involved Bernard Baruch and is discussednin Schwarz’s biography far more fullynthan it is by Murphy. The War ProductionnBoard was headed by DonaldnNelson, who was regarded by Frankfurter—andnothers—as indecisive andninept. According to Murphy (who citesnno source whatever), by 1943 Frankfurternhad “become preoccupied with a secretnfear that the military might be maneuveringnto take complete control of thendecision-making process.” Again accordingnto Murphy, “the military,”nrepresented by Assistant Secretary ofnWar Robert Patterson and AssistantnSecretary of the Navy James Forrestal,n”plotted to have .. . Nelson replaced bynBaruch.” The reason for this allegedn”plot” was not so much that Baruchnwas himself a puppet of the military,nbut that he was then 73 years old andnwould supposedly rely largely on an assistantnnamed Eberstadt “who had beennplaced on the Board by Patterson andnForrestal.” Eberstadt seems to have beennan earlier and more intelligent version ofnHaldeman and Ehrlichman; he was frequentlyndesaibed by contemporaries as anbrilliant but ruthless “Prussian.” AsnMurphy tells the story, this “plot” wasnforestalled at the last moment. MiltonnKatz, a former Frankfiirter student whonwas then serving as solicitor to the WarnProduction Board, supposedly keptnFrankfurter apprised of the situation atnthe WPB. When Frankfurter alsonlearned “that an executive order firingnNelson and replacing him with Baruchnhad been prepared and was sitting on thenpresident’s desk waiting for his signature,”nFrankfurter arranged for the informationnto be passed on to Katz who,nin a “pre-dawn” meeting, advisednNelson to fire Eberstadt before Nelsonnwas fired himself. It’s asserted that sincenthe only purpose in substituting Baruchnfor Nelson was Baruch’s anticipatednreliance on Eberstadt, the “Americanntradition . . . of having civilians exercisencontrol over the military” wasnheroically preserved.nNonsense. In the first place, it is immediatelynapparent that the true hero ofnS4inChronicles of CultttrenMurphy’s version is not so much Frankfurternas Milton Katz; it is not surprisingnto learn that “the basis for the entire accountnof this incident [is] drawn from anninterview with Milton Katz, August 3,n1979.” (Katz, an eminent scholar andngentleman now in his seventies, cannhardly be blamed for romantically exaggeratingnhis importance to the Republicn36 years previously.) Even more important.nMurphy has totally disregarded (1)nFrankfurter’s contemporaneous evaluationnof Patterson as “a complete innocent”n(hardly an apt description of an”plotter”); (2) Frankfurter’s statementnin his diary that Nelson’s decision to getnrid of Eberstadt was made at least a weeknprior to the firing and not the nightnbefore; (3) the likelihood that it was notnKatz but Wayne Coy, Assistant Directornof the Bureau of the Budget, who persuadednNelson to fire Eberstadt; (4) thenfact (which shortly became apparent tonJames Byrnes, among others) thatnRoosevelt did not want to appointnBamch to the WPB and that Baruch didnnot want the job; (5) the fact that thenpressure to appoint Baruch did not ceasenwhen Eberstadt was fired and (6) the factnthat, far from being some kind ofnmilitary coup d’etat, the “imbroglio” atnthe WPB was described by Frankfiuternhimself as nothing more than “the usualntug of war for power .”* After all this, it isnhardly surprising that Murphy fails tongive us Eberstadt’s correct first namen(“Ferdinand” and not “Fred”), and thatnhis account of a Frankfurter dinner onnJanuary 4,1943 has only the most superficialnand misleading resemblance to thenFrankfiuter diary account which is citednas Murphy’s only source. Yet the OxfordnUniversity Press describes The BrandeisInFrankfurter Connection as “unerringlyndocumented.”nJr rom Murphy it is a relief to turn to anbiographer who knows his business.nSchwarz’s fascinating account of BernardnBamch’s career includes numerousn*See Lash, Fmm the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter,npp. 166, 167, 178, 185-192.nnnvignettes on things ranging from thenAmerican search for nitrates in 1917-n1918 to Baruch’s “almost evangelicalnenthusiasm” for the “liberty shoe” inn1942. Even more to the point, Schwarznexplains superbly the effect of war andneconomic crisis on the conflicting politicalnphilosophies which have clashed innthis country for much of the 20th century;nin one vivid paragraph he gives anbetter picture of Washington bureaucracynin World War II than pages andnpages of Murphy’s meanderings:nCivilian wartime administratorsnsuspected army supply chiefs of plottingna coup d’etat against democraticnprocesses. New Dealers were certainnthat big businessmen were intentnupon eliminating smaller competition.nBusinessmen believed thatnliberals sought to carry on their socialncrusades besides fighting the Nazisnand the Japanese. Sometimes thenpolitical conflicts were predicatednupon personality, civilian occupation,nor class background. To beginnwith, wartime administrators oftenncharacterized each other with wordsnlike ‘ruthless’ and ‘ambitious’ becausenso many of them were ruthlessnand ambitious to win power in thenwar setup. But that was nothing newnin the bureauaacies of government,nbusiness or academe whence theyncame. Career government officialsntended to disparage the abilities ofnbusinessmen who wandered throughntheir bailiwicks during the emergency.nAcademics, mostly economists,nagreed that businessmennusually brought a narrow focus intongovernment. Even lawyers sneered atnbusinessmen. Some discerning observersnrealized that not all businessmenncould be lumped together andnbegan distinguishing between ‘productionnmen’ from the corporatenworld and ‘bankers’ from WallnStreet. Finally, even the old school tienmattered in making alignments.nPrinceton and Yale men dominatednthe War Department leadership andnobviously felt quite comfortable withnone another. Most were either WallnStreet brokersor lawyers who movedneasily in financial circles. They triedn