which is a microcosm of the largescalenstruggle between organisms. Notneven the sanctity of our cells is respected.nCytoplasm may be in competitionnwith nuclei in determining the sexnratios of gametes (sex cells), and mitocJiondrian(organelles involved in energynrelease) may be in origin invadingncells, bits of protein which have establishedna symbiotic relationship withnthe rest of the cell—a parasite at thenheart of our existence.nIt is a disturbing picture, but Dawkinsnmeans to shock us. Even if he isnwrong on every single point, his booknis the highest sort of intellectual gameplaying.nTime after time we are treatednto elaborate “what ifs” which expandnour ability to think about the nature ofnthings by forcing us to imagine annalternate set of arrangements. He describesnhis method by referring to thenNecker Cube, a two-dimensional representationnwhich we can interpret,ndepending on our perspective, as twondifferent cubes. Both views are equallyncorrect. “Similarly the vision of lifenthat I advocate … is not provablynmore correct than the orthodox view.nIt is a different view and I suspect that,nat least in some respects, it provides andeeper understanding.”nDawkins’s central theorem of thenextended phenotype—his ostensiblensubject—comes late in the book:n”An animal’s behavior tends to maximizenthe survival of the genes ‘for’ thatnbehavior, whether or not those genesnhappen to be in the body of the particularnanimal performing it.” The mostnobvious examples come from thenstrange world of parasites: the brainwormnwhich induces an ant to beneaten by sheep so that the worm canncomplete its life cycle; the tapewormnlarva that secretes a substance to stimulatenabnormal mouse growth; thenworm which causes an infected bee tonturn kamikaze and dive straight intonwater. These are all examples of hownthe genes of one organism maximizentheir reproductive success by controllingnthe behavior of another. The extendednphenotype also includes thendeliberate manipulation of the environment—beaverndams and termitenmounds.nThis notion of an extended phenotypenanswers at least one of the criticismsnexpressed by the opponents ofnsociobiology: that it focuses only onnthe effects of genes upon behavior andnadaption to environment—it saysnnothing about the impact of organicnlife upon environment. Lewontin,nRose, and Kamin oppose the view thatnorganisms “develop as a series of modificationsnimposed upon an essentiallynpassive, recipient object by the buffetingnof ‘the environment.'” In theirnview, “organisms do not merely receivena given environment but activelynseek alternatives or change what theynfind.” They reject Dawkins’s idea ofnthe extended phenotype because, well,nbecause it is Dawkins’s idea. Theyndeliberately misrepresent his positionnby quoting as part of his theory certainnideas which Dawkins introduces as then”entertaining speculations” of his colleagues.nIn fact, many of the criticisms madenby Lewontin et al. are addressed andnanswered by Dawkins. The most basicnobjection is to genetic determinism pernse. Stephen J. Gould and now Lewontin,nRose, and Kamin seem to find itnmorally and intellectually reprehensiblento think that there are severe geneticnconstraints on human social behavior.nAfter all, if men were naturallynviolent and territorial, if human beingsninevitably sorted themselves out innpecking orders, if male dominancenreally is a natural phenomenon andnnot just the result of social and culturalnoppression, then what happens to allnthose political movements to whichnthey have devoted themselves? Wenmight even begin to think that there isna connection between the Marxist suppressionnof private property and freenenterprise and the tens of millions ofnSoviet citizens who died as a sacrificento Lenin’s and Stalin’s gentle illusionsnabout the brotherhood of man.nDawkins wonders if his critics rejectngenetic determinism because they arennot materialists. Obviously, as dialecticalnmaterialists, few of them are preparednto believe that man has free willnbecause a supernatural creator madenhim that way. In fact, most of theirnobjections are at the policy level. Theynare afraid that if we stigmatize criminalnbehavior or low intelligence as geneticndisorders, then they will be regarded asninevitable or as an inherited curse tonbe eliminated from the gene pool.nDawkins describes such fears of fatalismnas “pernicious rubbish on an al­nnnmost astrological scale.” Genetic causes,nlike environmental causes, may beneither difficult or easy to reverse. Thenill effects of certain hereditary diseasesnare now treatable. The same cannot bensaid for the consequence of a governmentnschool education in the U.S.nThe issue of free will is completelynirrelevant to the debate. As Dawkinsnrealizes, the only serious alternative tonsome form of genetic determinism isnreligion.n”Not in Our (“.cues (s an important andntimely hook, for it not only CXIJOSCS thenfallacit’s of hioloi^ical determinism . . . butnalso prcaentu a positive view of humannbehavior that eould profjel us past thenstupefyinii sterility of nature-nurturenarguments.”nStephen fay C’ouldnThe Nfw York Rcxicw of BootsnLewontin et al. are not religious innthe ordinary sense, but their collectivenMarxism is a familiar surrogate. Theynspeak of faith in science as the “bourgeoisnideology”; they argue for a “dialectical”nunderstanding of behavior.nThey repeat crude Marxian interpretationsnof history: Roman and feudalnsociety, for example, was “repeatedlynupset by servile revolts”; scientific abstractionnis the analogue of mercantilenexchange. Above all, they make liberalnuse of the mirror fallacy—the ideanthat the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. arenmirror images of each other. Does thenSoviet Union use psychotropic drugsnand shock therapy to “correct” thenbehavior of dissidents? No matter, becausenin the U.S. rapists are occasionallyngiven drugs to inhibit their sexualn(and violent) impulses. It is an oldngambit. Sure, the Russians took overnEastern Europe, sent the tanks intonHungary, set up a Gulag which liquidatednundesirable minorities, but whatnabout the CIA involvement in Chile?nThe authors’ anti-American bias is sonstrong that it blinds them even to thenastonishing material progress experiencednby every class of society in thenU.S.:nIn 1900 only 6.3 percent of then17-year-old population of thenUnited States were high schoolngraduates, while at present it isnabout 75 percent, yet the unequalnMARCH 1985/17n