boring Serbia on the rule of law and thernadvantages of economic integration withrnother Balkan states.rnBoth Prime Minister Racan and PresidentrnMesic are openly pro-European.rnTheir task is easier than it may seem: Allrnof Europe (both East and West) is nowrnruled by recycled leftists and former communistrnfellow travelers, supported byrnglobal plutocrats. Contrary to the claimsrnof many conservatives, Croatia’s newrnrulers are not hypocrites; their policiesrnmesh perfectly with the antistate dogmasrnof old-style Marxism. What internationalrncommunism could not achieve throughrnclass struggle and revolution, modern liberalismrnis attaining through “free” tradernand economic globalism. In a worldrnwithout national boundaries, there is nornpoint in dismantling or safeguardingrnCroatias or Yugoslavias, since they willrnend up as part of a Brussels-based Euroslavia.rnIronicallv, the new Croatian leadersrnowe their current status to Tudjman:rnWithout him, they would be politicallyrnnonexistent. Although dead, Tudjmanrnstill commands respect, especiallyrnamong fellow nationalists —not just inrnCroatia, but in other parts of Europe.rnFor his criHcism of the legacies of Versaillesrnand Yalta, Tudjman was dislikedrnby Western opinionmakers, particularlyrnby historians who had made a career outrnof the myth of antifascism.rnTudjman’s flaw, however, was hisrnprovincialism; he enjoyed a typical balkanesquernlifestyle of nepotism and clannishrnwheelings and dealings. Like the hickrnwho comes to the big city — vi’hetherrnfrom Arkansas to Washington, D.C., orrnfrom the Croatian hinterland to baroquernZagreb—and suddenly assumes the rolernof public servant, Tudjman cherishedrnlavish and extravagant parades which costrnCroaha a great deal of money. He soonrnbecame a strongman presiding over anrnimpoverished Central European bananarnrepublic, characterized by a deepeningrnrift between a handful oinouveaux richesrnand a growing number of working poor.rnSurrounded by cronies and yes-men,rnTudjman gradually retreated into hisrnglass tower; despite frequent televisedrnhomilies to the Croatian people, his bodyrnlanguage and political preferences couldrnnot hide his Homo sovieticus-balcanicusrncore. Thus, Tudjman’s provincialismrnpaved the way for the leftist palace revolutionrnthat took place after his death.rnThe task of the new government willrnnot be easy. It has inherited ten billionrndollars of foreign debt, 30-percent unemployment,rnan economy that has beenrnstagnant for the past five years, and enormousrnfrustration among ordinar)’ people.rnYet most Croats, at least by Eastern Europeanrnstandards, live well: Per-capita incomernis higher than anywhere else inrnEastern Europe, and Zagreb is visiblyrncleaner and more European than anyrnother city in Western Europe or NorthrnAmerica.rnCroatia’s new elites are mistakenrnabout the West’s boundless benevolence.rnThey believe that foreign aid will pour inrnfrom the United States and the EuropeanrnUnion. The reality, however, is thatrnmore and more Croats face the cutthroatrngame of the free market. The averagernCroat does not care about the Westernrnobsession with self-censorship, politicalrncorrectness, and ethnic quotas. He simplyrnwants to live well, like his virtual rolernmodels on Melrose Place reruns.rnThe new government in Croatia willrnalso have to decide how to deal withrnBosnia-Hercegovina. Not only is Bosniarnpopulated by three irreconcilable peoples,rnwith three different historical narratives,rnit also provides a training ground iorrnthousands of U.N. troops who seek tornprop up a multiethnic utopia. Once thernforeign troops evacuate Bosnia, we mayrnsee a renewed Balkan killing field, withrnconsequences that could spread all thernway from Istanbul to Marseille andrnFrankfurt. Bosnia’s high unemploymentrn(70 percent), its war-torn infrastructure,rnand the lingering intra-ethnic hatred ofrnits three peoples could make it the catalystrnfor the balkanization of all of Europe.rnHence, Croat nationalists oddly regardrnthe recently departed Slobodan Milosevicrnas the only standardbearer of true nationalrnindependence in the Balkans today.rnThe rump Yugoslavia is the onlyrncountry in Europe that has rejected thernglobalist game and managed to slow thernrising Muslim tide in Europe.rnAlthough Croatia’s ruling coalitionrnsuccessfully dislodged Tudjman’s part’,rnits rank and file is riven with internal divisions.rnThis patchwork of six bickeringrnparties is held together by electoral spoils,rnministerial appointments, and deep resentmentrnof Tudjman’s past glon’. Thernnew government has nothing to offer exceptrnopening Croatia to more Westernrninfluence with all of its devastating effects,rnincluding drug abuse and prostitution.rnThe new leftist elite (despite its occidentalrnand ultraliberal verbal veneer) isrnan offshoot of the former communist system.rnIt desperately seeks Western approval,rnyet it does not seem to realize thatrnneither the European Union nor Americanrntaxpayers will provide a free lunch.rnThe West will make some gestures ofrngood will and deliver occasional sermonsrnon the necessity of upholding marketrndemocracy in the region. But at whatrnprice? The imported liberal experimentrncannot last. The new government is beingrnpressured by the West to encouragernforeign investment, yet it cannot affordrnthe luxury of downsizing the huge staternbureaucracy inherited from the Yugoslavrncommunist system. Even Tudjman,rnfearing social unrest, did not dare tacklernthis explosive issue. Croatians are notrnwilling to wait another ten years for anrneconomic miracle. Moreover, nobodyrncan predict the actions of the wealthy,rnconservative Croatian diaspora or thernsolidly entrenched, right-wing nationalistrnparties at home.rnThe biggest problem confrontingrnCroatia (and all countries in the region)rnis the pervasive communist mindset,rneven among Croats who profess genuinelyrnanticommunist sentiments. Thisrnschizophrenic worldview is widely ignoredrnby the Western scholars and politiciansrnwho harp on institutional and legalisticrnmeasures that will rapidly establishrnmarket democracy. However, tolerancernand civil societ)’ cannot be decreed byrnthe United States or the United Nations,rnand liberal democracy cannot be learnedrnovernight by people who have spent generationsrnunder communism. An Americanrnor German conservative may bragrnabout having read Stephane Courtois’rnBlack Book, and he may be able to maprnevery nook and cranny of the Gulag. Butrnimless he lived under communism, hernwill not be able to comprehend the distortedrnmindset of the citizens of postcommunistrncountries. Haifa centur’ of communistrnlaziness, the transvaluation of allrnvalues, and the depletion of Eastern Europe’srngene pool have completelv ruinedrnthe prospects of forging a civil societ’—atrnleast for the next hundred vears. In therndecades to come, in Croatia andrnthroughout Eastern Europe, the communizedrnmasses will continue to cr)’ out forrneconomic securit}’, rejecting Western notionsrnof self-initiative and ciic responsibility.rnWestern entrepreneurs will findrnHomo sovieticus is not extinct and will bernforced to reassess their investments. A citizenrnin postcommunist Croatia, or elsewherernin Eastern Europe, cannot changernDECEMBER 2000/41rnrnrn