them, exploit them, and dispossess them. They are at once thenreal victims of the regime and the core or nucleus of Americanncivilization, the Real America, the American Nation.nThroughout this century, Middle Americans have graduallynacquired a collective consciousness, an awareness of who theynare and what their position is in the regime that exploits them.nIn economically prosperous periods, the radicalism of thatnconsciousness is largely dormant, but in the Depression, theninflationary crunch of the 1970’s, and the recessions of thenearly 1980’s and the early 1990’s, material insecurity hasnserved as a trigger for a heightened consciousness, a radicalization,na sharper self-perception of their plight. Neithernliberalism and the ideologies of the left nor mainstreamnconservatism, an entrepreneurial version of classical republicanism,nadequately expresses their plight or their interestsnand values or offers much of a solution.nThe left offers nothing but economic redistribution predicatednon egalitarian and universalist dogmas, and in practicenthis means that liberal-left policies reflect the interests ofnthe nonwhite underclass and the intelligentsia that designs thenformulas and policies of the left. Hence, the left is incapablenof defending the specific interests and concrete culturalnnorms of Middle Americans. The right, though it defends (inntheory) Middle-American cultural norms and institutions,noffers a vision of decentralism, strict constitutionalism, economicnindividualism, and a minimal state that fails to speak tonMiddle-American material interests and the challenges thatnthey typically encounter. What Middle Americans need is a politicalnformula and a public myth that synthesize the attentionnto material-economic interests offered by the left with the defensenof concrete cultural and national identity offered bynthe right. The division of the American political spectrumninto the categories of right and left makes the politicalnexpression of such a formula virtually impossible.nThe appropriate formula for the expression of Middle-Americannmaterial interests and cultural values is nationalism. Thenmanagerial state and its linked economic and cultural structuresnhave succeeded in breaking down the regional variations, localnand sectional autonomy, and institutional stability and independencenof Middle Americans, and the regime nownlurches happily toward a globalization that seeks to integratenall Americans (and all other peoples as well) into a planetarynpolitical, economic, demographic, and cultural order in whichnnational identity will eventually disappear entirely. Thenhomogenization of subnational social and regional differencesnthrough political centralization, urbanization and mobility, massncommunications, and mass consumption and production meansnthat the older, decentralized identities of particular socialnclasses, sections, communities, and religious and ethnic groupsnno longer effectively mobilize Americans for political action.n• Identities as Southerners or Midwesterners, Catholic or Protestant,nAnglo-Saxon Old Stock or European ethnic, small businessmannor assembly-line worker, no longer seem to offer sufficientnbonds or common interests for serious political cooperationnfor any goal beyond immediate special interests. The emergingnidentity, of Middle America, however, appears to convey sufficientnmeaning to serve as the foundation of a politicallynand socially important force, and a nationalism that is politicallynand culturally based on Middle Americans, expressesntheir material interests, and affirms their cultural norms as thendominant public myth of American civilization is today the onlynpossible vehicle for effective resistance to managerial glob-n20/CHRONICLESnnnalism and the national and cultural extinction it threatens.nMoreover, only nationalism seems capable of organizing offensivelynon a collective scale. One reason for the failure of classicalnrepublicanism and similar decentralist movements was thatnthey were capable of only defensive maneuvering and were nevernable to overcome divisions of particular and divergent interestsnand identities sufficiently to organize an effective offensive strategynaimed at dominance rather than mere survival and liberty.nThe defensive strategy mounted by the Confederacy duringnthe Civil War was one of the main reasons for its militaryndefeat, and similar defensiveness has crippled conservativentactics as well. Activated only by immediate threats to local ornprivate interests, conservative forces have organized mainlynaround striking personalities and “single issues”—tax revolts,nreligious and social issues of largely sectarian concern, antibusingnand educational movements, anticommunism, deregulation,nterm limits—and they tend to disband or withernwhen their favorite personality is elected or the threats tontheir immediate interests and pet causes seem to be pushednback. Nationalism, through its historically proven capacity tonmobilize passions of mass solidarity and sacrifice and its aggressiveninvocation of collective identity, offers a practical instrumentnfor overcoming the burden of a purely defensive conservatismnand aspiring to enduring cultural and political power.nThe old nationalism of the Hamiltonian tradition will notnsuffice for this purpose, however. It was the explicitnmission of Hamiltonian nationalism to obliterate what Hamilton’snbest and most recent biographer, Forrest McDonald,ncalls “the inertia of a social order whose pervasive attributesnwere provincialism and lassitude.” The means by which Hamiltonndetermined to accomplish that “revolutionary change”nwas money—^wealth, economic growth—aided and supportednby the national state. “To transform the established order,”nwrites Professor McDonald,nto make society fluid and open to merit, to make industrynboth rewarding and necessary, all that needed to bendone was to .monetize the whole—to rig the rules ofnthe game so that money would become the universalnmeasure of the value of things. For money is obliviousnto class, status, color, and inherited social position;nmoney is the ultimate, neutral, impersonal arbiter. Infusedninto an oligarchical, agrarian social order, moneynwould be the leaven, the fermenting yeast, that wouldnstimulate growth, change, prosperity, and nationalnstrength.nBut by making money “the universal measure of the valuenof things,” the defining principle of the national identity,nand joining it to centralized power, Hamilton ultimately defeatednhis own purposes. In the first place, because his nationalismnset itself against existing social institutions and habits, it wasnnecessarily alienated from and adversarial toward the norms bynwhich most Americans lived, and its alienation has persisted forntwo centuries to inform the cultural style and attitudes of thendominant elites of the managerial system toward the rest of thencountry. Secondly, because his nationalism was based on thenabstraction of money, it was unable to win the support of anynbut economically ambitious Americans and unable to expressnor sustain a genuinely national or even any genuine socialnbond. Hence, Hamilton’s nationalism—rational, calculative,n