which barely escapes being no governmentrnat all,” continued to receive casualrnlip service, but little else: everything,rneven liberty itself, became expendable inrnthe eschatological contest with communism,rnhideed, a collectivist state withrnimperialist pretensions and an economyrnfixed permanently on a war footing werernprecisely what was needed in the apocalypticrnfight to the death with Sino-rnSovict communism.rnThe second invasion of conservativernterritory came in the 1960’s and 70’s, asrnyet another gang of disaffected Marxistsrnjoined up. The so-called neoconservatives,rncharacterized by such figures asrnIrving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz,rnhad perhaps forsaken their faith in socialismrnand discovered that they feltrnmore at home in National Review’ than inrnRamparts. But they retained a residualrndistaste for capitalism and evinced a positiverninfatuation with the New Deal andrnthe Europeanized social-welfare state itrnhad produced. These are the oxymoronicrn”big-government conservatives”rnwho in the 80’s coalesced into a powerfulrnclique within the conservative movement.rnThe neoconservatives arc quiternwilling—even eager—to use conservativernmeans to achieve liberal ends, andrntheir outlook was—and remains—globalrnand imperial. It is this faction of thernconservative wing that spouts globaloneyrnabout a Pax Americana, the “end of history,”rnthe unipolar superpower world,rnthe triumph of the managerial revolution,rnand the messianic mission to preservernand protect “democracy” fromrnKuwait to Somalia to Haiti.rnRaimondo argues persuasively (atrnleast for me) that with the co-optationrnand corruption of the right thernAmerican political dialogue has tiltedrndecisively, perhaps fatally, in favor ofrnstatism. Indeed, the “dialogue” has becomerna monologue. What remains ofrncontemporary conservatism, save conservationrnof the social welfare advancesrnenacted by the Democratic Party’s permanentrnlegislative majority? Most conservativesrnholding (and desperate to retain)rncoveted positions of power andrnprivilege have swallowed the notion thatrnthe .American state is and should be norndifferent from its European cousins:rnprovider, protector, and policeman notrnonly of its own crime-ridden streets andrngrowing underclass of welfare dependentsrnbut of “democracy” worldwide.rnFew, if anv, eonseraties todav speak ofrnrolling back the welfare state. Theyrnmerel)- quibble about who is able to runrnit more efficiently. The conservativernmovement, then, is about power—nothingrnelse—and control of the apparat. Itrnis a kind of mutated “me-too” conservatism,rna decaffeinated Clintonism.rnNowhere is this better illustrated thanrnin the conservative response to the Clintons’rnnational health plan, a federal powerrngrab unequaled since EDR’s NationalrnRecovery Administration. Rather thanrnopposing the monstrosity philosophicallyrnand on principle as “Marxism by therndrink” (in P.J. O’Rourke’s deliciousrnphrase), the Republicrats in Congressrnhave ginned up their own versions ofrnsocialism-lite.rnIs there reason for hope? Raimondornthinks there is, though 1 am less optimistic.rnHe believes that the collapse ofrncommunism, the end of the Cold War,rnand the rise of a “new” Old Right (thernso-called paleoconservatives groupedrnaround Pat Buchanan) base combinedrnto throw the larger conservative movementrninto a period of angst and introspection,rnpossibly even renewal. Conservativesrnmust decide what they standrnfor, as well as against, and that cannotrnbe what the statist, internationalistrnDemocrats approve of. And so Raimondo’srnbook takes on the character of arnmanifesto, a ringing call to arms for paleoconservativesrnand libertarians to joinrnin a new populist crusade, not only torntake back the conservative movementrnand restore it to its lost heritage but to returnrnthe country to its traditional republicanrnprinciples. The Buchanan candidacyrnwas, Raimondo believes, thernopening volley in the battle. It is pastrntime, he insists, for movement conservativesrnto rediscover the lost legacy of thernOld Right’s American nationalism,rnwhich was antistatist and anti-interventionistrnand which proudly reveled inrnAmerican exceptionalism.rnWill the long-suffering middle classrnrise up against its tormentors, as Raimondornbelieves? Will a beleagueredrnpeople rebel against the crushing weightrnof statism, redistributive taxation, bureaucraticrnelitism, and global empire thatrnis slowly crushing it underfoot? Perhaps,rnbut sheep make poor re’olutionaries.rnThe genius of the Yankee socialism—orrnfascism, depending on one’s analysis—rnthat has overtaken America is that it hasrndemocratized the dole through a monstrous,rninterioeking network of governmentrnhandouts and entitlements. Thernvast majority of Americans, includingrnmany in the middle class, now stand atrnthe receiving end of the Creat NationalrnNanny’s philanthropy. And, as CaretrnGarrett observed, habits of dependencernare much easier to form than to break.rnThe rift in the conservative movement,rnthe widening gulf between neoconsrnand paleocons, is by now widelyrnrecognized. The narrative treatment ofrnthat history is not what sets Raimondo’srnwork apart from other post mortems ofrnthe conservative movement in the aftermathrnof Bill Clinton’s ascension to thernpresidency (the idea that Ceorge Bushrnshould have been taken seriously as thernleader of anything like a “conservativernpartv” is patently absurd); the conservativerncrack-up has been well-chronicled,rneven as skirmish lines have been drawnrnand artillery unlimbered. Rather, thernstrength of his work is to be found in hisrn.sympathetic, though scarcely uncritical,rnportraits of the “forgotten” warriors ofrnthe Old Right and his inescapable conclusionrnthat contemporary conservatism,rnas it is known and practiced in thernprecincts of power, bears scant resemblancernto its progenitor. crn/r.f hniiiiduitcSITH-IrnCimOSlCLESrn( hionk i(NrnM;\rnSl’RSCKIHKKSrnT()l.l.]Kr.i:M’MIU-Rrn1-800-877-5459rnFEBRUARY 1994/27rnrnrn