don’t know what we have found. 4. If we figure outnwhat it is, there’s nothing we can do about it. Inneach case, the “it” is an SS-20, the fundamentalnSoviet system constrained by the treaty.nIn other words, the assertion that the INF treaty isnenforceable by the American side is as meaningless as thenproverbial medieval calculation of the number of angels thatncan dance on the head of a pin. The analogy is not spurious,nas the Soviet RSD-10 (SS-20) missile at the heart of thentreaty is as much of a mystery today as it was during thentreaty negotiations in Geneva, when the Soviet side refusednto provide even a photograph of the weapon. When one wasnfinally provided in Washington on the day the treaty wasnsigned, it transpired that the object depicted bore nonresemblance to what the American side had had in mindnduring the negotiations. Another, better quality, imagenfurnished two weeks later confirmed that neither thenproponents nor the opponents of the treaty could havenknown what an “SS-ZO” is.nI dwell on this example because the INF treaty is anmilestone in the history of the West. Not because nevernbefore in history had a peace accord presented suchnopportunity for unilateral deception, but because not sincenthe Dark Ages had free men given wholehearted credencento postulates that they could not prove by experiment ornopenly espoused doctrines that they were powedess tonoppose.nIt is not surprising that a military man like General Rogersnshould be so sensitive to the notion of expediency, politicalnor any other kind. Military men are expected to understandnthe essential difference between tactics and strategy, and thenrisk of confusing the two. Expediency is synonymous withnthat risk.nThe “poisoned pawn” in chess is a textbook example. Byntaking it to avail himself of a tactical benefit, the playernmakes a strategic blunder of which he is unaware and losesnthe game. It is, in fact, impossible to win at chess without thenwill to knowledge that is my subject here, and it is quite clearnthat its cultivation is what constitutes the game. Strategy isnsimply another word for the will to knowledge, whilentactics — unless ruthlessly subordinated to strategy — is simplynanother word for wishful thinking.nMany chess-sets sold in shops these days will include anbooklet on the game, often containing a dozen standardnconseils pratiques. I shall cite the first two:n1. Try to make advantageous exchanges (a rook forna knight for instance) as this will make your taskneasier.n2. When ahead, change off men; when behind,navoid exchanges.nOne need not be more than a beginner to understand thenuniversal strategic truth of this advice. If Jack has ten applesnwhile^Jill has eleven, it is good strategy for wicked Jill tonpersuade dumb Jack that they should eat ten apples each, fornat the end of the day Jill will have something while Jack willnhave nothing. I call Jack dumb because he lacks the will tonknow what will happen at sundown.nI am neither Marcuse in California nor Solzhenitsyn atnHarvard, and the will to knowledge of which I now speak isn18/CHRONICLESnnnnot meant to have ethical, philosophical, or religious overtones.nIf anything, the emphasis here is on “knowledge”nrather than “will,” though certainly each aspect of thennotion deserves a separate commentary.nThe knowledge of Soviet totalitarianism possessed by thenWest’s policymaking establishment is easy enough to assessnwithout recourse to Gallup. I have never met a singlenappointed or elected government official with a workingnknowledge of the Russian language, nor can a singlenjournalist on a British or American “quality newspaper”ncompose a grammatical sentence in Russian. This is roughlynequivalent to the inability of a citizen of a democracy — Mr.nShaw or a Financial Times reporter — to add together twonthree-digit numbers. This, I maintain, is a more fundamentalnindex of strategic failure than the total parliamentarynignorance of defense matters.nHow can, say, a “Gonservative think-tank” develop anninsight into the workings of a totalitarian society andncommunicate it either to the “Tory leadership” or to an”quality newspaper” like the Telegraph if no one along thenway is capable of reading Pravda? A case of the blind leadingnthe blind, as the Gallup poll makes clear, is worryingnenough, but before us are the blind who do not so much asnsuspect that others can see.nOn October 4, 1980, according to a small item in Pravda,nPetr Masherov, First Secretary of Byelorussia, candidatenmember of the Politburo since 1966 and bearer of sevennOrders of Lenin, “tragically perished” in a car accident.nCandidate members of the Politburo do not die in carnaccidents, and the fact that during the ensuing decade non”quality newspaper,” “think-tank,” or “Tory leader” hasnremarked on this, a pivotal juncture in modern Sovietnhistory equivalent to Stalin’s assassination of Kirov, isnemblematic of the ignorance that I seek to establish a priori.nIt can be demonstrated to a native reader of Pravda that onnOctober 21, 1980, when the totally obscure provincialnnamed Mikhail Gorbachev became a full member of thenPolitburo in the ill-fated Masherov’s stead, power in thentotalitarian oligarchy — for the first time in Soviet history —nopenly passed into the hands of the secret police apparatusnheaded by Gorbachev’s mentor Yuri Andropov, while thenactual transfer had taken place under the ailing Brezhnevnseveral years earlier. But to demonstrate this to the reader ofna Western “quality newspaper” is altogether impossible.nThus if Mr. Shaw were unfamiliar with the process. ofnaddition he would not have the slightest interest in thenChancellor’s report.nIam speaking, then, of the existence of a foreign-policynculture sophisticated enough to bear anything remotelynresembling a strategy where totalitarianism is concerned. Nonsuch culture has ever existed in the West, in my view, andnthe chances for its emergence are rapidly diminishing.nSince the autumn of 1917, when the world’s firstntotalitarian society came into being and was perceived as anthreat to the future of individual liberty, democracy’snresponse to its strategy of serial deceptions has been one ofnself-deception. As each new deception was unveiled andnlaunched, usually in the form of an ideological “seed coat”nfor the permanent aim of global expansion, democracy’snpolitical culture proved itself capable of analyzing little moren