tional and gutted Franklin Roosevelt’snNew Deal in the name of the protectionnof property rights and the search-andseizurenclause of the Constitution. Bynwhat right did the Court do this? Frankfurter,nfollowing Oliver WendellnHolmes, argued that the American judiciarynhad no such right, that it ought notnto invalidate laws enacted by legislaturesnand signed by executive authorities unlessnthose laws were manifestly irrational.nFrankfiirter followed this doctrine whilenon the Supreme Court and thus cameninto deep conflict with Warren, whonplunged the Court into a reckless attemptnto reform American societynwithout regard for tradition or consistency.nThe Warren Court, in its search fornperfect justice, perpetuated a grave injusticenof its own: namely, the tyranny ofnthe judges themselves. That Warren onlynaccidentally became a tyrant, that henacted out of a sense of his own perceptionnof fairness, does not lessen the fact of thentyranny.n1 here is a law above the law, St. Augustinenasserted, and the Western ttaditionnhas echoed this from Moses and thenprophets through Plato and Aristotle,nJesus of Nazareth, the Stoics, thenMedieval Schoolmen, Grotius, Locke,nRousseau, to our own day. But when thisninsight is used as a means of settlingnpolitical controversy, or as a means tonmanage legal conflicts, difficulties arise.nLacking a universally recognized sourcenor authority of natural right, yet convincednthat our legal system is meaninglessnunless it reflects some higher law, thenSupreme Court makes decisions thatnbecome not exercises in ideal justice, butnarbitrary ukases based on the judges’nsubjective preferences. There is a lawnabove the law, but what is its best enunciation?nThe Warren Court believed thatnequality, uniformity of process, andnfairness for individuals were the values bynwhich our laws should be judged andnwhich should be injected into the veinsnof our legal system. Other courts haventhought differently, holding a view ofnthe “law above law” based on propertyn14nChronicles of Culturenrights, for instance. Holmes thought thatnthe only solution, given our pluralism, isnfor the Court to restrain itsefffrom strikingndown laws based on a theory ofnpolitics. In a famous dissent. HolmesnLife in the ArchivesnRichard Nixon: Leaders; WarnernBooks; New York.nby Bryce Chiistensennin 1621 Francis Bacon was forcednout of England’s highest legal office bynenemies who discovered that he was acceptingngifts rather carelessly fromnanyone who cared to give them—includingnplaintiffs. In his mandatednretirement from politics. Bacon turnednto writing about one of the most importantnpublic figures of the previousntwo centuries in his The History ofnHenry VII. In 1974 Richard Nixon wasncompelled to leave America’s highestnoffice when his foes discovered that henapparently had some part in the attemptnto cover up the petty burglariesnand wire-tapping perpetrated by his subordinates.nOut of power, Nixon, likenBacon, has turned to writing aboutnpolitical helmsmen of the past in hisnLeaders. Though Nixon commandsnneither the virtues of thought nor ofnstyle which have immortalized “thentrumpeter of the new age,” he does enjoynan advantage over Bacon: whereas Baconnknew the founder of the Tudor dynastynonly through documents, Nixon knewnde Gaulle, Churchill, Khrushchev, andnthe other world leaders he portrays personally.nIndeed, it is Nixon’s personal involvementnwith his subjects that accountsnfor most of the strengths—as well as a fewnof the deficiencies—of his depictions.nIn evaluating Churchill as a historian,nNixon comments: “I have found him tonbe a much better writer when describingnMr. Christensen is an editorial intern atnthe Chronicles.nnnremarked that the “Fourteenth Amendmentndoes not enact Mr. HerbertnSpencer’s Social Statistics.” Neither doesnit enact Prof. John Rawls’s Theory ofnJustice. Dnevents in which he was not directly involved.n. . . Churchill’s reflections andnobservations often get in the way.” Atntimes the reader may wish to turn thisnevaluation back on Leaders. RichardnNixon is in the background of all the portraitsnand occasionally steps into the foreground,nobscuring our view of the statesmannunder consideration. The potentiallynpoignant conclusion of de Gaulle’snfuneral, for example, is ruined for narratornandttiAtt when the description ofn”the stirring strains of ‘The Marseillaise’n” is gratuitously intermpted by annaccount of how “another foreign guest,noblivious of the music, reached out tongrab [Nixon’s] hand.” But more oftennNixon’s personal “reflections and observations”ndo not “get in the way” butnrather illuminate it. When, for instance,nhe describes how he carefully preparednwelcoming remarks for Churchill butn