to conduct such a campaign.nOf the three army group commandersn(General Sir Bernard Montgomery, GeneralnOmar Bradley and General JacobnDevers) directly subordinate to Eisenhower,nMontgomery emerges as the mostnable Allied field commander. Montgomerynwas a consummate maneuverntheorist. General Eisenhower’s assessmentnof Omar Bradley as the best Alliednfield commander in Europe is not sharednby Weigley, who sees Bradley’s leadershipnas seriously flawed. In particular, hentakes Bradley to task for diverting an entirencorps and 25,000 tons of ammunitionnfor the capture of the port city ofnBrest, while 800 kilometers to the east,nthe main body of Allied forces was unablento exploit the German retreat intonthe Low Countries because of an acutenshortage of manpower and ammunition.nThis allowed the Germans valuable timento regroup and strengthen defenses.nWhen the Allied forces resumed the offensive,nthe Germans were able to extractna higher toll in Allied lives. As for thencapture of Brest, it was a hollow victory.nGiven Weigley’s passionate supportnof maneuver warfare, one would assumenthe General “Blood and Guts” GeorgenPatton, commander of the Third Army,nwould fit Weigley’s notion of the paragonnmaneuver-warfare commander. Butnwhile Patton’ s generalship was characterizednby heavy emphasis on speed andnmobility, it was also obsessed with occupyingnground rather than with destroyingnenemy forces. Weigley substantiatesnhis argument by pointing out that thenspectacular speed of the Third Army’snadvance across France was accomplishednby the avoidance of fighting. When forcednto stop and fight, the Third Army’snperformance was not quite so impressive.nNevertheless, Patton had a talent fornwaging war. His emphasis on speed andnmobility was reflected in the commonnAmerican soldier, who demonstrated anflair for war on wheels. The Americannsoldier driving a tank or riding in an armorednpersonnel carrier had no peer.nPatton’s genius derived from his abilitynto exploit the innate restlessness of thenAmerican soldier and to channel it into andriving, forward motion. But the Americannsoldier was far from a perfect warrior.nWhen his advance was slowed, and henwas forced to dismount from his armorednpersonnel carrier to fight a pitched battle,nhis aggressiveness waned. For instance,narmy studies showed that only 15nto 30 percent of the infantrymen evernfired their weapons in combat. ThenBritish, and especially Montgomery,nwere openly contemptuous of the Americanninfantry.nSaturday Review, R.I.P.nSaturday Review, the chief organ ofnschmaltz liberalism since the 1940’s, hasnexpired after a few years of terminalnagony that, on occasion, produced morenembarassment than disconsolation. Herenis one of the bereaved, who continues tonspeculate on what SR could do if, bynsome miracle, it had survived, as he confidednit to Time magazine, the notednorgan of moral schlock:n’I like to think oiSaturday Review asnan antidote to the sleaziness that isninvading our national culture, thencult of incoherence, the competitionnto pulverize language and glamorizenbrutality.’ He paused. ‘You bet I amntempted to return. But if I am wise, Inwill suppress the temptation.’nWho is expressing all those proper words,nJOl UNMISMnnnAt first the lack of aggressiveness innthe American soldier was laid to his inexperience.nBut when the condition continuednlong after units were blooded andnexperienced, concern arose even amongnsenior American military leaders. Montgomerynattributed the problem to whatnhe perceived as the poor quality of Americannleadership. Hitler, long advised ofnthe phenomenon by his generals, suggestednthat it was because Americans hadnnever been peasants; as free men, Ameri-nphrases and thoughts: “sleaziness” of thenmodish culture, “cult of incoherence,”n”glamorized brutality” which sound likenthe battle cry of the Chronicles of Culturenor The RockfordPapers since their inception?nWhy none other than Mr. NormannCousins, the longtime, emblematicneditor of SR. Under his stewardship thenjournal became the mouthpiece and PRnagent for the assoned liberations of then1960’s, all dressed in the glittering togsnof hyperhumanitarianism—which,nstrangely enough, always ended upnespousing the kind of pacifism that isnmost approvingly quoted by Pravda andnLiteratumya Gazieta. Did Mr. Cousinsngive some clue to feeling any responsibilitynfor the “sleaziness,” “incoherence” orn”brutality,” all of which his blind obediencento the Liberal Culture’s tenetsnhelped to make triumphant? Unfortunately,nhe gave no hint of remorse, nnwmmmmm^nOctober 198Sn