weighed in with a pieee by StephenrnSchwartz, a San Francisco-based writerrnwho visited the region and presented arnpicture of Kosovo Albanian poHtics sornsweetened that it called to mind the acconntsrnof commimist countries producedrnby the duped liberal polihcal pilgrimsrnof the Cold War era. Perhapsrncognizant that it was not American policyrnto support armed separatist insurrectionsrn(and that an American envoy to the regionrnhad bluntly described the KIA as arnterrorist group), Schwartz began by proclaimingrnthat most Albanians wererndeeply committed to the nonviolentrn”principles of Martin Luther King.”rnThey sought not independence and linkagernto “Greater Albania”—this was widelyrnunderstood as the KLA goal—but onlyrn”greater autonomy within a rump Yugoslavia.”rnWlien Serb forces uncovered arncache of mortars hidden in the houses ofrnsome Kosovo Albanian political leaders,rnSchwartz explained it wasn’t evidence ofrnKLA guerrilla achvity because “Albanianrnculture validates possession of firearms.”rnIt is true that there had been a nonviolentrnAlbanian campaign against the Serbs,rnpracticed for several years in the early andrnmid-1990’s (overlaying a longer history ofrnthe offen-bloody ethnic conflict). But byrnthe time tlie Standard published Schw artz’srnpiece, the KIA’s guerrilla campaign hadrnbegim in earnest. Schwartz dealt withrnthis issue by asserting that many Albaniansrnfelt the Serbs had created the KLA asrna pretext for repressing them, a view herndeemed “plausible.”rnThus, according to the Weekly Standard,rnthe KIA was possibly a Serb-createdrnmyth, while the true Albanian campaignrnagainst the Serbs in Kosovo wasrnsomething like a lunch-counter sit-in.rnMarty Peretz’s New Republic, a publicationrnwhose calendar seems strangelyrnstuck on 1936, followed with a morerncomprehensive rationale for war againstrnthe Serbs. I’he Serbian counterinsurgeneyrnin Kosovo was a war against “anrnethnicity” tiiat represents a challenge tornthe “fascist, racialist” foundation of Serbianrnrule. Milosevic was the “heir” to thern1930’s “monsters of Europe.” Unlike thernStandard, the New Republic did not seekrnaehially to cast doubt on tiie existence ofrnthe KLA, but grasped the bull by thernhorns and argued for Kosovo’s independence.rnThe Kosovo Albanians were forgingrn”a new nation” with its own bankingrnsystem and Mother Teresa health clinics,rnand “lives are more sacred tiian borders.”rn(The New Republic, for some reason, isrnnot known for its support of ethnic independencernfor Turkey’s Kurds.) SomernNew Republic writers acknowledged thatrna victorious KLA would probably haverndesigns on Macedonia, but Roy Gutmanrnargued that “it is hardly a foregone conclusionrnthat Kosovo’s independencernwould lead to the instant fracturing ofrnMacedonia.” Albanian activists wouldrnleave for their children the task of establishingrnunit)’ with Albania. Such a beliefrnrec|uired ignoring the words of virtuallyrnall KIA leaders and spokesmen.rnLinking the Serbs to Nazism was thernNew Republic’s signal contribution to thernBalkans debate, repeated again andrnagain. David Riefif, attending a rock concertrnin the Macedonian capital of Skopje,rndescribed pleasant-looking young menrnand women, fantilies with children, andrnchants of “Peace in the Balkans.” Nevertheless,rnthis reminded him of “Nuremberg,rn1936.”rnOnce Washington began bombing,rnthe magazine published a sinister coverrnstory, “Milosevic’s Willing Executioners.”rnThe title directly evoked DanielrnGoldhagen’s then-current book allegingrnwidespread German popidar complicityrnin Nazi crimes. Of course, the piece coveredrnitself in protective qualification:rn”Serbia is not Nazi Germany; Milosevicrnis not Hitler.” But the stain remained,rncarried by the inflammatory title. Thernpiece dwelled on the paucity of “goodrnSerbs” and made much of what writerrnStacy Sullivan described as their “gratuitousrnsadism,”rnThe examples she gave were imderwhelming,rnthough of course tiiere was nornshortage of Serb brutalities in Kosovo.rnShe mentioned Serb forces requiring ca[>rntured Albanians to chant “this is Serbia”rnor undergo similar humiliations, a tacticrnfound in most ethnic conflicts. The pointrnis not that the ethnic wars of tiie Balkansrnwere horrible —most readers knew that.rnThe point was to locate the evil exclusivelyrnamong the Serbs and to liken it to tirernworst horrors of the centun,’.rnGoldhagen himself weighed in the followingrnweek, claiming Serbia’s deeds differedrnfrom Nazi Germany’s “only inrnscale.” Admittedly, the Serbs had “sufferedrnsome injuries themselves” andrnlacked any apocalyptic ideology thatrnwoidd lead to the end of Western civilization.rnBut dead Bosnians and Albaniansrn”are just as dead as were the miuderedrnJews, Poles, Russians, gays andrnotiiers during Hidcr’s time.” Again, thernpoint was not to inform or analyze but tornsmear, to whip up the New Republic’srnreaders into a kind of anti-Nazi hysteriarnagainst a people that the magazine knewrnit could not defcnsibly claim were Nazilike.rnGoldhagen advocated military occupationrnof Serbia, on the model of thernoccupation of Germany and Japan. ThernSerbs could be compelled to “remakernthemselves,” ridding themselves of “nationalist,rnmilitarist and dehumanizingrnbeliefs.” Such a plan, though difficult,rnwas “feasible and morally right.”rnSecondary to the Serbs-as-Nazis refrainrnwas the New Republic’s emphasis onrneliminating respect for internationallyrnrecognized borders as a desirable aspectrnof the international system. Jacob Heilbrunnrnproposed a return to Wilsonianrnself-determination as a new principle. AsrnNATO pounded the Serbs, he wrote,rn”the Glinton adiuinistration had a goldenrnopportunity to relinquish the idea thatrnborders must remain sacrosanct.” Hernthought the favorable global implicationsrnobvious:rnthe more splintered the world becomes,rnthe less chance there is of arnrival power emerging to check currentrnAmerican dominance. ShouldrnGhina or Russia succumb to theirrnfissiparous tendencies, US pre-entinencernwould be sealed.rnOne wonders what a Russian or Chinesernforeign-policy analyst would make of this.rnRupert Murdoch’s and William Kristol’srnWeekly Standard was conrparativelyrnless imaginative than the New Republicrnin drumming up war spirit. Wliile editorrnKristol and foreign-policy analyst RobertrnKagan regidarly called upon the UnitedrnStates to exert itself to impose what theyrncalled “benevolent global hegemony,”rnmost rank-and-file Republicans werernmore inclined to clamor for tax cuts, bashrnthe Clintons, and otherwise enjoy thernprosperous 1990’s.rnThus, the 78-day military campaignrnagainst Serbia emerged as the magazine’srnmost perilous moment since its inception.rnIt gave full exposure to the deptii ofrnthe chasm between the Standard’s neoconservativerneditors and related televisionrntalking heads and the ordinary Republicansrnthese media stars werernsupposedly representing.rnThe tensions showed. Standard editorialsrnlapsed into near-hysterical namecallingrn—chastising “COPeaceniks,”rn”McGovern Republicans,” and tire “motleyrncoalition of neo-isolationists.. . Glin-rn42/CHRONICLESrnrnrn