without children, or smokers, for example.rnClearly, under this scenario there is no such thing as freedomrnof immigration. Rather, there exists the freedom of many independentrnprivate property owners to admit or exclude othersrnfrom their own properties in accordance with their own unrestrictedrnor restricted property titles. Admission to some territoriesrnmight be easy, while to others it might be nearly impossible;rnin any case, admission to the property of the admitting personrndoes not imply a “freedom to move around,” unless other propertyrnowners consent to such movements. There will be asrnmuch immigration or nonimmigration, inclusivity or exclusivity,rndesegregation or segregation, nondiscrimination or discriminationrnbased on racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, orrnwhatever other grounds as individual owners or associations ofrnindividual owners allow.rnNote that none of this, not even the most exclusive form ofrnsegregationism, has anything to do with a rejection of free tradernand the adoption of protectionism. From the fact that one doesrnnot want to associate with or live in the neighborhood of blacks,rnTurks, etc., it does not follow that one does not want to tradernwith them from a distance. To the contrary, it is precisely thernabsolute voluntariness of human association and separation—rnthe absence of any form of forced integration—that makesrnpeaceful relationships—free trade—between culturally, racially,rnethnically, or religiously distinct people possible.rnIn an anarcho-capitalist society there is no government and,rnaccordingly, no clearcut distinction between inlanders (domesticrncitizens) and foreigners. This distinction comes into existencernonly with the establishment of a government, i.e., an institutionrnwhich possesses a monopoly of aggression (taxation).rnThe territory over which a government’s taxing power extendsrnbecomes “inland,” and everyone residing outside of this territoryrnbecomes a foreigner. State borders (and passports), as distinctrnfrom private property borders (and titles to property), arcrnan “unnatural” (coercive) institution. Indeed, their existencern(and that of a domestic government) implies a twofold distortionrnwith respect to peoples’ natural inclination to associaternwith others. First, inlanders cannot exclude the governmentrn(the taxman) from their own property, but are subject to whatrnone might call “forced immigration” by government agents.rnSecond, in order to be able to intrude on its subjects’ privaternproperty so as to tax them, a government must invariably takerncontrol of existing roads, and it will employ its tax revenue tornproduce even more roads to gain even better access to all privaternproperty, as a potential tax source. Thus, this overproductionrnof roads does not involve merely an innocent facilitationrnof interregional trade—a lowering of transaction costs—rnas starry-eyed economists would have us believe; it involvesrnforced domestic integration (artificial desegregation of separaternlocalities).rnMoreover, with the establishment of a government and staternborders, immigration takes on an entirely new meaning. Immigrationrnbecomes immigration by foreigners across state borders,rnand the decision as to whether a person should be admitted nornlonger rests with private property owners or associations of suchrnowners but with the government as the ultimate sovereign of allrndomestic residents and the ultimate owner of all their properties.rnNow, if the government excludes a person while even onerndomestic resident wants to admit this very person onto hisrnproperty, the result is forced exclusion (a phenomenon thatrndoes not exist under private property anarchism). Furthermore,rnif the government admits a person while there is not evenrnone domestic resident who wants to have this person on hisrnproperty, the result is forced integration (also nonexistent underrnprivate property anarchism).rnNow add a few “realistic” empirical assumptions. Let us assumernthat the government is privately owned. The ruler literallyrnowns the entire country within its borders. He owns partsrnof the territory outright (his property title is unrestricted), andrnhe is partial owner of the rest (as landlord or residual claimantrnof all of his citizen-tenants’ real estate holdings, albeit restrictedrnby some kind of preexisting rental contract). He can sell andrnbequeath his property, and he can calculate and “realize” thernmonetary value of his capital (his country).rnTraditional monarchies—and kings—are the closest historicalrnexamples of this form of government. What will a king’srntypical immigration and emigration policy be? Because hernowns the entire country’s capital value, he will, assuming nornmore than his self-interest, tend to choose migration policiesrnthat preserve or enhance rather than diminish the value of hisrnkingdom. As far as emigration is concerned, a king will want tornprevent the emigration of productive subjects, in particular ofrnhis best and most productive subjects, because losing themrnwould lower the value of the kingdom. For example, from 1782rnuntil 1824, a law prohibited the emigration of skilled workmenrnfrom Britain. On the other hand, a king will want to expel hisrnnonproductive and destructive subjects (criminals, bums, beggars,rngypsies, vagabonds, etc.), for their removal from his territoryrnwould increase the value of his realm. For this reasonrnBritain expelled tens of thousands of common criminals tornNorth America and Australia.rnOn the other hand, as far as immigration is concerned, a kingrnwould want to keep out the mob, as well as all people of inferiorrnproductive capabilities. People of the latter category wouldrnonly be admitted temporarily, if at all, as seasonal workers withoutrncitizenship rights (as when large numbers of Poles werernhired as seasonal workers in Germany after 1880), and theyrnwould be barred from permanent property ownership. A kingrnwould only permit the permanent immigration of superior or atrnleast above-average people (i.e., those whose residence in hisrnkingdom would increase his own property value), as when afterrn1685 (with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes) tens of thousandsrnof Huguenots were permitted to settle in Prussia andrnwhen Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Maria Theresarnpromoted the immigration and settlement of large numbers ofrnGermans in Russia, Prussia, and the eastern provinces of Austria-rnHungary. In brief, while through his migration policies arnking might not entirely avoid all cases of forced exclusion orrnforced integration, such policies would by and large do thernsame as what private property owners would do, if they couldrndecide whom to admit and whom to exclude. The king wouldrnbe highly selective and very much concerned about improvingrnthe quality of the resident human capital so as to drive propertyrnvalues up, not down.rnMigration policies become predictably different once therngovernment is publicly owned. The ruler no longer owns therncountry’s capital value, but only has current use of it. He cannotrnsell or bequeath his position as ruler; he is merely a temporaryrncaretaker. Moreover, “free entry” into the position of arncaretaker government exists. Anyone can, in principle, becomernthe ruler of the country.rnDemocracies as they came into existence on a woddwidernscale after World War I offer historical examples of public gov-rn26/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn