rect lineage of the American populistrntradition. Unlike Lawrence Goodwyn,rnfor example, he does not try to find perfectrnfits between agrarian radicals livingrnin late 19th-century Nebraska and Mississippirnand the academic liberals of thern1990’s. Kazin understands that, by thernstandards of Tikkun, both the populistrnrank and file and leadership of the 1890’srnwere—culturally, at least—to the rightrnof anyone he is likely to meet in the NewrnYork-D.C. corridor. Fundamentalists,rnnativists, and antimodernists swelled thernpopulist legions, and not surprisingly thernpopulists whom Kazin finds most attractivernare those who became Progressives,rnlike Senator George Norris of Nebraska.rnWhat concerns the political class isrnthat populism rejects outright the synthesisrnof “liberal democracy.” That is tornsay, while populists have no problemrnwith accepting majority rule within definablerncommunities, they scorn the liberalrnelites which claim the right to governrneveryone else. Around the turn of therncentury it was a bourgeois elite againstrnwhich the populists arose. Thus the demandrnfor self-government expressed itselfrnas a desire for local or state economicrncontrol over utilities and transportation.rnBack then the Plains States and thernDeep South felt themselves captive tornthe big business and banking monopoliesrnof the Northeast and Upper Midwest.rnAnd if one looks at the differentialrnrail rates prevalent at the time, one seesrnthat business interests in some sectionsrnof the country were out to keep the otherrnsections impoverished. The populistsrnsought to deal with that situation byrn”taking back for the people what isrntheirs”: that is, the right to be economicallyrnas well as politically free of parasiticrnoutsiders. While it is possible to counterrnby pointing to conceivable long-termrnbenefit from the monopolies which thernpopulists opposed, e.g., higher productivernefficiency at the national level, thatrnis not what the populists wanted. Theyrndemanded control of their lives as membersrnof an endangered, predominantlyrnagrarian and small-town America.rnToday’s populists are also fighting torntake back what is theirs, though not whatrnKazin and other modern liberals wouldrnlike them to have. Feminists, gay-libbers,rnand social planners could not control thernoutcome of such an experiment; therncontributors to Tikkun would suffer coronaryrnocclusion if judicial racial engineeringrnwere ended in the United States.rnKazin makes much of the “postmodernrndisenchantment with fixed concepts andrnuniversal dreams.” He believes this mayrnbe a cause of the difficulty faced by hisrnown kind of folk in activating a sense ofrnpublic commitment. In point of fact,rnpopulists do not suffer from the semanticrnskepticism to which Kazin refers.rnThey speak about nations, regions, andrnmoral habits in addressing those whornparticipate in their own regional andrncultural communities. Moreover, theyrnrepresent a Euro-American reaction torn”human rights” and the fruits of “compassion.”rnThe populists in the UnitedrnStates, France, Northern Italy, andrnSouthern Austria want none of liberalism’srnsocial blessings, because of thernexorbitant price attached to them. Theyrnare certainly not interested in providingrnsocial services for those illegally transplantedrninto their midst or in developingrnmulticultural sensitivity. They are furiousrnabout public administrators andrnjudges using what Kazin calls “unpopulistrnlevers” to inflict their undemocraticrnwill upon helpless taxpaying citizens.rnThere are two errors in Kazin’s historyrnof populism which require mention.rnFirst, he stresses excessively the economicsrnof populism in the present age,rnparticularly in trying to show how thernleft might reconnect with populistrnneeds. But, as Paul Picconc properlyrnnotes, contemporary populism is primarilyrnabout politics and culture, and onlyrnderivatively economic. Populists by nowrnare less interested in distributing GNPrnthan they are in making government accountablernto its supposed masters. Populistsrnbelieve that politicians and administratorsrnshould serve them, and not tryrnto resocialize the public. They representrna late 20th-century response, often angryrnand sometimes incoherent, against thernequation of modern democracy withrnpublic administration. Populists insistrnthat democracy is about authorized citizensrngoverning themselves, and notrnabout them being managed or indoctrinatedrnby a master class; especially by onernwhose beliefs and loyalties are differentrnfrom their own.rnSecond, Kazin perceives too muchrnracism and racial resentment in the originsrnof the postwar conservative movement.rnOn this point he is not entirelyrnconsistent; he does point out correctlyrnthat Goldwater and many of his followersrnopposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964rnbecause of their concerns for propertyrnand constitutional issues. He also notesrnthe importance of anticommunism andrnthe anxiety about union power in analyzingrnthe components of postwar conservatism.rnNonetheless, he keeps returningrnto George Wallace’s right-wing populism,rnmixed with racial animosity, as arnparadigm of conservative politics.rnKazin fails to note that Wallace andrnthe Wallaeeites were an unpleasant diversionrnfrom business as usual for mainstreamrnconservatives. That businessrnof course was the protracted strugglernagainst the communist evil empire. Inrn1968 Frank Meyer made precisely thisrnpoint in National Review when he urgedrnconservatives to vote for Richard Nixonrnand against George Wallace. Meyer depictedrnWallace as a New Deal Democratrncapitalizing on class resentment, who,rnunlike Nixon, did not embody thern”mainstream of Western civilization,”rnwhich was Christian anticommunism.rnWallace, Meyer argued, was distractingrnthe right from the enemy at our gatesrnand threatened to siphon off votesrnhom the Republican Party to the advantagernof a tepid Cold Warrior, HubertrnHumphrey.rnKazin ought to read conservativerncolumnists and politicians of the 60’s.rnHe might find himself surprised to discoverrnhow predominant a theme thernCold War was for them: everything elsernin the way of postwar conservative principlerncould be compromised. Conservativesrnof the period viewed the civil rightsrnmovement differently at different times,rndepending on whether its critics or alliesrnwere more useful in pursuing an anticommunistrnstrategy. William F. Buckley,rnfor example, went from being hostilernto Martin Luther King, Jr., to flatteringrnhis memory profusely. In both cases, thernallies whom Buckley made in his careerrnas a militant Gold Warrior were the criticalrnvariable.rnKazin confuses conventional conservatismrnwith right-wing populism,rnthough they are clearly two differentrnthings. While the Deep South was vitalrnfor Goldwater in 1964, the electoral overlaprnbetween anticommunist Republicanismrnand the populist right was thernresult of an electoral conjuncture of circumstances.rnThe opponents of the civilrnrights movement and of federal socialrnengineering had no one better to vote forrnin 1964 than a Gold War activist who opposedrnthe Civil Rights Acts because ofrnhis views on property. But the “MiddlernAmerican Radicalism” that DonaldrnWarren has located within modern populismrnhas nothing to do with the combi-rn32/CHRONICLESrnrnrn