previous works of 19th-century Russiannhistory, as well as upon newnarchival sources, to develop importantnmeans of analysis that help make intelligiblenthe ultimate failure of the effortnto reform the autocracy of CzaristnRussia. There is little doubt that thesensame means are most helpful in understandingnthe challenges facing the variousnnationalities contained by the SovietnEmpire.nCzarist Russia suffered a humiliatingndefeat in the Crimea at the hands ofnthe Turks, French, and British in 1856.nIn 1855, in the midst of the war, CzarnNicholas I died after a reign of thirtynyears, and his thirty-six-year-old son,nAlexander II, inherited the highly centralizednand bureaucratic “Nicholasnsystem” of government. How bureaucraticna system was this? Minister ofn. Internal Affairs Lev Perovskii informednNicholas that his ministry alone processedn31,103,676 documents inn1850; provincial governors spent sixnhours each day signing official documentsnat the rate of 100,000 per year.nIn the 1840’s there existed an accumulationnof three million decrees andnofficial requests waiting to be actednupon. There was the case of the Balticngovernor who had to wait a fortnightnfor official papers from St. Petersburgnbefore he could fix the faulty flue in hisnoffice. Gogol’s Inspector General andnDead Souls captured the absurdity ofnthe system, and the defeat in thenCrimea only dramatized the need fornreform. How could such a mindnumbingnapparatus come into being?nMinister of Public Instruction S.S.nUvarov described the Nicholas systemnas dependent on three fundamentalnconcepts: Orthodoxy, autocracy, andnnationality. The Russian OrthodoxnChurch, the office of the czar, and thenRussian nation combined to legitimizenczarist authority. But as the RussiannEmpire grew in the 18th and 19thncenturies, these three concepts producedna massive and highly centralizednsystem. Nothing could be decided at anlocal level without the approval of thenczar, and innovation or response tonchange at the local level was simplynimpossible. The idea of a citizen societyn(grazhdanskoe obshchestvo) characterizednby decentralization and selfgovernmentnwas something that ansmall number of aristocratic intellectualsnbegan to discuss.nBetween 1845 and 1856, 513 educatednmen joined the Imperial RussiannGeographic Society. Founded perhapsnfor reasons of czarist pride, the societynnonetheless strove to make known factsnabout the boundaries and natural resourcesnof the growing Russian Empire.nIt was truly remarkable that suchnan organization should exist at all,nsince the Nicholas system had no traditionnof scholarship or learning. (Inn1850, in a population of 55 million,nthere were only three thousand universitynstudents.) The society had nonapparent political axes to grind, but itndid strive for accurate information, andnit was in this context that the wordnglasnost first came into usage. Thenidea was that issues of interest to thensociety needed to be discussed freely.nThe opinion of the czar and of thenchurch mattered little in these discussions,nand it was not long before thenidea of assessing more precisely thencondition of the peasants, the size ofnthe annual harvest, population figures,nmanufacturing data, and so on, begannto emerge. To strive for accurate, ifndisagreeable, information was an astoundingnactivity considering the politicalnculture in Russia at the time. Asnhistorian and public official B.N.nChicherin wrote in 1856: “One cannsay without exaggeration that everynofficial statement is nothing but a lie.nAll reports and dispatches from ournleading statesmen are lies. All reportsnand dispatches of governors and othernregional authorities are, in fact, lies. Allnstatistical data are lies.”nNineteenth-century Russia was notnunique in shielding its political rulersnfrom displeasing realities that flew innthe face of political decrees. But by thenmid-19th century other countries innEurope were developing leadershipnelites that could debate political policiesnin parliaments protected by law,nwhile Russia still relied on proizvol—nthe arbitrary and personal authority ofnthe czar. Glasnost, in this context, wasnsimply a means of discovering morenaccurate truths. Yet by itself, glasnostnwas insufficient to reform the NicholasnTHE FARM BUREAUCRACYnAGRICULTUREnAND THEnSTATEnMAUCET PROCESSES AND BUKEAUCXACYnby E. C. ]|asour, Jr.nForewordbyiHiceL. GardnernTHE IHDEPEMDENT INSTITUTEnThei INDEPENDENTnINSTITUTEn.Analyzing the direct and indirectneffects of all U.S. farm programs, .’nincluding price supports, marketingnorders, food distribution, credit andnexport subsidies, and conservation ofnnatural resources, Ernest C. Pasour, Jr.,nshows in Agriculture and the Statenthat these programs have conflictingnobjectives, only hurt the small farmer,nand most importantly, victimize thenpublic-at-large. This comprehensivenbook exposes current government farmnpolicies as harmfully anachronistic innan increasingly interdependent world.n”Professor Pasour presents an exhaustive,narticulate, and well-written analysis of U.S.nfarm price and income programs, and makes anpersuasive case.”n—D. GALE JOHNSONnProfessor of EconomicsnUniversity of Chicagon42 Figures • 9 Tables • Index • 279 pages, Paperback, Item #6071n$19.95 plus postage ($2.00 per book; CA residents add Sales Tax)nORDER TOLL FREE 1-800-927-8733nCredit card orders only. 24 hours a day.nThe Independent Institute, Dept. AA3,134 Ninety-Eighth Avenue, Oakland, CA 94603nnnDECEMBER 1990/41n