’s military departmentn(headed by an officer of inferior rank)nto overrule the commander in chiefnCurzon resigned in 1905, but the Liberalngovernment under Asquith re-nMOVING?nLET US KNOW BEFORE YOU GO!nTo assure uninterrupted delivery ofnChronicles, please notify us in advancenSend change of address on this form withnthe mailing label from your latest issue ofnChronicles to: Subscription Department,nChronicles, P.O. Box 800, Mount Morris,nIllinois 61054.nName_nAddress.nCitynState_ _Zip_n30 / CHRONICLESnfused to appoint Kitchener viceroy.nKitchener instead returned to Egypt asnconsul general.nHis record as a military reformernand battlefield victor made him thenobvious choice in 1914 as secretary ofnstate for war. He understood the naturenof the war and contrary to thenoptimism of others argued that the warnwould last at least three years. The warnwould not be won by the first millionntroops England sent into battle but bynthe last million which could be raised.nFirepower was the key, and Kitchenernemphasized the need for industrialnmobilization. He was disgusted by thenfact that while men were dying at thenfront, factories eould still be closed bynstrikers demanding higher pay.nThe field marshal was appalled bynthe lack of military preparedness,nblaming not only the politicians butnthe general staff for neglecting its dutynto press the government for morenfunds. Germany could put three millionnmen in the field with substantialnreserves. Excluding colonial forces,nEngland had fewer than 250,000 regularsnand 450,000 territorials (who werennot obligated to serve overseas). Thencontinental armies were conscript,nwhile England still relied on volunteers.nKitchener had favored conscriptionnbefore the war but now opted for anrecruiting campaign more in step withnBritish tradition (England did not go tonthe draft until 1916). The response wasnoverwhelming with two and a halfnmillion men rushing to the colors.nIn the post-Vietnam era it is hard tonpicture a society in which those whondid not enlist were harassed in thenstreets and sent white feathers by theirngirlfriends. The poster in which Kitchenernsternly stares out and points hisnfinger at the viewer with the captionn”Your Country Needs You” becamenthe model for the classic “Uncle SamnWants You” poster adopted in thenUnited States. (Kitchener’s stern looknwas the result of eye and facial nervendamage sustained from a marchnthrough a sandstorm.) Warner includesncopies of other posters used tonattract enlistment which stress the integralnnature of loyalty and duty withinnsociety. One urges “the young womennof London” to ask their boyfriends tonenlist because “If your young mannneglects his duty to his King andnCountry, the time may come when hennnwill neglect you.”nWarner laments in his introductionnthat “Dying for one’s country has andiminished appeal in the late twentiethncentury.”nIn fact, the whole idea ofnpatriotism has become suspectnin many European countries.nIn Britain there seems to be anwidespread credo that to benproud of one’s homeland andnheritage is wrong. The ideasnand beliefs of immigrantnpeoples must be given equalnplace to the ones traditionallynassociated with this country. Innconsequence. Kitchener’snstatement that “your countrynneeds you” has been renderednalmost meaningless.nIn our time the grand and wealthyncivilization of the West trembles beforenthe barbarians of the East andnSouth.nTrench warfare ground up the newndivisions in France. Kitchener’s reputationnas the Empire’s greatest generalnwas damaged as the casualties mounted.nSir John French’s attack at Loosnand Winston Churchill’s expedition tonthe Dardanelles were not conceived bynKitchener, but he was won to theirnsupport despite fears England did notnyet have the strength to see themnthrough. Thus he shared the blamenwhen they failed. Warner argues,nhowever, that both plans came close tonsuccess, laying the blame on theirntactical execution rather than theirnstrategic conception.nKitchener’s time was taken up morenby diplomatic and production problemsnthan with the kind of militarynduties which had made his reputation.nWarner argues that he “virtually assumednthe role of wartime Prime Minister”nin part because the Liberal leaders,nAsquith and Lloyd-George, werentoo busy chasing women (in the latterncase “with all the discrimination of annamorous rabbit”). It was on a missionnto Russia to see what could be done tonprop up the eastern front that Kitchenernwas killed when the cruiser Hampshire,non which he was traveling,nstruck a mine and sank. Warner speculatesnthat Kitchener “might have preventednthe disasters in Russia whichnled to the revolution,” but that seemsnto be carrying matters too far.n