(b) he therefore never betrays the slightestrninkling that the power of the overclassrnis rooted, as Burnham understood, in therncentralized managerial state constructedrnb- the very “national liberals” whomrnLind takes as his heroes. The overclass orrnmanagerial elite could not exist as arndominant group apart from its dependencernon the federal governmentrn(and mini-leviathans at the state andrnmetropolitan levels), the large corporations,rnand the managerial intelligentsiarnin the mass media and academic institutionsrnthat give the elite its credentialsrnand technical training and also serve tornredesign and discipline national culturernon behalf of the elite’s interests. Therniron triangle among state, corporation,rnand intelligentsia distinguishes the overclassrnfrom the earlier elite of the bourgeois-rncapitalist order, which used thernstate only as expedient and always regardedrngovernmental power as a potentialrnthreat to its interests.rnBecause it depends on the centralrnstate, the overclass cannot support a politicalrnideology that seeks to restrict thernpowers and size of the state. Lind, however,rnimagines that the overclass is doingrnexactly that by its embrace of contemporaryrnconservatism, which he also imaginesrnis seriously committed to restrictingrnthe state; and he can sustain this argumentrnonly because cither he knows veryrnlittle about organized conservatism inrnthis country today, or his thesis requiresrnthat he distort what he does know.rnThe “conservatism” that Lind seeksrnmost to pulverize is neoconservatisnirnand its allies in the ChristianrnCoalition and the mainstream conservativernmovement it has come to dominate;rnthe targets of his wrath are such neoeonservatirne idols as supply-side economics,rnthe “culture war” that neoconservativerngurus claim is rooted in the “new class,”rnthe “Confederate Theory of the Constitution”rnas articulated by such paragonsrnof juridical erudition as ClarencernThomas, and the “racism” and “new SocialrnDarwinism” he spies in various recentrnbooks by conservative or neoconservati’rne writers. The problem is thatrnalmost none of his targets seriously seeksrnthe restriction of state power; at bestrnmost of them seek merely an “amelioration”rnof the existing state apparatusrnrather than a real restoration of authenticrnfederalism. So far from conforming tornthe supposed need of Lind’s overclass tornrestrict state power, the neoconservativernpart of the overclass seeks the preservationrnof the managerial state. That, indeed,rnis why it can plausibly be calledrn”conservative” at all: what it wants tornconserve is the managerial state constructedrnby the national liberalism thatrnLind adores and the overclass dominationrnof American society that the managerialrnstate makes possible.rnBut among others on the Americanrnright—the Old Right, the Hard Right,rnand the Far Right—there is a much morernauthentic opposition to the state; and, inrnpart to sustain his thesis that the Americanrnright as a whole is dedicated to restrictingrnthe power of the state and inrnpart to vent his own resentments at beingrnignored by it, Lind must lump themrnall together with the neoeonservatives,rnarguing that the right in its entirety is arnunitary movement controlled by thernoverclass. He correctly acknowledgesrnthat “in the 1990’s, conservative intellectuals,rnbereft of a social base, continue tornexist as a group only because of subsidiesrnfrom foundations and corporations forrntheir little magazines and think-tankrncareers. They are generals without anrnarmy.” Hence, he argues, they have tornconscript the only segments of the rightrnthat do have a mass following, which justrnhappen to be those that are authenticalh’rnopposed to the present size, scope, andrnextent of federal power. It is the HardrnRight, not its neoconservative rivals, thatrndoes indeed seek revolution of a kind,rnagainst the overclass, the managerialrnstate that keeps it in power, and the ideologicalrnvehicles that provide justificationsrnfor it, whether “national liberalism”rnor its cousin, neoconservatism; but becausernLind never grasps the differencesrnbetween the two warring camps of thernright, he manages to miss entirely thernclass struggle that underlies their conflict.rnThe war between the Hard Rightrnand the neoconservative Soft Right is reallyrna social and political struggle betweenrnMiddle Americans and the overclassrnor managerial elite.rnllnable to identify much support fromrnbaronets of the managerial regime likernBill Kristol, Bill Bennett, or Jack Kemprnfor any genuine reduction of state power,rnLind must pack them all in the samernbasket as the emerging populist right,rnboth violent and nonviolent, and it is atrnthis point that he takes blithe wing intornthe happy skies of political paranoia.rnThe contemporary American farrnright has both public, politicalrnwings (the Christian Coalition, thernNational Rifle Association, ProjectrnRescue) and its covert, paramilitary,rnterrorist factions. Althoughrnthe Christian Coalition and OperationrnRescue offtcially denouncernviolence, the fact remains that arncommon worldview animates bothrnthe followers of Pat Robertson andrnPat Buchanan and the far-right extremistsrnwho bomb abortion clinics,rnmurder federal marshals andrncounty sheriffs, and blow up buildingsrnand trains.rnThe “common worldview,” it turns out,rnis “summed up” as “ZOG”—the labelrnthat the violent and anti-Semitic fringernof the extreme right uses to designate thern”Zionist Occupied Government.” Lindrnmerrily identifies ZOC with Buchanan’srn”Israel’s amen corner” (a reference to thernIsraeli lobby, not the government) andrnRobertson’s “New World Order,” neitherrnof which has anything to do with it.rnIndeed, in his sedulous researches tornshow that everyone on the Americanrnright from Norman Podhoretz to GordonrnKahl is an anti-Semite or a covertrnneo-Nazi fellow-traveler, Lind lapses intornranting.rnThus, his chapter on the “new SocialrnDarwinism” claims that Charies Murrayrnand Richard Herrnstein, Peter Brimelow,rnand Dinesh D’Souza are all part of a conservative-rnmovement plot to revive racialism,rnbut he ignores how the books ofrnthese writers were received, as well asrnwhat the books themselves actually say.rnMurray and Hermstein’s The Bell Curvernbecame a best-seller without the help ofrnneoeonservatives, who failed to promoternit as they did Murray’s earlier book LosingrnGround, and who in fact were quickrnto drop it when it ran into frenetic denunciationsrnfrom the left. Brimelow’srnAlien Nation, arguing for immigration restrictions,rnalso was not well received byrnthe neoeonservatives and the mainstreamrnright, which continue to be just asrnwedded to uncontrolled immigration asrnever. D’Souza’s book prompted the immediaternresignation of two black colleaguesrnfrom the American EnterprisernInstitute, and soon vanished from thernneoconservative Christmas reading list.rnMoreover, of the three books, neitherrnD’Souza’s nor Brimelow’s makes geneticrnarguments about race; only The BellrnCurve does so—gingerly. Lind has nothingrnof substance to say in response tornMurray’s and Herrnstein’s argument,rnDECEMBER 1996/31rnrnrn