nomic growth.rnThere is also Httle local support for thisrn”country” in which the U.N.’s High Representative,rnCarlos Westendorp, has chosenrnthe currency and the flag, and hasrneven dismissed the elected president.rnThere is no end in sight for an Americanrntroop mission which was originally supposedrnto last just a year.rnIntervention in Kosovo is even morernperverse. Not only does the West havernno answer—its autonomy proposal satisfiesrnno one and will be enforced onlyrnthrough yet another interminable occupationrn—but the two sides are not readyrnto quit fighting.rnThe administration’s unprincipledrnhumanitarianism perversely encouragesrnintensification of the fighting. Ethnic Albanianrnleaders understand the importancernof positive media coverage. Dr.rnAlush Gashi, an advisor to Kosovo Albanianrnleader Ibrahim Rugova, admitted tornme last June that the prospect of NATOrnintervention “depends on how we lookrnon CNN. People need to see victims inrntheir living rooms.” The Albanian diasporarnalso recognizes the importance ofrnpolitical lobbying. Thus, instances suchrnas the “massacre” in Racak, which appearrnto be the ugly but normal violencernsurrounding insurgencies (the U.S. governmentrncommitted far worse in suppressingrnFilipino independence a centuryrnago), are manipulated by foreignrnparties and domestic interests for policyrnends —in this case, American inter’ention.rnThe administration obviously believesrnthat NATO can push Yugoslavia hardrnenough to force autonomy, withoutrnpushing so hard as to yield independencernfor Kosovo. This is an illusion. Ifrnthe United States largely eliminates Serbianrnauthority within Kosovo and createsrna military shield for slow-motion Albanianrnsecession, the result is likely to be increasedrnpressure for not only an independentrnKosova, but a larger Albania,rnincorporating Kosovo, the nation of Albania,rnwestern Macedonia, and perhapsrnmuch more.rnWhen I visited Kosovo last June, I didrnnot find a single ethnic Albanian interestedrnin autonomy. Although manyrnwere cautious when discussing the possibilityrnof a greater Albania—obviously thernquestion arises, which group would endrnup in charge?—they freely criticizedrnMacedonia’s treatment of its Albanianrnminority. And virtually every tele’isionrnsatellite dish was turned toward Tirana.rnThe KLA has made its agenda clear.rnLast year, spokesman Jakup Krasniqi saidrnhis organization was “fighting for the liberationrnof all occupied Albanian territories,”rnincluding the western section ofrnMacedonia, whose population is onefourthrnAlbanian, “and their unificationrnwith Albania.” Many residents of Albania,rnfrom which KLA recruits and suppliesrnare flowing into Kosovo, and muchrnof the international Albanian diaspora,rnfrom which financial support comes, alsornsupport this wider agenda. Indeed,rnthe Albanian American Civic Leaguern(founded in 1989 by former New YorkrnCongressman Joseph DioGuardi) includesrnon its website {www.aacl.com) arnmap showing a Greater Albania whichrnincludes Kosovo, western Macedoniarn(along with its capital, Skopje), southeasternrnMontenegro (along with its capital,rnPodgorica), northern Greece, andrnsouthern Serbia (north of Kosovo). It is arnbreathtaking agenda.rnWhile the KLA may have signed onrnthe administration’s dotted line in Paris,rnthat doesn’t mean any, let alone all, of itsrndifferent factions have changed their ultimaternobjective. Even the moderaternKosovo political leadership is unlikely tornaccept autonomy, whatever the formalitiesrnof any agreement. During my visitrnlast June, Dr. Gashi told me that “independencernis inevitable.” Implementationrnof the Rambouillet agreementrnwould merely become a new startingrnpoint for the struggle for Albanian independence.rnFor this reason, Greece, the nationrnclosest to the conflict, is extremely uncomfortablernover NATO intervention.rnIn private meetings during a recent triprnto Athens (which preceded March’srnbombing), I found that oflPicials at everyrnlevel went out of their way to emphasizerntheir opposition to Western military intervention.rnOne top foreign ministry officialrncomplained that “if force was [sic]rnused it would have spillover consequencesrnfor us.” Such concerns are alsornvoiced outside of government, by membersrnof the conservative New Democracyrnparty, academics, businessmen, andrnjournalists.rnA former diplomat and conservativernmember of parliament, Petros Molyviatis,rnsays the important thing is “not to allowrnthe change of external frontiers. Ifrnwe do, it could blow up the Balkans.”rnUnfortimately, the administration’s planrnmakes this more, rather than less, likely.rnThe United States is aiding the veryrngroup most likely to spread instabilityrnsouthward into Macedonia and Greece.rnMilosevic is a brute, but he is no Hitier;rnhis ambitions are limited to his ownrncountry’s province of Kosovo. Those ofrnthe KLA are not.rnTraditionally, war has been thought tornbe a tool of last resort. But this administrationrnhas implemented the most militaristicrnprogram in at least two decades.rnPresident Clinton might have some justificationrnfor his many interventions if herncould point to some successes. But U.S.rnpolicy has consistenfly failed. Somaliarnwas a disaster, reconciliation is a fantasyrnin Bosnia, Haiti now enjoys a presidentialrninstead of a military dictatorship, Iraqrnremains recalcitrant, and U.S. threatsrnhave changed nothing in Kosovo.rnMore fundamental, however, is thernprinciple. What is the standard for makingrnwar? What justifies the extreme steprnof unleashing death and destruction onrnanother people? In the past, it has beenrna military threat against the United Statesrnor an ally. Yet Yugoslavia has done nothingrnagainst America or any of its allies.rnLet us grant that Serbian treatment ofrnKosovo’s ethnic Albanians has been atrocious:rnso has the behavior of two-scorernother governments in a variety of conflictsrnaround the globe. Is war the rightrnremedy in these cases?rnThere are other considerations asrnwell. By leading NATO into a campaignrnagainst the Serbs, the U.S. government isrnencouraging permanent European dependencernon America to defend Europeanrninterests. NATO was created arnhalf-centur’ ago to provide a defensernshield behind which the Europeansrncould rebuild. The alliance was neverrnintended to provide a permanent subsidy,rnespecially one to populous andrnprosperous states, after the opposingrnhegemonic threat had disappeared.rnDean Acheson assured Congress thatrnWashington’s troop presence would bernonly temporary, intended to protect thernwar-torn nations until they could standrnon their own. In 1951, Dwight D. Eisenhower,rnNATO’s first supreme commander,rnargued that the United States shouldrn”set clear limits” on the length of time itrnwould maintain forces in Europe. Arndecade later, he warned: “Permanentrntroop establishments abroad” will “discouragernthe development of the necessaryrnmilitary strength Western Europeanrncountries should provide for themselves.”rnIn a European conflict such as thisrn48/CHRONICLESrnrnrn