PERSPECTIVErnHaiti and American Empirernby Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.rnThink of all the ink spilled on foreign policy during thern80’s. Yet for all of Clinton’s “aceoniplishmcnts” on foreignrnpoliey (Middle East “peace,” NAFTA, Haiti), the suhjeetrndid not even appear on the political radar screen during thern1994 elections. Prank)-, ()tcrs do not care, and no fact ofrnAmerican political life brings a neoconserx-ative to tears morernquickly.rnTo understand the neoeonservativcs, we need to be aware ofrntheir implacable pursuit of American empire. ‘I’heir militaryrnprogram requires keeping massive numbers of troops, ships,rnplanes, spies, and bombs stationed around the wodd, readv forrnuse at a moment’s notice, as well as keeping the public hoppedrnup to fight any foreign country labeled an enemy. It was thernNew Left’s skeptical view of this program that led the neoconsrnto defect to the official right, which—thanks to the ColdrnWar—was far more hospitable to empire.rnThe relationship between the official right and the neoconsrnwas cozy during the late 1970’s and SO’s, and over time, thesernformedy distinguishable moxements became largely indistinguishable.rnBoth, for example, were dedicated to Reaganism,rnwhich meant a bigger welfare-warfare state in the name ofrnlimited government.rnLlewellyn H. Rockwell, ]r., president of the Ludwig von MisesrnInstitute in Auburn, Alabama, delivered this speech at thern1994 meeting of the John Randolph Club.rnFor the social democrats, the end of the Cold \4ir was arnterrible moment. It meant thev could no longer paint evervrnskeptic of the militarv machine as a “Blame America Firster.”rnThe- would ha e to deal with sensible critics, especially on diernOld Right, who favored a more traditional defense polie.rnThis put strains on their relations with the entire right, andrnon their ability to peddle a messianic foreign policy to thernAmerican public.rnThe neocons know, as we all do, that American public sentimentrnis basieallv isolationist. That is to say, we care morernabout our own country, region, state, and community thanrnabout the plight, real or alleged, of foreign peoples. The perccirned threat of Soviet communism overrode this isolationistrnimpulse, but there is nothing on the horizon—not even KimrnJong II—that can replace it, or call forth the same level of publicrndeference to Wishington.rnWith the end of the Cold War, the neoeonservativcs splitrninto two camps: universalist and nconationalist. The universalistsrnargued that American foreign poliey should have onernprinciple: the promotion of social democracy through militaryrnpower cvervwhere on the globe. Among this camp’s prominentrnspokesmen were Greg Fossedal, Ben Wattenberg, andrnJosh Muravchik. For them, no place on earth should bernallowed to escape the blessings of neocon rule, as imposed byrnthe State Department, the CIA, and the Army. What if otherrncountries did not want American-installed social demoeralO/rnCHRONICLESrnrnrn