setting action wluch was used to legitimize the authority of thernWTO. The WTO appeals panel agreed with the United Statesrnthat the EPA regulation was made in pursuit of the legitimaterngoal of conservation, as defined under WTO rules. Yet, it stillrnrejected the regulation itself, arguing that the EPA could haverncome up with a better way of implementing the same goal.rnNothing could better demonstrate the micromanagement ofrnAmerican law that the WTO intends to pursue.rnIf allowed to become a precedent, this ruling could threatenrna wide variety of other United States policies, including somernwith industrial base and national security implications. Everyrnvear, for example, the EC publishes a long list of American lawsrnand regulations it feels are harmful to European exporters.rnI fence, its interest in this WTO ruling.rnDuring the raucous debate over congressional implementationrnof the Uruguay Round of GAFT, opponents concentratedrnon the creation of the WTO. It was argued that the WTO constitutedrna transfer of sovereign authority from Washington tornGeneva because of its claimed right to declare any national lawrnor regulation to be “GATT illegal” as an impediment to internationalrntrade. The WTO panel went far beyond the specifiesrnof the gasoline case to assert its role as the authority that mustrngrant its permission before any national initiative can be implemented.rnIn the concluding section of the panel’s decisions isrnthe following claim: “Under the General Agreement, WH^OrnMembers were free to set their own environmental objectives,rnbut they are bound to implement these objectives only byrnmeans consistent with its provisions.” This is presumably applicable,rnas a general principle of WTO supremacy, to other areasrnof policy.rnPopulists and nationalists across the political spectrum, fromrnPatrick Buchanan to Ralph Nader, assailed the creation of thernWrO and the “globalist” philosophy behind it. On the right,rnthe argument was that a WTO based on one nation, one vote,rnwith no vetoes or Security Council, would put the UnitedrnStates at the mercy of foreign, in particular Third World, coalitions.rnOn the left, there was fear that American health, labor,rnand environmental standards would be struck down as harmfulrnto trade in foreign products that could not measure up. Bothrnright- and left-wing critics opposed the notion that the UnitedrnStates could not use trade policies to give American-based industriesrnand their workers an edge over foreign rivals. To thernright, the loss of kev industries signified a shift in the worid balancernof power. To the left, the loss of jobs and the downwardrnpressure from wage competition with exploited Third Worid laborrnwould undermine American living standards.rnProponents of the WTO, who ranged from idealistic Wilsonianrnliberals to jaded transnational businessmen, plaved a doublerngame in the debate over how much legitimate authoritv thernUnited States would retain. A prime example is law professorrnJohn H. Jackson of the University of Michigan. Jackson wrote arn1990 study for the Royal Institute of International Affairs onrnthe alleged “defects” in GATT’s pre-Uruguay structure, whichrnbecame the basis for the WTO. In testimony presented to thernU.S. Senate Committee on Eoreign Relations (June 14, 1994)rnJackson sought to allay fears by saying, “It is my opinion andrnjudgement that the proposed new World Trade Organization,rnas part of the results of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations,rnposes virtually no danger or risk to the United States Government’srnability to protect its sovereign capacity as an independentrnnation to take appropriate and necessary governmental actionsrnon behalf of its citizens.”rnYet, as Jackson wrote in the journal of World Trade Lawrn(Spring 1978), “Despite some occasional misguided or misinformedrnstatements to the contrary, the GATT is a bindingrntreaty obligation accepted by the nations which are ContractingrnParties.” Jackson also wrote, in a 1990 study for the influentialrnWashington-based Institute for International Economics,rnthat “despite cynical statements by members ofrnCongress that GATT rules are ‘irrelevant,’ there are a numberrnof proven instances in which congressional committees andrntheir staff members have taken considerable trouble to tailorrnlegislative proposals to minimize the risk of complaint to thernGATT,”rnThis is how sovereignty will bernlost; not swept away by conqueringrnarmies (at least, notrninitially), but given away byrnthe petty minds of bureaucratsrnand barristers.rnJackson is known for analyzing what he calls the competingrnregimes of “Power-oriented” and “Rules-oriented” diplomacy.rnHere is how he had described the conflict in 1978:rnPower oriented techniques suggest a diplomat asserting,rnsubtly or otherwise, the power of the nation he represents.rnIn general, such a diplomat prefers negotiation asrna method of settling matters, because he can bring tornbear the power of his nation to win advantage in particularrnnegotiations, whether the power be manifested asrnpromised aid, movement of an aircraft carrier, trade concessions,rnexchange rate changes or the like. Needless tornsay, often large countries tend to favor this techniquernmore than small countries; the latter being more inclinedrnto institutionalized or “rule oriented” structures of internationalrnactivity.rnA 1992 study prepared for the Worid Bank, based explicitly onrnJackson’s work, argued that in a system based on negotiationsrnbetween sovereign nations, “Powerful countries would grab thern’gains from trade’ away from the less powerful. .. . GATT rulesrndo not provide limits to national practice, but internationalrnsanction for it. Such rules are not part of the solution, they arernpart of the problem.” However, Jackson had noted eariier thatrnthe main obstacle to reform was “the desire of governments tornmaintain enough freedom or ‘sovereignty’ to deal with the burdensrnof the responsibilities their citizens impose on them.”rnThese concerns “lead governments to be very cautious in furtherrntying their hands through international bodies.”rnAs should be the case. The United States should favor, andrnAUGUST 1996/13rnrnrn