presence an offense to their “national”rndignity. Is there any doubt that, amongrnnon-minority Americans, there would berna nationalist reaction, not only over therntreatment of dispossessed “Americans” inrnthe minority-ruled statelets but againstrnthe dismemberment itself?rnThis, roughly, is the position that Russiarnand the Russians now find themselvesrnin, with the dismantling of the SovietrnUnion. To be sure, as Wayne Aliensworthrninsightfully describes the spectrumrnof Russian national opinion, therernhas been a reaction against the vivisectionrnof Russia’s national territory’ that occurredrnin 1991, by which the Sovietrnregime was finally laid to rest. Yet what isrnsurprising is not that this reaction has occurredrnbut that, given the increasing miseryrninto which most Russians have beenrnplunged in the post-Soviet era, it has notrnbeen a more forceful one. A stock themernof some of the more extreme (and numericallyrninsignificant) nationalist elements,rnsuch as Aleksandr Barkashov’srnproto-Nazi movement, Russian NationalrnUnity, is the international anti-Russianrnconspiracy, in whichrnthe United States works in concertrnwith the International MonetaryrnFund (IMF), the U.N., NATO,’rnand an internationalist-orientedrnelite in the mass media to underminernRussian sovereignt)’, militaryrnsecurity, and cultural identity.rnGiven, however, the role of U.S. “experts”rnin turning Russia’s post-Soviet privatizationrninto the biggest looting of arnnation’s resources in world history (estimatedrnby some authorities at upward ofrn$400 billion), coupled with a U.S. policyrn(begun under Bush but compoundedrnunder Clinton) that is cynically contemptuousrnof Russia’s legitimate interestsrnin the Caucasus, the Balkans, and thern”near abroad” (that is, the newly independentrnstates, first delineated as administrativernsubdivisions within the U.S.S.R.rnby Lenin and Stalin, the borders ofrnwhich the United States now considersrnsacred), and the threat posed by an unnecessaryrnand gratuitous expansion ofrnNATO, the mystery is not why somernRussians go in for conspiracy theoriesrnbut why most have not—yet. (Back inrnthe days of communism, the UnitedrnStates meekly acquiesced in the “BrezhnevrnDoctrine,” under which the SovietrnUnion had the right to ensure that socialistrnstates would remain eternally socialist.rnBut today, not only is post-commimistrnRussia not entitled to a MonroernDoctrine in its owir neighborhood, it isrnregarded as aggression per se if Moscowrnobjects to the establishment of an Americanrnsphere of influence in areas vital tornRussia, but of negligible importance tornAmerica.)rnAllensworth, a Russia analyst at thernU.S. government’s Foreign Broadcast InformationrnSer’ice, is superbly equippedrnto explain the complexities and nuancesrnof the kaleidoscopic variations of Russianrnnationalist opinion. Allowing, perhaps,rnthe wish to become father to the thought,rnAllensworth confronts the dominantrnanti-nationalism of American policy—rnanti-nationalist in its hostility not only tornRussian nationalism but to American nationalismrnand to every other manifestation,rnin any country, of a patriotic consciousnessrnnot completely subordinate tornglobalist ideology—with the fact (or atrnleast the hope) that Russia is down butrnnot yet out. “Russia is at a crossroads. Arnchoice must be made, not between nationalismrnand internationalism but betweenrnRussian irationalisms.” Fromrnamong the contenders to succeed thernterminally decrepit Boris Yeltsin and hisrnhopelessly corrupt U.S.-supported regime,rnhe clearly prefers retired generalrnAleksandr Lebed, now governor ofrnSiberia’s Krasnoyarsk region and a leadingrnadvocate of what Allensworth callsrn”reform nationalism.” As the most constructivernvariant of nationalist opinion,rnreform nationalism, Allensworth suggests,rnnot only can restore Russia to thernstatus of a respectable great power in arnvery dangerous neighborhood; it has thernmoral authorit)’ to pull the countrj’ out ofrnthe domestic morass into which it hasrnsunk. Echoing Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,rnthe acknowledged godfather of OrthodoxrnChristian patriotism in Russia,rnLebed believes that a healthy Russiarnmust be reestablished on authentic nationalrntraditions —notably, the mutualrnreinforcement of the army and thernChurch. (While Solzhenitsyn is, ofrncourse, a professed Orthodox Christian,rnLebed, so far as this reviewer knows, hasrnnever declared his religious faith. He hasrncriticized former Soviet apparatchikirnwho have opportunistically rushed to declarernthemselves believers in the postcommunistrnera; on the other hand,rnLebed was the only presidential contenderrnto attend the recent interment ofrnthe royal martyrs, Nicholas II and hisrnfamily, at the Peter and Paul F’ortress inrnSt. Petersburg.) As Lebed puts it in hisrnautobiography:rnSo let us remember what Russiarnstands on, and return the Church,rnwhich was separated from the state,rnto its bosom and create a powerfulrnspiritual state institution. And seriously,rnthoughtfully, as we can bernwhen we want to be, let us reformrnthe army and bring it back to itsrnformer might and grandeur. ThernChurch strengthens the army; thernarmy defends the Church. And onrnthis restored spiritual axis—the twornforces of our great power—we canrnbegin to feel like Russians again.rnTo feel like Russians again. It is hard tornread Allensworth’s book without mentallyrncomparing, more than once, the parallelsrnbetween nationalism in Russia andrnthe quandary of American national identit)’.rnWhen will we be permitted to feelrnlike Americans again? While Foster’srnSoyiet-st}’le plan for American denationalizationrnnever made it past the drawingrnboard, other programs, structurally differentrnbut kindred in spirit—multiculturalismrnin education, multilingualism,rnaffirmative action, dual citizenship, uncontrolledrnimmigration—have confusedrnand demoralized Americans’ nationalrnconsciousness. In the final analysis, despiternthe genocidal ministrations of thernSoviet regime and the dashed hopes ofrnde-communization, Russians still knowrnthey are Russians. Yet how many Americans,rnby comparison, can describe withrnany degree of coherence who we are as arnpeople? Indeed, apart from the universalistrncant about “one nation, many peoples”rnthat has become de rigueur in publicrndiscourse today, is it even permissiblernto speak of an American “nationality” atrnall?rnThe question is hardly an idle one. Allensworthrnaptly closes his book with arnchapter on “The Global Regime and thernNationalist Reaction”:rnThe conclusive stage of the economic,rnpolitical, and social rationalizationrnthat began in early modernrnEurope is its globalization.rnThe fear that all nationalists expressrnof the developing hegemonicrnglobal monoculture is inextricablyrntied to their intuitive grasp of thernfundamental meaning of modernism’srnfinal drive toward dominance:rnThe real question facingrnAPRIL 1999/29rnrnrn