decision. Theretofore, state legislativernapportionment had been treated by thernCourt as a nonjusticiable political question.rnBrennan, however, brought it intornthe adjudicatory ambit by removing itrnfrom the Guaranty Clause and declaringrnit an equal-protection issue, thereby assuringrnthe ultimate outcome in a subsequentrncase: one man, one vote. In arnpenetrating dissent, Frankfurter denouncedrnthis remarkable arrogation ofrnpower: “There is not under our Constitutionrna judicial remedy for every politicalrnmischief, for every undesirable exercisernof legislative power. The Framersrncarefully and with deliberate forethoughtrnrefused to enthrone the judiciary. Inrnthis situation, as in others of like nature,rnappeal for relief does not belong here.rnAppeal must be to an informed, civicallyrnmilitant electorate.” He added: “Thernnotion that representation proportionedrnto the geographic spread of population isrnso universally accepted as a necessary elementrnof equality … that it must be takenrnto be the standard of a political equalityrnpreserved by the Fourteenth Amendmentrn. . . is, to put it bluntly, not true.”rnThis type of rigorous textual and historicalrnargument mattered little to a Courtrnon the long march to electoral Utopia.rnSubstantive Due Process. In GriswoldrnV. Connecticut (1965), the Courtrnstruck down a Connecticut statute thatrncriminalized the sale of contraceptivesrnand their use by married couples; in orderrnto reach this conclusion, it created arn”right to privacy” from the “penumbras”rnand “emanations” of the Bill of Rights.rnThe author of this sloppy nonsense wasrnDouglas, but Eisler makes it clear that itrnwas Brennan who masterminded thernradical core of the opinion: “Brennan’srnarguments persuaded Douglas to changernhis rationale. As a result, the Court statedrnfor the first time that the Americanrncitizen had a ‘right to privacy.’ And itrnwas that Brennan-formulated principlernwhich would ultimately flower into anrneven more controversial and contentiousrnissue—a woman’s right to an abortion.”rnIndeed, in Roe v. Wade (1973), JusticernBlackmun initially drafted a narrow opinionrnon the subject of abortion; it wasrnBrennan who pushed for and securedrnthe most sweeping abortion law in thernWestern worid. Moreover, Brennan hadrnset the tenor for Roe with his opinion inrnEisenstadt v. Baird (1972). This casernproved to be an important link betweenrnGriswold and Roe, inasmuch as it involvedrnthe extension of the right of contraceptionrnto the population generally,rnregardless of marital status. Brennanrnrecklessly noted that “if the right of privacyrnmeans anything, it is that right ofrnthe individual, married or single, to bernfree from unwarranted government intrusionrninto matters so fundamentallyrnaffecting a person as the decisionrnwhether to bear or beget a child.” Thernframework, then, was set; abortion simplyrnhad to be placed within it by therncase that rivals Dred Scott in infamy.rnAffirmative Action. In Board of Regentsrnof the University of California v.rnBakke (1977), Justice Lewis Powell wroternan opinion that would have eliminatedrnrace as a factor in university admissions.rnBrennan, however, ever the adroit behind-rnthe-scenes politician, convincedrnPowell to reconsider. Professor BernardrnSchwartz concisely comments on thernoutcome: “If not for Brennan, indeed, itrnis probable that the Burger Court wouldrnhave ruled all racial preferences unconstitutional.rnHe saw the opportunity tornchange the Powell unqualified voternagainst the Davis [the medical schoolrnthat had refused Bakke admission] specialrnadmissions program to one that reversedrnthe lower court’s refusal to allowrnrace to be considered.” Brennan, in hisrnseparate opinion in Bakke, wrote:rn”Government may take race into accountrnwhen it acts not to demean or insultrnany racial group, but to remedy disadvantagesrncast on minorities by pastrnracial prejudice.” Of course affirmativernaction—which invariably translates intornquotas—demeans and insults the grouprnit purports to help. After all, if you canrnmake it on vour own, then why do yournneed help? In Johnson v. TransportationrnAgency, Santa Clara County (1987),rnBrennan again demonstrated his zeal forrndivisive affirmative-action plans, even atrnthe expense of coherent statutory construction.rnJohnson involved a countyrnprogram that favored women in promotionsrnbecause of their sex; there was nornevidence of past discrimination. Thisrn28/CHRONICLESrnrnrn