cent of his income was spent on servicingnold debts. The Spanish national debtnled direcdy to a reduction in the numericalnstrength of the Spanish army: fromn300,000 in the l630’s to 50,000 by 1700.nDuring this same period efforts toncontrol the manufacture of arms innplaces like Liege commonly caused disruptionsnin operations. The only way thenKing of Spain could ensure an adequatensupply of arms was to leave the manufacturersnalone and pay their price. Bynthe end of the 17th century the rulers ofnEngland, France, and Germany hadn”ceased to struggle gainst the constraintsnof the market.” They came to realize thatnconfiscatory taxation was counterproductive,nthat equitable taxes actually increasednthe national wealth and thenstate’s revenues. The technical innovationsnof the European powers caused annastonishing economic growth and allowednthem to expand their powernacross the face of the earth. The exceptionnis, of course, Russia, where timidnbureaucrats could not afford to take risks.nSo long as European military techniquesnremained fairly stable—^as in the periodnbetween 1736 and 1853—^Russia, withnher enormous resources, could afford tonbe stodgy. But in a period of irmovationn—after 1853—the Russians fell farnbehind. Is this a lesson for our SALTnnegotiators?nIn the past 100 years Europe and thenU.S. have been turning away from thenfree market. Up to a point, the resurgencenof command economics may have beennnecessary. The high prices and greatncapital risks of new weapon systemsnmake a close cooperation between businessnand government inevitable, but thensocial cost has been great. Britain innWorld War I first worked out the wellare/nwarfare linkage which dominates all thenmajor powers today. It was realized, bynthe likes of Uoyd-George, that “an alloutnarms race could be conducted onlynby a government prepared to intervenendrastically in prevailing socioeconomicnrelationships.” This meant not only progressiventaxation but a steady increasenin the role of government in everydaynItfe. The pace of these developments acceleratednduring World War II. After thenwar, command technology methodsnwere applied to reconstruction: “Managedneconomies became normal… freedomncollapsed into obedience and conformitynto bureaucratically channelednbehavior.” The frightening part is thenrole played by patriotic conservatives,nwhose consciences were quieted by thenreflection that all the changes were onlyn”temporary measures.” McNeill’s evidencencan be taken as an illustration ofnGabriel Marcel’s contention that “thenexcessive and unhealthy developmentnbrought about in the military machine,non its administrative side, by the latenwar, will prove to have exercised annalmost entirely evil effect on humannrelationships and to have played a considerablenpart in bringing into beingnthose new conditions of life of whichnalmost all of us complain.”nWhatever the “right” of the matter,nthe state’s wholesale intervention in theneconomy is seldom productive. And yetnhardly anyone—certainly not antiwarn”liberals”—^is proposing to reduce thenrole of the state. But these same liberalnpacifists are very eager to restrict thenstate’s generally unchallenged right toncall upon all able-bodied men to defendntheir country. James F. Childress, a professornof “religious studies and medicalneducation,” discusses the issues of “nonviolence,nwar, and conscience” in a setnof essays, Moral Responsibility innConflicts.nChildress argues that nonviolence hasnmoral priority over violence because itnis man’s nature to trust, like BlanchenDubois, to the kindness of strangers.nNonviolent resistance to “evil” is an appealnto conscience, an attempt to “evokentrust.” In the case of war, there is a presimiptionnthat violent solutions arenwrong because of our “prima &cie dutynnot to kill or injure others.” Therefore,nwar must be justified by the state whichncompels its citizens to participate. Thencriteria for a “just war” include the legitimatenauthority of the state, a reasonablennnchance of success, a proportionality betweennrisks and rewards, and right intention.nIn handling draft resistance basednon appeals to conscience, “the state hasnto show that a compelling interest cannotnbe met in alternative ways to avoidninjury to conscience.” Since Childress’sncase for conscience rests on trust, morenparticularly trust in strangers, it is feir tonask how much men really do trust eachnother. Even in our own deracinated society,nwe do not typically trust strangersnif we can avoid it. We limit our confidencenas much as possible to membersnof family, community, or interest groupsnto which we belong. Childress borrowsnthe example of a mother entrusting hernchild to a baby-sitter. But no sensiblenmother employs a total stranger; she reliesnon a network of friends and relationsnfor recommendations. It is true thatntrust binds people together into community,nbut it also pits them againstnoutsiders.nThe moral priority of nonviolencenneeds to be established on a firmer foundationnthan trust. Childress never considers—evennfor the sake of argument—nthe case that has been made for violencenSend for your complimentaryncopy of The Rockford Institute’snAnnual Report featuringnthe work of the eminentnartist and designer WarrennChappell.nMail this coupon to:nThe Rockford Instituten934 North Main StreetnRockford, IL 61103nNamenAddressnCity State ZipnJuly 1983n