power indefinitely unless it, or a substantial part of it, loses itsnwill to power. It can lose that will because it doesn’t knownhow to handle an economic crisis or a losing war, or becausenit has lost faith in its own right to rule.nIt was almost impossible for the first generation ofncommunist revolutionaries, the ones who stormed thenWinter Palace or who took part in the Long March tonYenan, to lose the revolutionary fervor to which they hadncommitted their lives. But conservatives who adopted then”black hole” theory that once a country goes communist,nit’s all over, forgot that once a revolutionary regime isnestablished, generations who grow up in the system need notnretain that fervor. They join the party as careerists, to getnahead in the world, and if they see that communism is anneconomic and moral failure, they begin to lose faith in thenofficial ideology. One reason for the massacre at TiananmennSquare is that the first generation of dedicated Chinesenrevolutionaries, in their 80’s and 90’s, are still in power.nOver a decade ago and long before Gorbachev, a friendnof mine who is a foreign policy specialist revisited Moscownafter an absence of many years. He came back stunned,nreporting that “nobody — nobody—believes in Marxism-nLeninism anymore. They’re just going along with thenregime because it happens to be in power.” We should all bendelighted that the communist attempt to mold the NewnSocialist Man by massive propaganda obviously didn’t take.nEveryone paid public lip-service to the official ideology butnno one believed it. Perhaps the public school system innRussia and Eastern Europe is no more efficient than it is innthe U.S. The Communist parhes were therefore ready, atnthe first opportunity, to dissolve themselves, and to join thenrush to pluralism and free markets. In Romania the vital rolenof ideology was starkly clear, for when the oppressed massesndecided that dying (literally) was better than continuing tonobey the orders of Ceausescu, the soldiers refused to keepnturning on their own population, and the regime wasntoppled within a week.nIf communism has collapsed, then obviously the ColdnWar is over. But U.S. foreign policy has been defined bynthe Cold War for the past four decades. If the Cold War isnfinished, what should American foreign policy be now?nThere is no need at this point to engage in controversy aboutnwhether or to what extent the Cold War was justified. Onenthing, however, is clear: that the collapse of communism wasnlargely brought about by internal forces and had very little tondo with U.S. policy, one way or another. Like it or not, thenU.S. does not have the power to shape the entire world.nThe most remarkable, though unfortunately not surprising,nfact about American responses to the end of the ColdnWar, whether among Republicans or Democrats, is hownmuch they insist, despite everything, that nothing has reallynchanged. The U.S. policy of militarism and global intervention,nostensibly pursued solely in response to the militarynthreat of Soviet Russia and international communism, must,nit seems, continue pretty much as before. This January,nPresident Bush told a group of conservatives at the WhitenHouse that there will be no “peace dividend,” and hisnproposed military budget reveals that standpat view all toonclearly. The heralded “cuts,” like almost all budget “cuts”nthese days, are not real cuts at all, but only a lessening of thenrate of increase. The proposed Bush budget increasesnmilitary spending by 2 percent a year; only estimatedninflation leads to a projected reduction of 2 percent a year,nin “real” terms (corrected for inflation). All importantnweapons systems are to go full steam ahead, and Secretary ofnDefense Richard Cheney insists that 200,000 U.S. troopsnare still needed in Europe even (/all Soviet troops are pullednout. By what bizarre logic? Because the Soviets still havennuclear weapons that can reach the U.S. But U.S. troopsnwere supposedly in Europe to combat or deter a Sovietninvasion of Western Europe. Since any idea now of thenWarsaw Pact countries as a military menace to the West isnsurely loony-tunes, one begins to wonder about the realnreasons for the policy of global military intervention.nLittle help, too, can be expected from the Democrats.nNote their frenzied reaction to the Bush proposal toneliminate admittedly obsolete military bases: “Not in myndistrict you don’t!”nIt is indeed extraordinary how many dire “threats” to thenU.S. have been discovered by the Establishment since thencollapse of communism in Eastern Europe. There is, firstnand implausibly as we have seen, still the Soviet Union, evennas the old Russian — much less the Soviet — Empire isnvisibly falling apart. Second, there is the fact that some smallnnations have nuclear weapons: but do we really need allnthose missiles and all that vast apparatus against a few minornThird World countries? Or against France? Or Israel?nA third target, though around for a long time, has beenntouted highly as a brand-new menace: “international narcoterrorism.”nBut while narco-terror may prove useful innjustifying a few Third World invasions, it can scarcelynprovide a rationale for a host of nuclear missiles, or at least sonone hopes. Perhaps, too, the administration would be betternadvised to send troops into Washington, D.C., or even intonfederal prisons, where drugs are particularly rife.nA fourth, more generalized threat has been proffered bynthe Bush administration: that we live in an uncertain world.nBut surely this permanent but rather vague human conditionndoes not justify bases everywhere and a $300 billionnannual military budget!nA fifth terrible threat, in contrast, is all too concrete: onenthat emerged among Establishment pundits literally the daynafter the collapse of the Berlin Wall. As communismncrumbled in East Germany, a new menace was found in thenappearance on the near-horizon of an event that the U.S.nhad championed for forty years: the reunification of Germany.nBut suddenly, on a dime, we began to hear grimnwarnings: Hitler! The Kaiser! Germany as permanentnbutcher-bird of Europe! One newspaper article evenndredged up the alleged sole German guilt for the Franco-nPrussian War of 1870-71, conveniently overiooking the notexactly-pacificnrole of the French Emperor, Napoleon III.nFinally, a sixth menace has been trotted out. This threatnwas raised in the course of a rambling discussion ofnpost-Cold War foreign policy in the Wall Street Journal bynIrving Kristol: the specter of Islamic fundamentalism.nKristol even went so far as to propose that the U.S. and itsnrecent enemy the Soviet Union work together — discreefly,nof course — to put down this rising menace.nThere is something very curious at work here. Ever sincenWoodrow Wilson, the United States has had great difficultynnnMAY 1990/17n