When her son came to investigate, hernfound her sitting on a stump outside. Hernwas forced to take legal action over two orrnthree years, and he won. But when arnmilitiaman came to carry out the order ofrnthe court, the Albanian said that he had arnmachine gun and warned, “Whoever approachesrnwill be mowed down!” Thisrnprompted Ljubicic to ask: “What kind ofrnstate are we?”rnThe president of the Bar Associationrnreferred to Serbia’s “crippled constitution”rnwhich does not permit Serbia to exercisernits governmental authority on thernterritory of its provinces, and argued thatrnfederal bodies which have authority arernquiet while “open enemies of Yugoslaviarnescalate their evil deeds.”rnThe persecution was of such a naturernthat even Serbian communist officialsrnleft Kosovo. My two cousins, who werernorphaned early in World War II, werernreared in Kosovo by Uncle Peter and hisrnwife, who had no children of their own.rnThe youngsters were courted by party authorities,rnand when they reached age 18rnwere inducted as members. The older ofrnthe two, the young man, first became arnteacher and later a local party secretary.rnWhen I was doing research in Belgradernduring several summers in the 1970’s, herncame several times to see me. On onernoccasion, I asked him how he got alongrnwith the Albanians. His answer: “I getrnalong well with them, but I always carry arnrevolver.” In the early I980’s, he and hisrnfamily moved to Belgrade.rnSlobodan Milosevic, who becamernhead of the Serbian communists inrn1986, went to Kosovo to investigate inrn1987, and there he uttered the famousrnphrase: “No one will beat you again.” Inrnthe past, I have written that—despite thatrnrhetoric —he let two years pass beforerntaking action. My subsequent researchrnreveals that steps were taken in 1988rntoward amending the constitution of Serbia.rnIt is not clear where the initiativernoriginated, but it is obvious that adherencernto constitutional procedures wasrnscrupulously followed.rnThe first step was to amend the YugoslavrnConstitution, thus permittingrnSerbia to change its constitution with respectrnto the status of the autonomousrnprovinces within it. This was done inrnlate 1988. Two key sentences serve to explainrnthat need: “The Socialist Republicrnof Serbia . . . should be able to carry outrnindispensable functions on the whole ofrnits territory.” And: “The right of the Serbianrnpeople to form its state, as other peoplesrnof the Socialist Federated Republicrnof Yugoslavia, was not accomplished becausernthe constitutional principle thatrnthe provinces are integral parts of the SocialistrnRepublic of Serbia was not consistentlyrnrealized in practice.” With thisrnact, the republics recognized the validityrnof one concern of the maligned “Memorandum”rnof the Serbian Academy of Sciencesrnand Arts. Deceitfully, Sloveniarnand Croatia were later to blame thernbreakup of Yugoslavia on Serbia’s actionsrnconcerning Kosovo.rnTo amend Serbia’s constitution,rnthe consent of the provinces was alsornnecessar)’. Vojvodina gave its consent inrnFebruary 1989 and Kosovo in March.rnThe amendment takes away the right ofrnprovincial assemblies to veto acts of thernSerbian parliament, because it says thatrnthe latter has the right to amend the constitution.rnBut there are three conditions.rnThe provinces may give their opinions; ifrnthey are rejected a six-month waiting periodrnensues; and if they are still rejected,rnthe provincial assemblies may force a referendum.rnThe new Serbian constitution ofrn1990, did not, as widely alleged, revokernKosovo’s autonomy. It reduced it to thern1963 level, which was still considerable,rnbut the Albanians rejected the decreasernand engaged in civil disobedience. Theyrnrefused to participate in all governmentalrninstitutions—schools, police, medicalrnfacilities—and set about creating theirrnown informal ones. They even went onrnstrikes in governmental enterprises,rnwhich resulted in firings. In the end,rnthey proclaimed Kosovo an independentrnstate. These acts prompted the Belgraderngovernment to establish a military presencern—which the Albanians dubbed “occupation”rn—in the province.rnMilosevic repeatedly indicated that hernwas ready for a dialogue in order to find arnsolution. The only thing he was not willingrnto negotiate was secession, while thernAlbanians indicated that they wanted tornnegotiate nothing else. In the past twornyears, the more militant Albaniansrnformed what they called the “KosovornLiberation Army” (LAK), which by theirrnown admission has resulted in the murderrnof over 50 Serbian officials as well asrn20-odd “disobedient Albanians.” (Itrnshould be noted that the Albanians celebratedrnthe killing of each Serbian policeman.)rnIn March 1998, Serbia retaliated.rnA few days before that happened, U.S.rnBalkan envoy Robert Gelbard describedrnthe LAK as a “terrorist organization.”rnHowever, the United States took the leadrnin condemning the Serbian actionsrnagainst the “LAK terrorists,” demandingrna military withdrawal.rnIt needs to be noted that the ethnicrncomposition of Kosovo, while predominantlyrnAlbanian, is more complex thanrnthat usually mentioned in the media,rni.e., 90 percent Albanian and 10 percentrnSerbian. Although the Albanians boycottedrnthe 1991 census, it is estimatedrnthat there are between 1.6 million andrn1.8 million of them, or a little less thanrn82 percent. As of early 1998, a largernnumber of these were living abroadrn(200,000 in Germany; 260,000 in Italy;rn130,000 in Switzerland; and 200,000 inrnthe United States). There are aboutrn200,000 Serbs living in Kosovo. Butrnthere are also other minorities: aboutrn150,000 Gypsies, who are Muslims;rn50,000 Turks, who are pro-Serb; 30,000rnto 50,000 Slav Muslims, who are alsornpro-Serb.rnWhat is the solution? When I posedrnthat question in 1981 to Serbian dissidentrnMilovan Djilas, he replied, “Therernis none.” Nevertheless, in recent yearsrnseveral solutions have been suggested.rnThe first of the proposed solutions,rnsupported by Serbia’s leading novelistrnand onetime president of Yugoslavia,rnDobrica Cosic, and some of his colleagues,rnwould divide Kosovo so that thernAlbanians could form their own smallrnstate or join Albania. The Serbs wouldrnseek to save as many as possible of theirrnChristian monuments. The main argumentrnin favor of this plan is to prevent arnfar greater future problem: the growingrnnumber of Albanians (compounded byrntheir high birthrate) who have moved intornSerbia proper, well beyond the boundariesrnof Kosovo. Under the separationrnscheme, once the boundary line wasrndrawn, Albanians on the Serb side wouldrnhave to move out, and the Serbs on thernAlbanian side would move to Serbia. It isrnimpossible to estimate the extent tornwhich the Serbs of Serbia support thisrnproposal. It is, however, rejected by thernMilosevic government, as well as by thernSerbian Resistance Movement in Kosovo,rnmainly on the ground that it wouldrnset a precedent for other parts of Yugoslaviarnto demand secession. In thernpast, some Kosovo Albanians have supportedrnpartition.rnA second solution, proposed by somernKosovo Serbs, would involve the “regionalization”rnof Serbia, dividing it into somern10 or 12 regions in the hope of enhanc-rnOCTOBER 1998/43rnrnrn