fill their desires. This might be primarily the case for domesticrnaffairs, but it also concerns foreign policy. Here we have to bearrnin mind that by 1910 practically all of Europe had constitufionalrnmonarchies and only a few republics, but in any case, thernparliaments held the purse strings. History might have followedrna totally different course if the Austrian parliament hadrnvoted the money for the introduction of the breach loader,rnwhich the Prussians had already introduced in their army.rnThus Prussia won the war of 1866 against the German Leaguernheaded by Austria. And in 1936, Stanley Baldwin admitted inrnthe House of Commons that the Conservatives would have lostrnthe last elections even more dramatically if in their programrnthey had featured rearmament. “Our specific democracy,” hernsaid, “would have reacted against such a proposition.” Popularity,rnnot the good of the country, is the prime motive of parties.rnLloyd George, too, was riding the wave of popularityrnwhen, in his election speeches after the armistice in 1918, hernpromised to “Hang the Kaiser” and make the Germans payrn”that the pips squeak,” which led to the reparations, the ruin ofrnthe German middle class, and the rise of Hitler. Peace treatiesrnin the democratic age do not have to satisfy monarchs, merelyrnthe voters “back home” who are moved by sympathies and antipathiesrnand who judge other nations not impartially but accordingrnto their racial, ethnic, religious, or political-constitutionalrnaffinity.rnGeorge F. Kennan saw the different treatment of Finlandrnand Poland in the light of these “popular” sympathies. (LloydrnGeorge, needless to say, admired Hitler and despised thernPoles.) Indeed, democracies are gravely handicapped inrnpreparing for (unavoidable) wars and in making peace becausernthe conditions laid down by the victors must please the voters.rnThus Hitler was not truly born in Braunau, but in Versailles.rnThe treaty dictated there under duress (continuation of thernhunger blockade) was immediately denounced by John MaynardrnKeynes, a better prophet than economist, as a possible catalystrnof future catastrophes.rnIn a democracy, then, “politics” is conducted between unavoidablyrnignorant multitudes facing gigantic problems andrnamateurish “professional” politicians. The larger and the morern”progressive” a nation, the more involved its problems—veryrnunlike the problems facing the cantons of Switzerland. Arnsound foreign policy demands infinitely greater knowledge andrnpractice than the handling of mere local issues. Yet the backgrounds,rnupbringing, and education of our temporary rulers,rnand above all of our foreign ministers, are now the despair ofrnimpartial observers. The outstanding statesmen in Americanrnand European history used to be monarchs, and their aides andrnrepresentatives were aristocrats with an international outiook,rnnot darlings of the masses such as Ledru-Rollin, who exclaimed,rn”I am the leader of the people, I have to follow it!” Inrnnon-democracies, responsible administrators have more timernto collect information and to learn the ropes. For example, AndreirnGromyko, Soviet foreign minister and perhaps a mediocrernmind, knew after 34 years who was who and what was what.rnDemocratized Americans view the expert with great suspicion,rnbut they would not like to see amateurism prevail in the clinicsrnof Rochester, Minnesota. Government, however, is not concernedrnwith the survival of a few patients but with the protectionrnof millions of people. One would think this would pushrnour leaders to formulate long-term strategies, but this is not therncase. Our democratic age does not think or act with future generationsrnin mind, but only from one legislative period to another.rnHow then can one expect a reasonable foreign policy?rnIwas born in 1909, and so 1 have witnessed much of the sicknessrnplaguing the world today. The world’s democraciesrnnow resemble a huge Punch and Judy show, with presidents,rnprime ministers, chancellors, foreign ministers, state secretariesrnjumping up and down, making decisions and calculationsrnbased not on reasoned concern but on the politics of the moment.rnAfter World War II, the democracies produced only twornleaders who could qualify as statesmen—Charles de Gaulle,rnwho took over the bankrupt Fourth French Republic, and KonradrnAdenauer, whom the Germans dubbed the Demokrator.rnThese two men were personal friends. They were born notrnmore than 300 miles apart, were both devout Catholics, andrncould talk to each other without interpreters. Yet each timernthey met and made plans for the future they had to add thernmomentous words, “We’ll do this or that provided we arernre-elected.”rnPrior to the French Revolution, alliances and enmities had arncertain continuify. The renversement des alliances in 1756,rnwhich broke the age-old French-Prussian friendship and startedrnthe Seven Years War, was regarded as revolutionary. (In his firstrnPolitical Testament, Frederick II of Prussia had called Francernthe classic ally of his country.) Yet the great imcertainties of arnforeign policy in a world of parliamentary elections were heraldedrnby the break of the Anglo-Austrian Alliance in the War ofrnSpanish Succession, when Britain arranged for a separaternpeace with France and left the Austro-Germans holding thernbag . . . and this in the midst of a major war. Elections had replacedrnthe WTiigs and the Tories, and the Duke of Marlboroughrnwas recalled from the battlefields. This earned Englandrnthe title of “Perfidious Albion.”rnTrusts and true friendship between countries are rare today,rnand they can hardly exist between democratically ruled countries.rnThe European countries can confide in the United Statesrnas little as the United States can confide in European countries.rnCan Taiwan really count on the United States? Could SouthrnVietnam? Read the letter President Nixon wrote to NguyenrnVan Thieu promising full American intervention should NorthrnVietnam break the armistice, and then decide. (Of course, thernquestion arises whether the American President could givernsuch an assurance without congressional backing.) New electionsrnin the Near East have nearly destroyed the Israeli-Palestinianrnpeace process. How can “anonymously voting” nationsrntiust each other? Theodor Herzl, Israel’s founding father, knewrnthis only too well and warned the Zionists in this programmaticrnDer ]udenstaat never to adopt democracy, but since there existedrnno known descendant of King David, he encouragedrnthem to study the constitution of the elitist Republic of Venice.rnWith constitutionally organized instability and change, hoppingrnfrom one election to another, with populations in immenselyrncomplex civilizations exposed to mass media in whichrnthe half-educated lord it over the quarter-educated, the formationrnof an historically oriented foreign policy cannot be expected.rnHow can this be remedied in an age when, on top of it all,rnthe French revival of democracy has brought us conscriptionrnand total war involving all civilians?rnTyranny is by no means the only alternative to democracy.rnStill, the countiess military cemeteries the world over shouldrngive us pause. As to the problem of foreign policy, one thing isrncertain: one cannot shoot at moving objects with a shaky armrnand swimming eyes.