tional to fight a war, but once a war begins,nrational calculations will governnoperations. He also believes that bothnsides would hold back a reserve whichnwould be the basis for exercising powernin the postwar world. This implies thensurvival of state and society, though probablynunder military rule.nUnfortunately, his views are not alwaysnconsistent. This is largely due tonthe feet that this collection of essays wasnwritten over seven years (1976-82).nThat these 19 essays were written fornthe Catholic, leftish Commonweal alsonplays a part. By Commoniveal standards,nPowers is a “hawk.” Still, on occasion.nPowers feels the need to feed the prejudicesnof his audience. If the new technologynrequires a change in strategy andnhardware, then the Carter-Reagan defensenbuildup is necessary. However,nPowers states at one point that if Reaganngets what he wants in defense spending,nhe will wreck either the economy or thennation, depending on how much is cutnfrom social programs to “pay” for defense.nThe more cuts, the more the “nation”nis imperiled.nPowers also makes mistakes. At severalnpoints he claims that the U.S. has constantlynincreased the power of its nuclearnarsenal since World War II. He claims hendoes not have the figures to prove this,nwhich is hard to believe given his researchnand the ease by which such statisticsncan be obtained. In truth, the powernof the U.S. arsenal has declined by halfnsince 1968. This is because w^e have replacednmany one-megaton single warheadsnwith much smaller MIRV’s. AnMinuteman III with three 0.17-megatonnwarheads has only half the megatonnagenof the Minuteman II. Thus, warheadsnhave increased, but not destructivenpower, another benefit of the new technology.nThis decline is even greater fornsubmarine-launched missiles. In addition,n10 missile submarines have beenntaken out of the force and not yet replacednby Tridents. This sort of error cannonly be an attempt to attribute overbuildingnto the U.S. At another point. Powersnclaims that the Soviets wouldfollow anynattempt by the U.S. to stockpile reservenweapons in shelters. It is well knownnthat the Soviets are already doing this.nSoviet SS-18 and SS-19 silos, unlikenAmerican silos, are equipped for “cold”nlaunches so that they can be reloaded.nThe SS-20 also has reloads. Such reservesnmake arms-control ^cements based onnsilos or deployed launchers meaningless.nPowers will not take sides in the debatenover Soviet motivations. Whethernthe Soviets are paranoid because of pastninvasions and encirclement by capitalism,nor whether they are expansionists withnan ideological cause makes little differencento him. Either could produce anmood in Moscow which considers warnto be inevitable. This leads to the greatestnsingle contradiction in Powers’s work.nIf technology, planning, and attitudesnare all pointing toward World War III, isnit not wise to do more to prepare for it?nIt is easy to accept from history thenlesson that deterrence is only a temporaryncondition, capable of affecting thentiming but not the inevitability of a dash.nIt has failed often enough in the past. Butnthat acceptance should motivate action,nnot the maudlin resignation of Powers.nHe can see only two camps: those whonfavor more weapons to prop up deterrencenand those who fevor disarmamentnto avoid war. A war will prove the “doves”nright. A third option, that weapons arennot only needed to deter but also to fightna war, is not considered. Thinking Aboutnthe Next War includes nothing aboutnprotecting American lives through defensivenmeasures nor anything about anstrategy for winning a war. But if war isnno longer “unthinkable,” both of thesenissues are vital.nX hat is, they are vital to anyone whonwants to see the U.S. survive. BenjaminnPage is not so concerned. In his discussionnof defense spending he postulatesnthe result of a Soviet conquest of the U.S.:nThe capitalists’ wealth would presumablynbe expropriated by a SovietimposednNorth American Socialist RepublicnThe factory worker, on thenother hand, has less to lose economi­nnncally and might conceivably come outnahead if the economy were socializednand his workplace publicly owned. IfnAmerican workers would, in fact, benbetter oflf under socialism, it is possiblenthat their tax dollars spent on defensenagainst international socialismndo them more harm than good. If so,ndefense spending is fiindamentallynpro-rich.nIs it possible that a political science professornat the University of Chicago hasnnever heard of Lech Walesa?nWho Gets What does contain someninteresting factual information onngovernment taxation and spending programsnand their links to certain parts ofnthe economy, as do college textbooks onnpublic finance. What makes Page intriguingnis his all-consuming ideologicalnoutlook and his demonstration of thenessential unity of leftist thought acrossnthe entire spectrum fi-om liberalism toncommunism.nPerhaps the best way to define the differencenbetween right and left is on thenissue of equality. Behind this issue lie thencompeting concepts of what constitutesnjustice. Do all people deserve equal income,nrespect, and influence becausenthey are human beings with souls or, atnleast, consciousness? Or do differentnpeople justly deserve different incomesnand gradated rankings in the social hierarchynby virtue of their different levelsnof performance or contribution to society?nIn practice, if left to their own devices,npeople work themselves out to benhighly unequal. Equality is not a naturalnstate unless the overall standard of livingnis so low that all are equal in poverty.nThat is why early theories of equalitynstarted with a state of nature. However,nas soon as progress becomes feasible,nsome found that they had the ability tonmake progress more rapidly than others.nHistory indicates that this minority ofnambitious or energetic or curious individualsnhave pulled the rest up the laddernof success behind them.nff inequality is normal, then outsidenintervention is required to create equality.nConservatives defend the traditionaln117nSeptember 1983n