VITAL SIGNSrnFOREIGN AFFAIRSrnarnThe Globetrotters:rnBush and Gore onrnForeign Pohcyrnby Jeffrey Thomas KuhnerrnIt’s the economy, stupid” is oncernagain the slogan of the Democraticrnpresidential campaign, but this timernaround it is also the Republican slogan.rnThe exclusive focus on domestic issuesrnmay reflect a general American contemptrnfor all things foreign, but there isrnanother reason for the lack of debate onrnforeign policy: There is no fundamentalrndifference in the candidates’ approach torndiplomacy.rnBoth Al Gore and George Bush endorsernthe globalist interventionism of thernClinton administration. On most issues.rnBush and Gore share the same positions:rnBoth supported NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia;rnboth favor NATO enlargement;rnboth would seek fimding for a nationalrnmissile-defense system; both are staunchrndefenders of NAFTA, PNTR with Chinarn(and its ascension into the WH^O), andrneconomic globalization; and both wantrnto maintain the crippling economic sanctionsrnagainst Iraq and Cuba. A Bush orrnGore presidency would continue tornmaintain a unipolar world order based onrnAmerican hegemony, free trade, andrnopen borders.rnYet, for all their similarities, there arernsome nuanced distinctions betiveen therntwo candidates that reveal much aboutrnthe current state of their respective parties.rnGore is a humanitarian neo-Wilsonianrnwho is more hawkish than PresidentrnClinton. Throughout his political career,rnthe Vice President has been a rarernbreed in the Democratic Partv; A big-governmentrnliberal who has called for heavyrnmilitary spending. While in Congressrnand as veep. Gore has consistently supportedrnthe use of American power—therninvasion of Grenada in 1983, the GulfrnWar, the interventions in Haiti, Bosnia,rnand Kosovo, hi fact, the Vice President’srntop advisors have admitted that, wheneverrnthe President wavered on certain militaryrnactions (such as the invasion of Haitirnor the airstrikes on the Bosnian Serbs),rnGore loudly beat the drums of war, leadingrnthe interentionist faction within thernClinton administration.rnUnlike the reign of Gore’s boss, whornviewed foreign policy as a short-term toolrnto manipulate domestic public opinionrnduring the Lewinsky scandal or to advancernthe interests of big business whornare major contributors to the DemocraticrnParty, a Gore presidency would takernClintonism to its logical conclusion.rnGore is the consummate globalist.rnThere is no corner of the world that herndoes not consider as part of the “vital securityrninterests” of the United States.rnThe core of his foreign policy is what hernhas called “forward engagement,” nippingrnin the bud potentiallv “disruptive”rnproblems such as global warming, thernproliferation of nuclear, biological, andrnchemical weapons, the spread of destructiverndiseases like AIDS, and the threat ofrnterrorism from “rogue states.”rnGore stresses that, with the end of thernCold War, we are now living in a “NewrnGlobal Age” in which the “traditional nation-rnstate is changing.” Hence, the UnitedrnStates must pump more money intornits military, intervene in trouble spotsrnaround the world, and provide greaterrn”leadership” and funds to internationalrnand regional institutions in order to securernglobal stability. Yet the Vice Presidentrnis more than a foreign policy busybody:rnHe is a revolutionary Utopian.rnGore believes that it is the responsibilits’rnof the United States to “promote the prosperity”rnof the world’s poorest regions andrnto improve living standards for billions ofrnpeople “who make less than a dollar arnday.” Even Bill Clinton and MadeleinernAlbright never expressed this kind ofrnoverweening internationalism.rnIf Gore wins in November, Africa willrnlikely emerge as the next major area forrnAmerican intervention. The Vice Presidentrnhas repeatedly criticized his Republicanrnopponent for failing to includernAfrica in America’s sphere of “strategicrninfluence,” attacking the Texas governorrn(and implicitly Clinton) for not demandingrnthe use of American and U.N. troopsrnto prevent the genocide in Rwanda.rnGore’s policy toward /Africa is a recipe forrnendless U.S. military action. The debaclernin Somalia should have taught thernVice President that the African continentrnis riven with ethnic conflicts which canrnbog down the United States in countiessrnguerrilla wars.rnBush, on the other hand, has a betterrnunderstanding of the relationship betweenrnmilitary means and geopoliticalrnends. He is a realist internationalist whornbelieves that “Eurasia” is America’s greatestrnstrategic priorit}’. Like all establishmentrnRepublicans, his most importantrngoal is opening markets in Asia and Europernfor multinational corporations.rnUnder the influence of ultra-hawkishrnadvisors such as Condoleeza Rice andrnPaul Wolfowitz, the Texas governor is invokingrnfears of a revanchist Russia and anrnexpansionist China. Many Beltway punditsrnhave argued that Bush’s strategic visionrnclosely resembles the Reagan doctrine.rnAs usual, they are wrong. Instead,rnBush’s diplomacv is similar to that ofrnNixon and Kissinger. Bush promotes arnpolicy of triangulation that seeks to containrnboth the Russian Bear and Red China.rnThere is one crucial difference, however,rnbetween Bush’s foreign policy andrnthat of Nixon during the early 1970’s:rnWith the fall of the Bedin Wall, neitherrncountry poses a threat to the UnitedrnStates.rnThis has not stopped the Texas governorrnfrom making belligerent statements,rnand a Bush presidency would put thernUnited States on a path toward confrontationrnwith Moscow and Beijing.rnBush has suggested NATO enlargementrninto the Balkans. Moreover, he has gonernfurther than either Clinton or Gore inrndemanding that Kosovo not only remainrnan international protectorate but eventuallyrnbe detached from Serbia and givenrnfull independence —an act that wouldrnundermine Moscow’s traditional spherernof influence in the Balkans and threatenrnits tenuous hold over Chechnya. Bushrnhas also called for providing greater economicrnand military assistance to thernUkraine and the Baltic states to act as arnbuffer against the possible restoration ofrnthe Russian empire. Even if Moscowrnsought to reconstitute the old czarist empirern(assuming this is possible, given Russia’srnimploding economy and its recentrndismal military performance in the Cau-rnNOVEMBER 2000/41rnrnrn