What kind of crises? Fugate warns:rn”risks to European security remain,rnwhich are multifaceted and multidirectional,rnsuch as international criminal networks,rnand thus hard to grasp and assess.”rnFor this, America must remain the dominantrnpartner in a transatlantic military alliance,rnmaintaining 100,000 troops inrnEurope? To fight crime?rnThe issue is not isolation versus engagement,rnbut what kind of engagement.rnThe Lhiited States possesses the strongestrnmilitary, largest economy, and mostrndominant culture on the planet. Ratherrnthan feeling threatened by every minorrncivil war or social disturbance, she canrnremain secure, choosing when to intervene.rnThat is, she can exercise tlie sort ofrndiscernment and selectivity implied byrnreal leadership.rnReal leadership also means devolvingrnsecurih’ responsibilities upon populousrnand prosperous allies. The Cold Warrnthreats to America and its allies havernlargely abated; moreover, the capabilitiesrnof the latter to defend themselves haverndramatically increased. They haven’trnbothered to do much more, hov ever. Almostrnfour years ago. Gen. John Sheehan,rnthen Supreme Allied Commander of thernAtlantic, warned of “the technologicalrngap between the United States and Europe.rnSoon the other members of NATOrnwill be little more than constabularyrnforces, with the United States possessingrnthe only genuine modern army.” He wasrnright. Even the Europeans were embarrassedrnby their appalling performance inrnKosoo, fielding just 10 to 15 percent ofrnAmerica’s combat capabilities. That reflectsrnlack of effort, not resources. Theyrnare fully capable of doing much more.rnThey won’t, however, because theyrndon’t believe thev need to. Thev perceivernthe potential risks differently. Most importantly,rnthey recognize that Washingtonrnis determined to protect them—evenrnif they do nothing. To continue smotheringrnEurope in America’s military embracernwill only encourage continued irresponsibilitv’.rnTrue, the Europeans are pressing torncreate a 60,000-man rapid-deploymentrnforce by 2003, but there is little in therncontinent’s past behavior to suggest thatrnthe plan will become more than talk.rnSuch a force will require real resources,rnsomething the Europeans have not beenrnwilling to provide, as long as thev can relyrnon America.rnU.S. officials recognize the problemrnwithout acknowledging the cause. FormerrnDefense Secretary William Cohenrncomplained that, “At a time when thernUnited States is embarking on the largestrnsustained increase in defense spending inrn15 years, some allies have announced onlyrnmodest increases, while others are eitherrnbarely maintaining spending levelsrnor are reducing inveshiients in defense.”rnGerman officials have told John Hulsmanrnof the Heritage Foundation thatrntheir military spending may drop to justrn1.1 percent’of GDP, one third of U.S.rnlevels.rnAmerica’s untoward generosity createsrnanother problem: It encourages Europeansrnto hand off their problems tornAmerica—problems such as the Balkans,rnwhich is growing ever messier, with ethnicrnAlbanian guerrillas operating inrnMacedonia and Serbia, or an expandingrnEuropean Union.rnLast year, European CommissionrnPresident Romano Prodi, while visitingrnLatvia, said that the European Unionrnwould issue security guarantees for allrnE.U. members, four of whom are notrnmembers of NATO. Given the absencernof any E.U. military—let alone an effectivernone —the enforcement burden willrninevitably fall on America, as would protectionrnof more distant states, such as thernnine Central and Eastern Europeanrncountries that have requested to be admittedrnto NATO in 2002.rnThe same problems are evident withrnU.S. policy in the Far East. China mayrnpose the most potent potential long-termrnthreat to America; however, the chiefrndanger would be to Washington’s dominancernin East Asia, not the Americanrnhomeland. The best way to discouragernaggressive behavior b’ Beijing is to encouragernthose states with the most at stakernto take o’er their own defense.rnA sophisticated Taiwanese militaryrnwould help deter Chinese adventurism.rnJapan could create and maintain the airrnand naval forces necessary to defend bothrnitself and nearby sea lanes. If the Philippinesrnis determined to spar with Beijingrnover the Spratiy Islands, it needs to developrna serious navy. And so on. The UnitedrnStates should stand back and act as arndistant balancer, instead of immediaternmeddler. But the Asians will not take onrnnew defense responsibilities if we continuernto dominate.rnWashington should begin devolvingrnsecuritv’ responsibilities to its allies. ThernBalkans is the obvious place to start. ThernEuropeans argue that they already providernmore than 80 percent of the troopsrnand 90 percent of the financial assistancernin the region. That means that theyrncould provide J 00 percent without anyrnstrain. Indeed, where better to begin deployingrnthe nascent rapid-deploymentrnforce?rnMoreover, U.S. forces have cause tornleave—and quickly. Kosovo and Macedoniarnare catastrophes ready to erupt.rnBosnia is little better—an artificial staternmarked by pervasive corruption and festeringrnhostilitv’ that sun’ives only throughrna foreign military occupation. Any untowardrnincident, like the Mogadishu shootoutrnin Somalia, will generate overwhelmingrnpublic demands to withdraw, withrnthe I3ush administration left holding thernbag.rnThere is no reason for the UnitedrnStates —which, unlike its allies, carriesrnglobal burdens —to garrison ever)’ localrntrouble spot, especially when neighboringrnstates have both more interests atrnstake and sufficient resources to act.rnNATO is “the greatest alliance in history,”rnargued Secretary Cohen. Secretar)’rnof State Colin Powell calls it “sacrosanct.”rnBut an institution so wonderfulrnshould be capable of adapting, both inrnterms of perceived threats and the resourcesrnavailable to meet those threats.rnWashington should encourage developmentrnof a truly independent Europeanrndefense capability. Then the Europeansrncould handle civil wars in the Balkansrnand the securitv of E.U. members. Andrnthe United States could worry about thernbig stuff, such as the reemergence of a seriousrnhegemonic threat.rnDoug Bandow is a senior fellow at thernCato Institute and a former specialrnassistant to President Reagan.rnETHICSrnInvasion of thernOrgan Snatchersrnby Alberto CarosarnThe heated discussion of humanrncloning and related genetic issues isrnovershadowing another, equally crucial,rndebate, on organ donation and transplantation.rnThe hvo debates have a commonrnfeature: They are increasingly dividingrnthose who are called to deal with thesernproblems, including medical doctors,rnAUGUST 2001/45rnrnrn