cans had never learned to take orders unquestioningly.nBut it was clear to all—nwhile the American soldier may lack aggressivenessnin a pitched battle, he didnnot lack courage.nIn war there is little time for reflection;none must make do with what one has.nConsequently, Allied leaders onlynglanced at the problem and sought tonturn the positive talents of the Americannsoldier to best benefit. Yet the naggingnquestion remained—why was the Americannsoldier defiant on the defensive andnso superb when in a fluid, mobile situation,nbut less effective in a slow, sluggingnbattle? While Professor Weigley raisesnthis question, he does not answer it.nOthers, however, have noted the reluctancenof the American soldier to call outnwhen in combat. S.L.A. Marshall, one ofnthis country’s most astute students ofnwar, observed that small infantry formationsnoften lose their tactical cohesionnupon initial contact with the enemy becausenthe men in the squad or platoonnwould lose contact with one another. Atnthe first crack of a bullet, a soldier wouldnquite correctly and naturally take covernbehind the nearest bush or in the closestnshell hole. But this would often causenhim to lose sight of his comrades evennthough they might be only a few feetnaway. Unwilling to call out to ascertainnthe whereabouts of his fellows, a sense ofnisolation would overcome the soldier andnwith it an enervating fear. Marshallnfound that if the soldiers were taught tonshout to one another and thus demonstratenby the sound of their voices thatnthey were not alone on the battlefield,nthen the unit would keep its cohesionnand would be able to resume its advance.nMarshall’s suggestions were incorporatedninto the army’s training program to goodneffect in the Korean War. Unfortunately,nthe program of the Infantry School atnFort Benning gives no evidence to suggestnthat Marshall’s insights are stillnbeing heeded.nIn autumn 1981 the New York Timesnreported on a conference held in upstatenNew York to discuss the EisenhowernChronicles of CulturenPresidency. In attendance were formernadvisers and friends of the late Presidentnas well as a number of professional historians,nincluding several prominent liberalnscholars. Considering the nature of thengathering, the casual observer would expectnnot only the usual descriptions ofnEisenhower’s warm and engaging personality,nbut also the usual dribble ofn”academic” analyses of Eisenhower asnthe unintelligent, lazy, weak and politicallynunsophisticated President. Butntimes have changed. Since the laten1970’s, a quiet and generally more positivenevaluation of the Eisenhower yearsnhas emerged. Blanche Wiessen Cook’snThe Declassified Eisenhower: A DividednLegacy of Peace and Political Warfare isnan additional contribution to this processnof re-evaluation.nWhat is curious about this re-evaluationnis that it should have taken place atnall. However, in spite of the fact that thenEisenhower years were ones of peace,neconomic prosperity and social progress,nmost of the initial evaluations of PresidentnEisenhower were negative. Indeed,nshortly after he left office, Eisenhowernwas rated 21st among all Presidents, nearnChester Arthur, in a poll conducted bynArthur Schlesinger, Jr.nThe poor appreciation initially accordednthe Eisenhower Presidency by scholarsnstemmed from its success. The academicncommunity was predominantly liberal,neven more so then than now. Rather thannappreciating the Eisenhower achievementsnfor what they were, the academicsnunleashed wild expectations amongnAmerican liberals. Subdued for twondecades, first by war and then by thencretinism of “unprogressive” Presidents,nthese expectations were nurtured on thenlegacy of the New Deal and on theoreticalnconstmcts developed in the newly enrichednsocial-science faculties. Suddenlynwith the onset of the New Frontier andnthe Great Society it seemed that allnthese noble dreams at last would benfulfilled. And when these hopes andnwishes were compared against the realitiesnof the Eisenhower Presidency, thenEisenhower tenure seemed dull, trivial.nnndisappointing.nBut while for many the early 60’s werenyears of optimism, the late 60’s and earlyn70’s were ones of increasing disillusionment.nPoverty still existed, illiteracynseemed to be increasing, racial injusticenwas still with us, economic growth wasndecreasing and peace had eluded us fornover a decade. Considered against thisnbackdrop, the achievements of the EisenhowernWhite House are much morenrespectable.nrJlanche Wiessen Cook was atttactednto Dwight D. Eisenhower, the statesman.nTaking advantage of recentlynopened and declassified Eisenhower archives,nBlanche Cook presents a view ofnhim which is distincdy at odds with thenone seen by most academics in the earlyn60’s. For Professor Cook, President Eisenhowern’ ‘was the most undervalued andnmisunderstood statesman of the twentiethncentury.” Although a soldier by profession,nhe was a “presidential pacifist.”nOften perceived as a naive babe in thenwoods. Cook shows that, contrary to thenpopular perception, Eisenhower was politicallynsophisticated and well-informed.nAn incurable romantic, perhaps,nhe believed that men given a fairnchance will ultimately choose good overnevil. What the good was, Eisenhowernnever doubted: the American model, andemocracy with safeguards for individualnliberty and a prosperous economynbased on the principles of free enterprise.nOverall, Eisenhower saw his foreignnpolicy as a propaganda effort to win then”hearts and minds” of the world awaynfrom the pernicious influence of communism.nBut Eisenhower, the Presidentialnpacifist, also understood the efficacy ofnforce, which he felt was most effectivenwhen it was not used but threatened. Tondate, most of the historical re-evaluationsnof Eisenhower have focused primarily onnhis foreign-policy accomplishments.nOne can only hope that further studiesnsuch as Blanche Cook’s will emerge thatnwill focus on other aspects and so providenus with a fuller, more accurate picture ofnthe Eisenhower Presidency. Dn