Mitchell, the owner of a small farm, andrnPhilip “Wigle” Vigol were convicted ofrntreason. Months later. President Washingtonrnpardoned both, while aroundrnPittsburgh, Slaughter observes, “overrn2,000 of the most disaffected frontiersmenrnmigrated farther into the continent’srninterior, thereby ensuring forrnthemselves at least a temporary escapernfrom the ever-lengthening arm andrnincreasingly strong grip of the centralrngovernment.”rnHad he been living in those years, it isrnmy bet that my grandfather, given hisrnself-reliance, grit, and steely resolve to dornthings his own way, would have been outrnfi’ont in that migration.rnRalph R. Reiland is an associate professorrnof economics at Robert Morris Collegernin Pittsburgh.rnFOREIGN AFFAIRSrnCommies inrnD.C.—Againrnby Lawrence B. SulcrnDid Asian operatives, some of themrnconnected with the People’s Republicrnof China, influence the WhiternHouse, the Department of Commerce,rnand other offices of the executivernbranch? This is one of the questions ofrnthe day concerning the Clinton administration.rnThe Senate Committee on GovernmentrnAffairs has said that it “believes thatrnhigh-level Chinese government officialsrncrafted a plan to increase China’s influencernover the U.S. political process. . . .rnOur investigation suggests the plan continuesrntoday. . . . Importantly, the FBIrntold the White House about the Chinesernplan in June 1996, when two FBI agentsrnbriefed two representatives of the NationalrnSecurity Council . . . the FBIrnplaced no limitation on sharing the information,rnmuch of which the WhiternHouse had independent access tornthrough other means.” The Democraticrnminority of the committee agrees with atrnleast the first part of this statement.rnAs grave as these developments are forrnthe nation’s security, it is both interestingrnand instructive to recall that communistrnpenetration of the White House and otherrngovernment entities has an earlierrncounterpart—a half-century ago. Thernoutline of earlier penetration operationsrnhas been apparent to interested observersrnfor many years, but fuller details are nowrnemerging. It was clear enough at therntime, but now it is even more conclusivernand specific: Soviet intelligence penetratedrnthe Washington administration ofrnPresident Pranklin Roosevelt, using asrnagents high-level officials in the WhiternHouse as well as in executive departments.rnThe information obtained, andrnthe influence exerted, benefited the Sovietsrnimmensely in the ensuing ColdrnWar, and the cost to the West in wealthrnand human resources was tremendous.rnDuring the I930’s, numerous Americanrncommunists acquired jobs in the administration,rnsome of them rising to highrnpositions. A number of these New Dealersrnwere communists working under therndirecfion of Soviet intelligence, often inrndouble capacities as both collectors of intelligencernand agents of influence. AsrnWhittaker Chambers, himself a formerrnSoviet agent, explained to his erstwhilernemployer, Henry Luce of Time magazine,rnbeing a communist and a Sovietrnintelligence agent were the same thing.rnAs more recent events show, however,rncommunist ideology is not a requirementrnfor being a communist intelligencernagent. Ideology may be useful,rnbut money can be a better motivator. Intelligencernagents for communist countriesrntoday are often convinced capitalists,rntheir services bought with cash or thernpromise of future profits. Some of thernAsian operatives working in Washingtonrntoday undoubtedly fit this category. Thernlate Armand Hammer was both anrnAmerican capitalist and a Soviet sympathizer.rnIn fact, he was an Americanrncapitalist for the Soviet Union.rnToday’s counterintelligence officialsrn(and outside scholars) are uncoveringrnmany details of communist penetrationsrnof the White House in the I930’s andrn40’s. They have received help from severalrnsources: recent access to Soviet documentsrn—particularly files of the CommunistrnInternational (Comintern),rnopened for a time in the former SovietrnUnion—revelations of former Soviet intelligencernofficials, and the Venona papers.rnScholars, East and West, are now examiningrnVenona, the treasure-trove ofrncommunications intelligence documentsrnfinally being freed up by the U.S.rngovernment. Venona is described by tliernNational Counterintelligence Centerrn(NACIC) as “enciphered Soviet telegramsrnfrom the 1940’s that the U.S. andrnallied intelligence intercepted and decryptedrnover a 37-year period.” “Venonarnwas a turning point in the Cold War,”rnNACIC explains. “It revealed the scopernand magnitude of Soviet intelligence, especiallyrnoperations directed at stealingrnthe secrets of the atomic bomb. The decryptedrnmessages, along with other information,rnopened the way for U.S. and alliedrncounterintelligence to launch arncounteroffensive against Soviet espionage.”rnAmong other things, Venona providesrninformation on a number of high-levelrnSoviet intelligence agents who operatedrnin the United States. Such information,rnobviously known to insiders in the governmentrnand helpful to them in directingrnthe counteroffensive against the Soviets,rnnow is available to everyone. Forrnthe public, Venona provides closure, inrnan intelligence sense, to a number of importantrncases, including the one involvingrnAlger Hiss. From the time of WhittakerrnChambers’ accusations againstrnhim, Alger Hiss’s guilt was never inrndoubt to objective observers. Nevertheless,rnit was denied for decades by his supporters,rnincluding much of the Americanrnmedia. Upon his death in 1996,rnmany American news sources continuedrnto express doubt about Hiss’s guilt.rnVenona, however, makes it clear thatrnHiss was indeed a high-level agent of thernSoviets—one of the highest, both in espionagernand in active measures. The AlgerrnHiss case is now closed.rnVenona provides insights into the casernof another Soviet agent of the time,rnLaughlin Currie, an important advisorrnin the Roosevelt White House. Nominallyrnspecial economic advisor to thernPresident, Currie was entrusted with arnnumber of important special tasks for thernPresident—and, of course, for Soviet intelligence.rnCurrie later denied chargesrnof espionage and left the country. It isrncommunist intelligence doctrine that anrnagent never admit to espionage.rnThe case of Oleg Gordievsky, for tenrnyears an agent of British intelligence inrnthe Soviet KGB station in London, isrnparticularly revealing. According tornGordievsky, Iskhak A. Akhmerov, the Sovietrnintelligence case officer for many ofrn42/CHRONICLESrnrnrn