winning the next election in 2001, OnernNation retains the status it had beforernOctober 3: as the only parliamentary vehiclernleft for mobilizing Middle AustralianrnRadicals, hi this respect, the recentrnpoll changed nothing. Thoserncommentators who imagine that OnernNation without Mrs. Hanson will resemblerna headless chicken fail to comprehendrnthe simple statistic which drove thernEconomist, in its October 10-16 issue, tornsqueaks of editorial horror: Of the 12rnmillion Australians who cast their ballotsrnin October, one million voted for Hanson-rnendorsed candidates. Despite dailyrnabuse of their beliefs in radio and televisionrnbulletins, despite Labor-Liberalrnsweetheart deals for which no one everrnhad an opportvnity to vote, one millionrnAustralians still wanted “a choice, not anrnecho.”rnThe brutal truth of what this means tornthe big parties —the National Partvrnabove all—was acerbically expressed byrnBill Gossage, a farmer of western NewrnSouth Wales who recentiy emerged as arnHansonite after having campaigned forrndecades on the Nationals’ behalf hi thernSydney Morning Herald on July 1, Mr.rnGossage excoriated Primary IndustryrnMinister John Anderson, within whosernelectorate he lives. ‘Teople in the bush,”rnhe observed,rnare angrier [with Anderson and hisrnfellow Nationals] than they everrnwere with Labor. This is becausernin the minds of bush voters Laborrnwas always expected to be the baddie.rn. . . Wlien I went to see Andersonrnto complain about the guns issue,rnhe asked me: “Who elsernwould you vote for?” By Christ, hernwouldn’t ask us that now.rnR.]. Stove writes from Sydney, where hernedits the subscription-based Internet magazinernCodex FromrnGermanyrnby Josef SchiisslbumerrnWhat Kohl MinedrnThe recent German federal electionrnbrought the remarkable defeat of ChancellorrnHelmut Kohl and his party, thernChristian Democratic Union (CDU),rnand the establishment of the most leftwingrnparliament and government in thern50-year history of the Federal Republicrnof Germany. The drag of incumbencyrn—Kohl had spent 16 years in office —rndoes not provide the essential explanationrnof this smashing defeat: MinisterrnPresident Ran of North Rhine-Westphalia,rnthe most populous state, has hadrna 24-year tenure and is likely to succeedrnMr. Herzog as the federal president nextrnyear.rnTo be sure. Kohl has been the bestrnGerman chancellor “the world” —i.e.,rnthe United States, United Nations, andrnNATO—has ever seen. His major devotionrnwas to Europe: originally a typicalrnCDU concept that provided a substituternfor the lost Reich, this idea has been pervertedrnin the whole of Europe, especiallyrnafter the collapse of the Soviet Union, intornan expression of the internationalismrnwith which Chancellor Kohl was increasinglyrnassociated. For the sake of thisrn”Europe,” Kohl was willing to abandonrnhis country’s own currency in oppositionrnto a clear-cut majority of the Germanrnelectorate. Kohl’s defeat is the final resultrnof the increasing gulf between hisrnEurocratic agenda and the interests andrnconviction of his usual constituents.rnSince the opposition parties, includingrnthe victorious Social Democratsrn(SPD), did not oppose the introductionrnof the euro, one might dispute an explanationrnthat bestows too much importancernon the issue of the abolition of therndeutschemark. The problem is that thernonly parties that openly opposed the eurornwere on the right. Germans are wellrnaware that every right-wing party, if closernto meeting the five-percent threshold requiredrnfor parliamentary representation,rnis considered by the “international community”rnas Hitler’s heir apparent. (AlthoughrnHitier never regarded himself asrna “right-wing” politician, the ideologicalrncontiol agencies of the American occupationrnforces in Germany, advised byrntheir communist experts, decided otherwise.)rnKohl’s left-centrist regime relegitimizedrnthe radical left, subjected rightwingrnparties to secret-service observationrnand manipulation, disciplined civil servantsrnwith known right-wing convictions,rnand persecuted those who expressedrn”wrong thoughts” about immigrants, immigrationrnpolicy, or the holocaust. A recentrnFrench study charged Germanyrnwith greater political persecution than inrnthe final period of communist East Germanyrn—yet unlike in the dubious case ofrnthe Scientologists, zealous human-rightsrnactivists have remained silent. Mindfulrnof the squeeze put on (largely Germanspeaking)rnSwitzerland, many Germansrnwere unwilling to put their economicrnwell-being, already endangered by nearlyrn30 years of liberal budgetary policy, atrnrisk by voting their real convictions,rnwhich would have invited a round ofrnGerman-bashing in the United Statesrnand in those areas that are considered thern”world community.”rnIn contrast to Kohl, the candidate ofrnthe SPD, Gerhard Schroder, indicated arnlack of enthusiasm for the euro, althoughrnit was quite clear that, at this late date,rnthe “international community” wouldrnnot permit the scrapping of the new currency.rnHaving no other choice due tornthe international Einbindung (one ofrnKohl’s favorite terms with respect to Europe,rnmeaning something like “incorporationrnwith fetters”), the Germans, not effectivelyrnallowed to vote for the right,rndecided to punish the man who madernthe euro “irreversible”: Chancellor Kohl.rnGerman voters were attracted decisivelyrnby a very cunning move by challengerrnSchroder: He hired a GermanrnJew who resides in New York as his culturalrnaff^airs manager. Being Jewish, Mr.rnMichael Naumann was allowed to announcernthat he opposed the elaboraternholocaust memorial that Kohl desired tornerect in the center of Berlin. In response.rnKohl made the mistake of statingrnthat forsaking that project would be resolutelyrnopposed by the (American) “EastrnCoast,” not usually a constituency for arnGerman politician. The prospect (not atrnall a pledge) that Schroder’s victoryrnwould avert perpetual redemption paymentsrnby Germans contributed morernthan anything else to Kohl’s election defeat,rnoverriding all the objections thatrn36/CHRONICLESrnrnrn