I must say that he is simply wrong onrnboth counts. Just because an ideologyrnultimately leads to disaster for the classrnthat peddles it, it does not follow that thernclass expected to gain nothing from itsrnadoption. Nazi state managers enjoyed arnhell of a ride while it lasted, and the earlyrnpolihcal and military successes of thernNational Socialist state gave them everyrnmaterial incentive to support its ideology.rnAs for mass immigration, it ought tornbe obvious that both corporate and bureaucraticrnelites benefit from it, the onernby gaining cheap labor, the other by acquiringrna new underclass on which theyrnmay tinker even further with their managerialrnskills.rnNor is it the case that a class simplyrnpretends to believe in an ideology, asrnGottfried suggests I believe. “J”or allrnthese writers,” he writes, meaning myself,rnBurnham, and C. Wright Mills,rn”ideology takes a back seat to socialrnforces in explaining modern politicalrnorganization;” but “When conservativernRepublican Congressman Dick Armeyrnlectures his Texas constituents on thernneed for even higher levels of immigrationrnfrom Mexico, it is not opportunismrnbut ideological fervor that explains hisrnbehavior.” What really explains Republicanrncongressmen like Mr. Armey isrnprobably sheer stupidity, but even cognitiverndysfunction need not be invoked asrnan explanation. I have no doubt whatsoeverrnthat Mr. Armey does truly andrndeeply believe in mass immigration andrnthat he is in large part motivated by hisrnbeliefs. The point is that it is irrelevantrnwhat he believes; the regime —the system,rnthe society, the apparatus by whichrnthe managerial class dominates —demandsrnmass immigration, and leadersrnlike Mr. Armey emerge in response tornthat demand. They are elected and acquirernleadership positions because thern”social forces”—the interest groups thatrnhelp manage and finance campaignsrnand elections, the media that condemnrnimmigration restrietionism and eulogizernthose who oppose immigration controls,rnthe organized voting blocs that help determinernwho gets elected—push themrninto leadership and either ignore or pushrnout anyone who neglects their interests.rnSince Gottfried readily acknowledgesrnthat opinion polls show strong majoritiesrnopposed to mass immigration, how elserncan he explain its continuation if strategicallvrnpowerful social forces are notrnpushing it and those who support it? Inrnthe absence of such social forces and of arnpopular consensus in favor of immigration,rnleaders like Dick Armey could neitherrnemerge at all nor survive in leadershiprnpositions simply because theyrnhappen to “believe in” open borders.rnIhave no major quarrel with Gottfried’srnargument that those who espouse liberalismrn(or what passes for it) really believernin their stated beliefs, but acknowledgingrnthis does not help explain whyrnthose who believe in some ideas triumphrnover others who believe in different ones.rnYet his emphasis on ideology leads him,rnin my view, to concentrate too much onrnthe historical and philosophical analysisrnof ideas rather than of the social forcesrnthat do explain what triumphs andrnwhat loses. His book would have beenrnstronger had he paid more attention tornsocial forces such as managerial corporationsrnand their elites as engines of socialrnreconstruction. As a critical dissection ofrnthe ideology of the “liberal democratic”rnstate that prevails today, however, Gottfried’srnbook is unparalleled since JamesrnBurnham’s Suicide of the West. LikernBurnham, he shows in luxurious detailrnhow those who repeatedly invoke “pluralism”rn—Horace Kallen, TheodorernLowi, Ronald Dworkin, and Amy Gutmann,rnamong others —contradict theirrnown premises and expose themselves,rnwith their saccharine-sounding agendasrnof “tolerance,” “diversity,” and “harmony,”rnas crypto-authoritarians whose ideasrnjustify not only the suppression of oppositionrnbut also what Gottfried calls, in arnphrase that should be perpetuated, “therndehumanization of dissent,” by whichrnanyone who disagrees with the “pluralistic”rndeconstruction and delegitimizationrnof bourgeois society is less than human,rncertainly less than rational, an “authoritarianrnpersonality,” a “status-frustrated”rnvictim of alienation, a subject morernsuitable for the analyst’s couch or thernpadded cell than a mind to be arguedrnwith. This contradiction of pluralism’srnown premises is not a lapse in logic butrnrather part of a calculated strategy byrnwhich the suppression and delegitimizationrnof dissent by the managerial state isrnjustified.rnOnce initiated, this mission continuedrnbeyond the point at whichrnmoderate pluralists wished to havernit stop. For if the state is to be empowered,rnas all pluralists believe itrnmust, to fight “prejudice” throughrnsocial engineering, why should itrnlimit its energies to “anti-Semites”rnor “racists”? The pluralist mandaternfor change can be and has beenrnapplied to other ambitious ventures,rnwhich like earlier ones haverncome at the expense of social freedom.rnWith due respect to its formerrnpractitioners now sufferingrnsecond thoughts, all phases of pluralismrnreveal the same tendencies,rnthe ascendancy of the managerialrnstate and its restructuring of socialrnrelations.rnGottfried’s book is probably destinedrnto become a classic of contemporaryrnconser’ative thought and to endure longrnafter the tracts and pamphlets of neoconservativernsloganeers are forgotten.rnWhether one takes the ideas themselvesrnor the social forces behind them as thernprimary engines, Paul Gottfried showsrnclearly that the totalitarian imperatives ofrnmodern post-liberalism are inherent inrnthe ideology itself and not an accidentalrnaccretion that is epiphenomenal to modernization.rnIn this respect, After Liberalismrnbelongs in the same category asrnSuicide of the West and The Road to Serfdom.rnAbsent the hegemony of the managerialrnclass and its apologists on thernright and the left, it might come to enjoyrnthe same stature and influence thosernclassics have acquired. crnAfter Liberalism: Mass Democracy and the Managerial Statern*^ Tn Western Europe and North America, [the] state rests its power upon a multi-rnJ. tiered following: an underclass and now middle-class welfariate, a self-assertivernpublic sector, and a vanguard of media and journalistic public defenders. . . . [T]hernregime and its apologists have been able to marginalize their opposition. This isrnapparent on . . . the now respectable or moderate Right. There a tolerated oppositionrnoffers tepid criticism of the administrative state while warning against populistrnextremism.”rn— Paul GottfriedrnFEBRUARY 1999/27rnrnrn